Disease Exposure Control
Draft as of November 2, 2005
A Draft Prepared by:
The Center for Strategic & International Studies
Homeland Security Program
This document is a draft of Model Operational Guidelines for Disease Exposure Control. It is intended to provide states, cities and counties with guidelines to slow or stop the spread of contagious disease when vaccines or other medical countermeasures are unavailable. The guidelines seek to do so by: (1) describing the tools available to public officials for controlling the spread of disease; (2) discussing key policy issues that should be considered; and (3) suggesting protocols to consider for developing specific plans.
Over the next three months, CSIS will collaborate with the various stakeholders in reviewing and refining this document to ensure that it reflects the best technical, public health, and emergency operations thinking to plan for an outbreak.
For More Information Please Contact:
David Heyman
Director and Senior Fellow
Homeland Security Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006
1 This document was prepared thanks to the generous support of The Stuart Family Foundation. [INSERT: Look up "Truman Anderson" on a search engine to learn more about the Stuart Family Foundation]
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/051102_dec_guidelines.pdf
Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy: David Heyman
David Heyman is the Assistant Secretary for Policy at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Previously, he served as a Senior Fellow and Director of the CSIS Homeland Security Program where he led the CSIS' research and program activities in homeland security, focusing on developing the strategies and policies to help build and transform U.S. federal, state, local, and private-sector homeland security institutions.
Heyman is an expert on terrorism, critical infrastructure protection, bioterrorism, and risk-based security. He has led or contributed to a number of studies on aviation security, nuclear security, bioterrorism preparedness, and pandemic flu planning. He also was the principal architect of, and helped run, "Steadfast Resolve," a cabinet-level tabletop exercise that examined critical decision making at the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council during the next potential terrorist attack. Heyman also is an adjunct professor in security studies at Georgetown University.
Heyman has served in a number of government positions, including as a senior adviser to the U.S. Secretary of Energy and at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy on national security and international affairs. Prior to that, he was the head of international operations for a private-sector software/systems engineering firm developing supply-chain management systems for Fortune 100 firms. He has worked in Europe, Russia, and the Middle East.
Heyman has authored numerous publications, including "America's Domestic Security" in Five Years After 9/11 (CSIS, 2006); Model Operational Guidelines for Disease Exposure Control (CSIS, 2005)—which has been utilized by cities and states across the country and was the basis for some of the government's pandemic flu planning guidance; DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security (CSIS/Heritage Foundation, 2004); and Lessons from the Anthrax Attacks (CSIS, 2002). Heyman has testified before a number of committees in Congress and has appeared in various media outlets including NPR, CNN, BBC, FOX News, and the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer.
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/bio_1248803604384.shtm
Prior to that, he was the head of international operations for a private-sector software/systems engineering firm developing supply-chain management systems for Fortune 100 firms. From my research, and I am asking you guys to use a search engine and confirm it on your own, that the "software/systems engineering firm developing supply-chain management systems" that David Heyman worked for was RGTI Systems Software based in New York, NY. RTGI was bought out by BDM International Inc based out of McLean, VA, (BDM is right DOWN THE STREET/WALKING DISTANCE to Booz Allen Hamilton's HQ!!!) BDM uses Enterprise Architecture software to manage their supply chain systems!!! So this Heyman guy is involved with enterprise architecture, supply chains, flu pandemic planning, CSIS, John P Holdren's office, DHS, and the National Security Council. Holy s**t! | ||||
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Page 40 of PDF Community Quarantines In community quarantine, all persons in a specific area or region, where a high community-wide case count has been identified or where there is potential for widespread exposure, are quarantined. Movement of persons within the community is limited to the area of quarantine—a number of houses, a building complex, a neighborhood, or groups of buildings and/ or neighborhoods. Community quarantine is implemented by arranging a perimeter—a controlled access area—around the region of concern. In outbreaks where health officials have a good understanding of the pathology of the disease and nature of the outbreak, authorities and the public may be more confident that they have delineated the correct boundaries for community quarantine. More likely, however, there will be considerable uncertainty involved in the determination of the precise geographic area to quarantine, which consequently may present greater challenges to public officials trying to reassure an anxious and potentially confused public, who may already be skeptical about the government’s ability to manage the crisis and protect them from further harm. Lastly, because community quarantines are the most sweeping form of quarantine, they will likely be the most difficult to implement and enforce. Legal/ Political Quarantine is one of the more politically sensitive tools that can be employed for disease exposure control. The decision to separate and restrict movement of persons who, for all intents and purposes, are well (by definition they are not ill, but may have been exposed to someone or something that could infect them) raises a number of legal, ethical and ultimately political questions that must be weighed carefully. To the extent possible quarantines should be voluntary. Governments should take steps to induce voluntary compliance by providing adequate care and support so as to help those in quarantine not feel abandoned, psychologically isolated, or unduly burdened. This may require provision of food, health care, the capacity to communicate with friends and family outside of the quarantine, and perhaps even entertainment. It may also require provision of some financial incentives, such as reimbursement for income lost during quarantine (for more discussion on inducing voluntary compliance, see chapter on Toolkit for Compliance). For various reasons, individuals who should be quarantined may not wish to be quarantined. Such individuals may resist quarantine because, for example, they believe they are not sick (or likely to become sick), because they cannot afford to be unpaid for a short period of time, or leave their family unattended; or because they fear being confined in proximity to people who they believe may infect them. In these cases, to protect the public from infection by a possible carrier of disease, officials will need to legally order and enforce the quarantine of individuals. Involuntary quarantine, however, may be viewed as a violation of personal liberty and equivalent to criminal detention. The greatest challenge to officials, then, is balancing the interest of the public being protected from disease, with their interest in preserving individual liberty. In general, public interest can supersede individual rights in order to achieve a common good; but actions to do so must be ethical, even-handed, transparent for all stakeholders, provided for and carried out in accordance with the law, and strictly necessary to achieve the objective. Furthermore, there can be no less intrusive and restrictive means available to reach the same objective.84 Under these circumstances, a social compact forms the basis of action: public health officials have an obligation to restrict certain individual rights to protect the health and well-being of the community; and citizens have a civic duty to comply with them in order to protect their family, friends and the broader health of the community85. When quarantines are required, public officials should inform the public of the threat to their health, communicate the known risks, provide full information about the need for public action, and describe how the government will support individuals whose movement has been restricted. They will also need to ensure that proper legal authorities and procedures are in place to remove and detain suspected or confirmed cases, contacts, or carriers who are or may be endangering public health. Laws that establish the legal basis for government action in these cases must also provide that quarantines can be applied almost anywhere, and not restricted just to hospitals. Who to Quarantine? Anyone who has been exposed or potentially exposed to the infectious agent causing an outbreak should be quarantined. Identifying individuals who may have been exposed may not be easy or even possible. When possible, health officials will need to do the hard work of tracing contacts—tracking down all those who have been in close contact with someone who is known to be sick or infected, and/ or tracking down all those who were in the vicinity where exposure may have occurred (either from the release of a pathogen, or from interaction with known sick or suspected cases)—and quarantining them. When the source of possible infection is known, contact tracing is straightforward, though potentially resource-intensive. Individuals or groups who were exposed or potentially exposed may be asked to stay at home (home quarantine), or to quarantine at a designated facility (facility quarantine). The larger challenge will be quarantining when the source of infection is unknown or there is widespread community transmission. Under these circumstances, it may be difficult or impossible to trace exposures, and larger-scale community quarantine should be contemplated. There is much debate and little agreement about the feasibility and utility of large-scale quarantines. For the most part, this is because in large, heavily-trafficked urban areas with international transportation hubs, people come and go so rapidly that it is virtually impossible to identify who was in a certain location at a certain time at the moment of exposure. That being said, all cities are different; all disease outbreaks unique. The question of large-scale quarantine feasibility will need to be assessed on a case-by-base basis, with consideration of a range of factors related to the degree and speed by which a disease may spread. Such factors include: disease pathology; type of outbreak (deliberate or naturally occurring; if deliberate, single or multiple releases); city size; city density, public transportation volume; level, frequency, and access to transportation (air, land, and sea); scale and frequency of public gatherings; and social customs (e.g., shaking hands, cheek-kissing, wakes at funerals). While few tools exist, it is possible to model these factors from city to city and provide some data for decision-makers to assess the possible spread of an outbreak, and inform decisions on the size and shape of large-scale community quarantines.86 Walden and Kaplan have developed an approach for real-time estimation of the size and time of a bioterror attack,87 from case report data, that is simple enough to implement in a spreadsheet. Their model can help estimate the spread of disease during the first generation of cases for a single-source attack. In cases where the likelihood of disease spread is high or uncertain, or resources to implement large-scale quarantines simply unavailable, more aggressive tools should be contemplated, including initiating restrictions on community activities, and asking the public to shelter-in-place until the scale of the outbreak is determined (see Community Restrictions and Sheltering below). |
QuotePage 40 of PDF
Community Quarantines
... More likely, however, there will be considerable uncertainty involved in the determination of the precise geographic area to quarantine, which consequently may present greater challenges to public officials trying to reassure an anxious and potentially confused public, who may already be skeptical about the government’s ability to manage the crisis and protect them from further harm. Lastly, because community quarantines are the most sweeping form of quarantine, they will likely be the most difficult to implement and enforce.
Legal/ Political
Quarantine is one of the more politically sensitive tools that can be employed for disease exposure control. The decision to separate and restrict movement of persons who, for all intents and purposes, are well (by definition they are not ill, but may have been exposed to someone or something that could infect them) raises a number of legal, ethical and ultimately political questions that must be weighed carefully.
... Involuntary quarantine, however, may be viewed as a violation of personal liberty and equivalent to criminal detention. The greatest challenge to officials, then, is balancing the interest of the public being protected from disease, with their interest in preserving individual liberty.
In general, public interest can supersede individual rights in order to achieve a common good; but actions to do so must be ethical, even-handed, transparent for all stakeholders, provided for and carried out in accordance with the law, and strictly necessary to achieve the objective. Furthermore, there can be no less intrusive and restrictive means available to reach the same objective.84
Who to Quarantine?
... In cases where the likelihood of disease spread is high or uncertain, or resources to implement large-scale quarantines simply unavailable, more aggressive tools should be contemplated, including initiating restrictions on community activities, and asking the public to shelter-in-place until the scale of the outbreak is determined (see Community Restrictions and Sheltering below).
Community Quarantines
... More likely, however, there will be considerable uncertainty involved in the determination of the precise geographic area to quarantine, which consequently may present greater challenges to public officials trying to reassure an anxious and potentially confused public, who may already be skeptical about the government’s ability to manage the crisis and protect them from further harm. Lastly, because community quarantines are the most sweeping form of quarantine, they will likely be the most difficult to implement and enforce.
Legal/ Political
Quarantine is one of the more politically sensitive tools that can be employed for disease exposure control. The decision to separate and restrict movement of persons who, for all intents and purposes, are well (by definition they are not ill, but may have been exposed to someone or something that could infect them) raises a number of legal, ethical and ultimately political questions that must be weighed carefully.
... Involuntary quarantine, however, may be viewed as a violation of personal liberty and equivalent to criminal detention. The greatest challenge to officials, then, is balancing the interest of the public being protected from disease, with their interest in preserving individual liberty.
In general, public interest can supersede individual rights in order to achieve a common good; but actions to do so must be ethical, even-handed, transparent for all stakeholders, provided for and carried out in accordance with the law, and strictly necessary to achieve the objective. Furthermore, there can be no less intrusive and restrictive means available to reach the same objective.84
Who to Quarantine?
... In cases where the likelihood of disease spread is high or uncertain, or resources to implement large-scale quarantines simply unavailable, more aggressive tools should be contemplated, including initiating restrictions on community activities, and asking the public to shelter-in-place until the scale of the outbreak is determined (see Community Restrictions and Sheltering below).
The DHS and other agencies dedicated to 'protecting' the American public NEVER mention the violation of constitutional rights; and by what law they are allowed to violate individual rights, and in what circumstances. They simply and frequently talk about the 'sensitive legal issues', and they always make a statement to the effect that 'we must be careful about the rights of individuals' - without explaining exactly how they intend to protect individual rights.
You can read this PDF in terms of a recipe for handling "Disease Exposure", or you can read this document, along with all of the other documents posted to this forum - the documents describing the control grid, the surveillance economy, the FEMA camps, the revolution in military affairs, and the cybernetics agenda, and see the real 'value' of this outline to those who are afraid of the 2nd amendment. Get a good disease scare going, and you have everyone marching in line to quarantine... the H1N1 False Flag Pandemic may have been a beta test for something they plan to carry out; a bio-terror false flag that would enable 'justifiable' control (takedown) of large geographic sectors of the country. The 'hidden home-grown' terrorist in the form of a virus or bacteria (can't see the little turban and beard)...
So let's cut to the chase - get to the real purpose of this paper: further along on page 64 ...
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II. Enforcing Compliance
When individuals fail to comply with disease exposure control measures—despite public appeals or incentives offered—government officials must consider other more coercive means for enforcing compliance. These can range from warning would-be violators with the prospect of punishment, instituting active monitoring within certain perimeters of communities for possible offenders, and punishing noncompliance with fines and even forcibly detaining and/ or imprisoning violators.
Key Considerations
Law Enforcement
Public safety officers, police, public health officers with police authorities, and other law enforcement officials will have the primary responsibility of enforcing compliance to disease exposure control measures. The National Guard, as long as they are not federalized and thus not bound by posse comitatus, may also support efforts to enforce compliance. Four key issues should be considered: who’s in charge, what are the rules of engagement, how do you ensure proper protective measures, and what other enforcement issues must also be addressed.
• Who’s in Charge. Although public health would likely be the lead agency for managing an outbreak crisis response, law enforcement officials will play a major supporting role in enforcing quarantines and other exposure controls. Specific roles and responsibilities would be determined in collaboration with public health officials but may include: establishing perimeters and maintaining access controls around certain buildings or areas of a city; managing crowds; providing security for medical facilities, health care providers, and shipments of medical supplies; overseeing transportation of affected populations to and from quarantine facilities; and supporting the provision or delivery of medical, food, or other essential services.
• Rules of Engagement. One question that surfaces immediately in discussions on enforcing restrictive measures is when and if lethal force should be employed to protect a vulnerable public from potentially infectious individuals fleeing quarantines? The answer is “no.” First, a guiding principle of law enforcement is to use the least force necessary to subdue possible threats. Second, non-lethal force can be equally as effective as lethal force, without risking the tragic consequences of wrongful arrest or undermining public trust. Third, it is important to understand as rules of engagement are contemplated, that exposure control measures can be effective even if compliance is not 100%. In fact, the benefit of quarantines and other similar restrictive measures tend to reach their maximum benefit at a compliance rate of about 90%.95 So while public compliance with control measures is vitally important, enforcement does not have to be absolute for programs to be effective.
In all instances in which law enforcement officials may engage the public, they should do so with full knowledge of the risks posed to them by infected individuals, and what measures they can and should take to protect themselves from infection. Protocols will be needed for enforcement officers on how to deliver quarantine orders and control access to and from a quarantine facility or area (e.g., stand so many feet away; wear specific protective gear, etc.). Enforcement officers may also need to be prepared to answer a number of key questions:
- What conditions dictate who should be quarantined? For how long?
- What are the rights of families separated by quarantine?
- What punishment will be meted out to escapees?
- Can there be court appeals of quarantined status? How will they work?
- Can there be voluntary quarantine entry?
- What are the rights of foreign nationals?
- Can you hold public health officials liable?
- What are the rights of families regarding burial/ cremation?
95 Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Version 2 (CDC). January 8, 2004.
To better provide health information to those receiving quarantine orders, health officials may also join enforcement officers to deliver orders.
• Protective Measures.
Law enforcement responsible for enforcing restrictions will need to receive education on the disease, on the risks presented by engaging those infected, guidance and training on appropriate protective gear, and will need to recognize that if they engage potentially infected individuals, they too will have to be quarantined, perhaps away from their family.
• Other Enforcement Issues.
Responding to opportunistic crime. While supporting the activities of managing the response to a large-scale infectious disease outbreak, law enforcement officials will still need to respond to common criminal activity, including the possibility of an increase in opportunistic crime—thefts, looting, and other criminal acts that seek to exploit the health emergency.
Coordinating a criminal investigation with other agencies. If it becomes apparent that instances of disease may not be the result of natural causes, the FBI must be notified. The FBI, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts. The Department of Homeland Security in coordination with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services maintains the overall lead in managing the incident response.96 Law enforcement and Public Health officials will need to coordinate with one another and hold joint investigations (epidemiological and forensics) in the event of a deliberate outbreak. Even if the outbreak is widely believed to be naturally occurring, law enforcement officials will likely remain vigilant for any signs that it was indeed deliberate.
Perimeters and Active Monitoring
To keep quarantined individuals in—and healthy individuals out—officials will need to establish controlled access into and out of quarantined areas. Well-controlled access will diminish the likelihood of additional exposures and allow resources to be devoted to other aspects of the response. It also affords temporary access for health care workers and response personnel as needed.
In some cases, access control may be limited to just a single building.
When several buildings are at risk or when community quarantines are warranted, access control may be best accomplished by establishing a secured perimeter with one (or at most a few) entrances/exits. While such restrictions are difficult to imagine, and may well be difficult to implement, it is useful to note that the use of perimeters to restrict movement of the public is not at all uncommon in urban settings. During parades, demonstrations, fires, crime scenes, or for protection of special visitors, law enforcement personnel routinely restrict movement into and out of sensitive areas. Access control for large-scale quarantines could build on those procedures.
Officials must issue appropriate credentials for entry and exit, and strictly enforce the perimeter for anyone who lacks proper credentials. To guard against fraud, credentials should be linked to biometrics and possibly re-formatted on a daily basis. The credentialing process would likely be administered by a central agency—preferably the lead agency responsible for managing the crisis (e.g., office of emergency management). This agency would need to manage the creation and dissemination of access passes, and establish protocols to handle daily exceptions and special requests. It would also need to coordinate with law enforcement or other officials responsible for maintaining the perimeter. Since persons who prematurely leave quarantine also pose a risk transmission to the community, passes are needed to allow those who have completed quarantine to leave the quarantine facility or area.
Key elements of a perimeter include…
1. Transmission Zone within a perimeter
2. Guarded checkpoints/ Monitoring stations/ Access controls
3. Barriers to control flow of traffic
4. Barriers and patrols to enforce flow of pedestrian traffic
5. Protective Zones just outside of perimeter as a buffer for delivery of goods to Transmission Zone and decontamination of people/ transport leaving the Transmission Zone
6. Zones just outside of the buffer/ Protective Zone
Key activities inside the Protective Zone …
1. Credentialing for access to hot zone
2. Monitoring and observation of persons moving between hot and warm zones
3. Supporting the delivery of basic goods and essential services
4. Protecting health care professionals
5. Facilitating sanitation and decontamination activities
6. Maintaining public order
7. Transfer of Goods
8. Decontamination of People
9. Decontamination of Delivery Vehicles, other vehicles
10. Decontamination of Sanitation vehicles
11. Issuance of PPE
12. Possible support of mental health counseling services
13. Ensuring perimeter enforcement
14. Supporting transportation to/ from quarantine facilities
Activities outside the Protective Zone…
1. Gathering goods for delivery
2. Developing information/ guidelines/ public messages and establishing special hotlines/ information dissemination hubs
Movement between Transmission Zone and Protective Zone…
1. Possible transport of symptomatic to isolation
2. Removal of waste
3. Provision of goods
4. Movement of law enforcement/ health care providers/ EMS and service providers
Monitoring of individuals in Transmission Zone…
Officials have a number of technologies available for monitoring and observation. Factors to consider when deciding which technologies to use include the number of personnel required, total expense, overall effectiveness, legal authorities required, and likelihood of public compliance.
A key balance will be between the cost of sophisticated tools and the personnel required for less sophisticated measures. More sophisticated tools may be too costly to implement, but personnel-intensive mechanisms may suffer from a lack of available and trained personnel. Home visits will require much more personnel than remote monitoring and observation techniques. And remote techniques such as epic or electronic tagging will require installation of cameras or other technology that significantly increases labor. Although trained nursing or other medically trained persons will be best qualified to monitor (as well as to deal with the questions posed by a population of people who will likely be quite frightened), monitoring call centers may also be staffed by trained volunteers when personnel runs short. Thus it may be of greater use to concentrate on methods—such as phone calls—that focus on monitoring for symptoms with the goal of quickly identifying and treating those who become sick.
Possible technologies include:
1. Phone calls. Daily (or twice-daily) phone calls are perhaps the most efficient way to monitor quarantined persons for compliance and symptoms. Evasion tactics, however, may include use of “call forwarding,” use of a cell phones, and household members pretending to be the person in question.
2. Home visits. Though resource intensive, in-person visits may be the most effective means of monitoring and observation. Officials performing house calls would confirm identification, check for symptoms, and verify compliance with home quarantine.
3. Web-based monitoring. Although persons can be required to submit information over the web, there is no guarantee that this information will be correct and, in the absence of biometrics, it may be difficult to confirm identity over the web.
4. Video monitoring. Video monitoring (also called Electronic Picture or E-pic) allows visual identification and real-time symptom assessment and ensures that the person being monitored is indeed at home. In cases like SARS where temperature is a reliable indicator of potential infection, health officials can require that those being monitored also take their temperature under observation.97
5. Electronic tagging. Usually reserved only for those who have demonstrated noncompliance, electronic tags may be fitted around the wrist or the ankle, and will set off an alarm if the wearer strays too far away or outside of his/her home. The alarm will also be set off should the wearer tamper with the sensing mechanism.
Punishing Noncompliance
Possibly the most severe form of enforcement, punishing noncompliance includes issuing fines, imposing jail time and using physical force to compel compliance. In many cases the threat of force will be enough to ensure compliance, and the use of force or punishment should be reserved only for those cases when efforts at inducing compliance have failed.
Fines are perhaps the least intrusive means of enforcing compliance, but also may be the least effective. During the SARS outbreaks, fines were issued for breaking quarantine, spitting, and other violations of community-based restrictive measures. Non-lethal force should be considered for cases posing a danger of violence, a breakdown in public order, or a serious risk of danger to health of the community.
The option of jailing would-be violators presents a unique challenge. Prisons or jails do not in general have hospital level infection control measures in place, nor AIIR isolation wards. Officials would not introduce an infected person or even a potentially infected individual into the general prison population. Consequently, secure alternative facilities would need to be established or specific jail facilities would need to be cleared for violators. In the US, where prison capacity is already stretched, finding an existing prison or jail facility or clearing prisoners from one facility for violators would be problematic.
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All of this could have easily come (and likely was copied directly) from a military document describing how to take down an urban area; a city - like maybe Fallujah - or any other city in Iraq or Afghanistan. They've been practicing for years. And now we have the structure here in the US - everything is in place to implement the 'suggestions' outlined in the PDF.
If we did not live in a fascist oligarchy, measures to deal with biological 'disease exposure' could be seen as good preparation for an outbreak of smallpox, or avian flu, or (pick any disease - check out Plum Island, or the missing bioweapons at Ft.Detrick). But we do not live in a nation governed by representatives of the people - we live in a country with a government that was effectively overthrown in 1913, and attempts to take it back were met with deadly force (see JFK assassination). So we can't trust that the procedures they outline in documents like this are 'for our own good'. Nothing we have seen from this government (and I speak of both sides of the right/left paradigm) has been good for the people.
Thanks to birther truther tenther for posting this document: when we see a false-flag bioterrorist attack beginning, we'll know the drill.
Congressional Commission: Bio-Terror a Bigger Worry Than Nukes
10/22/2009
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpCvvERJsO8
"... it is far more likely that in the next three to four years we will have a bio-terrorist event
somewhere in the world, possibly in the United States."
- Randall Larsen
Executive Director, WMD Commission
Randall Larsen’s resume:
http://randalllarsen.com/
National Security Advisor, Center for Biosecurity, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 2004–present
Vice president and corporate officer (1 of only 5) of a 400-person consulting firm, 2000–2003
Department chair and professor of strategy at the National Defense University, 1998–2000
US Air Force colonel and former commander of America’s VIP fleet of aircraft at Andrews AFB, Maryland, 1996–1998
http://www.speakersonhealthcare.com/speakers/ColRandall_Larsen.php
Col. Randall Larsen
Exclusive Representation
* Homeland security Advisor for CBS News
* Director of the Institute for Homeland Security
* Analyst & Commentator on "Larry King Live," "Jim Lehrer News Hour," and "Oprah"
Keynote Fee : $5,001 - $10,000 plus expenses Fee Note
Travels From: VA
Programs
Bioterrorism: Myth or Reality?
Some call it the greatest threat America will face in the 21st century; others say it is grossly over-hyped. Who is right? What priority should America place on biodefense? Will a biodefense program better prepare America for the public health and medical challenges of the 21st century, or will it divert valuable resources? Colonel Larsen, the former Chairman of the Department of Military Strategy and Operations at the National War College says, "In the 21st century, public health will be as important to national security as the Department of Defense was in the 20th century. Research and development for new vaccines and treatments are perhaps more important today than R&D for new weapons systems in the Pentagon."
Our Own Worst Enemy
In this program, based on his upcoming book of the same name, Colonel Larsen explains why government (and sometimes, corporate) over-reactions to 9-11 may be a greater threat to the American economy than al Qaeda. What are the real threats, and what is the hype? What are the challenges and opportunities for corporations in this new security environment? With the common sense of an Indiana corn farmer, the insights from more than a decade of study in homeland security, combined with an entertaining delivery, filled with insider stories that range from sobering to hilarious, this former vice president and corporate officer tells you what America's business leaders need to know about security in the 21st century.
Safe, Comfortable, Reliable
For two years, Colonel Randy Larsen commanded America's fleet of VIP aircraft at Andrews AFB, Maryland. He provided a clear and concise vision for the 1,000 people he commanded: "We provide safe, comfortable, reliable air transportation to America's leaders." This was a 24/7 operation that routinely had air crews and planes on six different continents in more than a dozen time zones. Larsen shares his thoughts on executive leadership, the challenges of customers who expect perfection every day, team building, motivation and most of all, an intense focus on safety and quality. Insightful, inspiring and entertaining.
Biosecurity in the 21st Century
Biosecurity will change many aspects of our lives in the 21st century. It has three key elements. First, it will be one of the economic dynamos that drives the global economy in the 21st century. The biotechnical revolution will revolutionize economic development as dramatically as the industrial revolution did in the 19th century. Second, proper investments can leverage this technology to make quantum improvements in both public health and medical care delivery, not only for Americans, but for all people. Third, there will unfortunately be a dark side to the biotechnical revolution that will include bio-terrorists, bio-hackers, and bio-errors in addition to the naturally-occurring bio-threats we will face. Harnessing the power of the biotechnical revolution can provide America the bio-defenses required for combating both the natural and man-made threats.
Asking the Right Questions About Homeland Security
Colonel Randall Larsen, USAF (Ret), author of OUR OWN WORST ENEMY (Grand Central Publishing, September 2007), and former Chairman, Department of Military Strategy and Operations at the National War College, explains how leaders in both the public and private sectors continue to ask the wrong questions about homeland security. Larsen's list of wrong questions include: "How do we prevent terrorists from smuggling nuclear weapons into America?" "How do we prevent biological terrorism?" "Why aren't we preparing our major cities for rapid evacuations?" Colonel Larsen explains why these are the wrong questions, and then identifies the right questions that he has developed from more than 13 years of study in this field. His presentation is filled with insider stories ranging from sobering to hilarious (including the day he smuggled a weapon of mass destruction into a meeting with Vice President Cheney). This speech is jam-packed with take-home value for corporations, local communities, and families.
Corporate Responsibility and Homeland Security
From the Fortune 100s to small businesses, Larsen's message has great appeal and take-home value. He explains how both the private and public sectors have been focused on the wrong questions in the post 9-11 world, and argues that corporations, large and small, must understand that building resilience to man-made and natural threats must be a higher priority than the traditional security focus of buying gates, gun, guards and gadgets. This speech is based on research from his next book: The Investor's Guide to Homeland Security. The "investors" are stockholders and taxpayers who deserve the best return on their investments - something most are not receiving today.
Speaker Information
* Two days after 9-11, when VP Cheney wanted a briefing on the threat of bio terrorism, he called Randy Larsen
* During the anthrax crisis of Oct 2001, Larry King needed an expert; he called Randy Larsen-6 nights in a row
* When the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture wanted help in developing a counter terrorism program at USDA, he called Randy Larsen
Colonel Randall Larsen, USAF (Ret), is the Founding Director of The Institute for Homeland Security. He previously served as Chairman of the Department of Military Strategy and Operations at the National War College.
Colonel Larsen began his studies of homeland security in 1994 while on a one-year fellowship at the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Today, Congressman Chris Cox, Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee calls him, "One of America's top authorities on homeland security." One of the first witnesses to testify before the 9-11 Commission, Colonel Larsen has served as an expert witness to the Senate Armed Services, Senate Judiciary, House Government Reform, House Homeland Security, and House Budget Committees since 9-11. In March of this year, he ran a two-day workshop at Wye River for 28 members of the House Homeland Security Committee.
Colonel Larsen has also provided private briefings and tutorials on a wide range of Homeland Security topics to numerous members of Congress, including Senators Kennedy, Warner, Kyl, Feinstein, Roberts, Cornyn, Graham, as well as members of the Bush Administration, including Vice President Cheney and Secretary Ridge. Additionally, he served on the 2003 Defense Science Board Summer Study on Homeland Security, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
An internationally renowned leader in war gaming and executive simulations, Colonel Larsen and his war-gaming skills have been referred to as a "national treasure" by Former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre. The knowledge and conclusions derived from these exercises have led to the implementation of new programs and policies by the Administration and Congress.
Colonel Larsen is the author of several publications, including The Executive's Desk Book on Corporate Risks and Response for Homeland Security, What Corporate America Needs to Know About Bioterrorism, and Defending the American Homeland 1993-2003. His newest work, Our Own Worst Enemy: Why Our Misguided Reactions to 9-11 Might be America's Greatest Threat, is scheduled for release on 9/11 2005.
The Homeland Security consultant to CBS News since March 2003, Colonel Larsen is also a frequent guest on radio and television, including CBS, NBC, ABC, CNN, BBC, NPR, "Jim Lehrer News Hour," FOX News Channel, "Larry King Live," and "Oprah." His analysis and opinions have recently appeared in The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Chicago Tribune, USA Today, Christian Science Monitor, The Los Angeles Times, Newsweek, Time, and Business Week.
A veteran of 32 years served in both the Army and Air Force, Colonel Larsen's flying career began when he was a 19-year-old Cobra pilot in the 101st Airborne Division. He flew 400 combat missions in Vietnam. He also served as military attache at the US Embassy in Bangkok, the chief of legislative liaison at the US Transportation Command, and the commander of America's fleet of VIP aircraft at Andrews AFB MD. His decorations include the Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star, 17 awards of the Air Medal (3 with "V" Device for Valor), and the South Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry.
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http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11_commission/030401-larsen.htm
Statement of Randall J. Larsen to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
April 1, 2003
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee. Let me begin with my bottom line.
My first recommendation is that your focus should be on the future, not the past. And when I say the future, I am not talking about next year. That will not allow sufficient time to make the substantial changes that are required. Furthermore, your focus should be on how America failed, not which individuals or even which organizations failed. Let me explain.
Whenever people ask me why I went to Vietnam, I answer, "Why did you send me?" I did not volunteer, and I was not old enough to vote. I actually had little to do with it.
The same type of response might be appropriate for why our systems failed to prevent the attacks of 9-11. You should not seek to assign blame to those who worked within the system. We, the American people, gave them a system that was terribly flawed for the mission required.
We did not intend to give them a flawed system. The system began with the creation of the Central Intelligence Group by President Truman, and evolved through the National Security Act of 1947, the covert actions of the 1950s, the domestic intelligence abuses of the 1960's, and the reforms that came out the Church hearings. It was designed for the Cold War. But in 1993, at the World Trade Center, international terrorism came to America, and the nature of the threat changed. Unfortunately we did not change the apparatus meant to protect us.
As the former CEO of General Electric, Jack Welch, has noted, "When the outside is changing faster than the inside, the end is near." On 9-11, we reached the end of an era--an era when we could afford to have a solid firewall between intelligence and law enforcement, and an era where battlefields were "over there."
Even though I have been studying homeland security for nearly a decade, I did not fully understand how seriously flawed this system had become. Last year I spent six months working on the follow-up to the DARK WINTER exercise. Many of you have probably heard of DARK WINTER. The effort was led by John Hamre from CSIS, Tara O'Toole from Johns Hopkins, and me. It was a two-day exercise in June 2001 that simulated a smallpox attack on the United States homeland. Senior national security figures such as Sam Nunn, David Gergan, Jim Woolsey, Bill Sessions, and Governor Frank Keating played key roles in this exercise. We have briefed the results of this exercise to key leaders including Vice President Cheney, Secretary Ridge, and numerous members of Congress.
Many of these same senior national security leaders participated in the two-day SILENT VECTOR exercise in October 2002. SILENT VECTOR was a joint effort led by John Hamre and Phil Anderson from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Dave McIntyre and me for the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security. SILENT VECTOR was a unique homeland security exercise, because in the scenario, the attack never occurred.
The participants, who were acting as the Homeland Security Council, were provided increasingly specific and credible information of an impending attack. We wanted to see what actions these senior participants would take. What would be the economic impact of these attacks? In some of the scenarios we examined during our preparation; we discovered that over-reactions by the government could cause more economic damage than the actual attacks. In the exercise, we learned that it is very difficult to estimate the economic impact of these actions.
The terrorists were planning an attack on critical energy and chemical infrastructure on the East Coast of the United States. Intelligence information, primarily focused on activities outside the United States, provided a continuing stream of details from numerous sources and methods in several countries and regions. Law enforcement information, from the Federal and local levels was provided to the decision makers and even included one "walk-in" who had developed cold feet. A third stream of information was provided to the participants. This information assessed the vulnerabilities of various types of infrastructure and the potential consequences of various types of attacks.
What the organizers and participants of SILENT VECTOR found so surprising is that there is no agency within the US government that serves as a fusion center for these three data streams. Yet, it is this type of fusion that would be required to allow senior elected and appointed officials to decide how to use their limited resources to defend our homeland.
Should extra security be placed at nuclear power plants or chemical storage faculties? Could attacks on gas pipelines turn off the heat on the East Coast during a very cold winter? What about liquefied natural gas storage facilities--are they more of a threat than a nuclear power plant or several rail cars filled with chlorine gas? Which would be easiest to attack? Which would be the most significant threat to the most people?
Since an organization to fuse information from three independent data streams did not exist last spring, the planners of SILENT VECTOR created one for the exercise. Could the attacks have been detected and thwarted if this type of organization existed prior to 9-11? America had intelligence information of training classes in an old airliner in Salmon Pak, south of Baghdad. At this site, terrorists were trained how to hijack airliners using only short knives. Had this intelligence information been fused with information from the FBI and FAA, America might have had the opportunity to thwart the 9-11 attacks.
If a fusion center had been equipped with sophisticated data-mining capabilities, that Florida State Trooper who stopped Mohammad Atta in July 2001 for a routine traffic violation might have discovered that Atta was a person of interest to the CIA, the Treasury Department, and FAA. Even as late as the morning of 9-11, appropriate information systems and data-mining technologies could have identified three of the hijackers who were on terrorist watch lists, four more who listed the same address as those on watch lists, three more who had made frequent phone calls to those addresses, and two more who had previously used Mohammad Atta's frequent flier number.
Would a fusion center armed with this type of technology have prevented 9-11? No one can know. But this we do know--and this is not from Randy Larsen, but General Dwight David Eisenhower: "The right system will not guarantee success, but the wrong system will guarantee failure."
On 9-11, America had the wrong system in place to defend our homeland.
My advice: do not focus your efforts on the individuals or organizations that were given the wrong system. Fix the system. Do not focus your efforts on next year. Look five years down the road. Describe which threats you will address. You cannot build a system capable of protecting America from all threats. If we do not establish priorities, the greatest threat will become uncontrolled spending. Do not waste your time on systems that could prevent car bombings. They will not threaten the survival of our nation. Your two top priorities should be nuclear weapons and sophisticated biological weapons. Genetically engineered biological weapons will be the greatest threat America faces in the coming decades.
Your goal should be to design for America a system that will fuse intelligence information, law enforcement information, and vulnerability assessments along with the enormous amount of data in the commercial sector that is available to banks and other corporations, but not necessarily to those who are charged with defending America. This system will also need to deliver timely information to its users--everyone from the President to the police officer on the beat in New York City and the public health officer in Hays County, Texas. And without question, the information provided to various users must be acceptable within our constitutional and cultural values--no easy challenge, but it will be our best investment in security.
Furthermore, this system will be of great value not only in the prevention mode, but also for mitigation and response. This system will be critically important for the Department of Homeland Security in determining where and how to best spend their funds for training, education, and equipment. These decisions should be based on threats and vulnerabilities, not politics as usual.
Today, I see no organization within the new Department of Homeland Security
or the Terrorism Threat Intelligence Center that can perform this function. Start with a blank piece of paper.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Randy Larsen is an ANSER Vice President and the Director of the Institute for Homeland Security, a not-for-profit public-service research institute. He is a member of the Defense Science Board (2003, DoD's Role in Homeland Security), and serves as a member of the editorial board for the quarterly journal Bioterrorism and Biosecurity: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science (Johns Hopkins University).
Since September 11, 2001, numerous senior government officials, including Vice President Cheney and Governor Ridge, have sought his advice and counsel. He has served as an expert witness in hearings held by the Senate and the House of Representatives and provided informational briefings to numerous Members of Congress, the military, the Intelligence Community, and business audiences. His recent speaking engagements include the Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Association, the International Institute for Security Studies (London), the German Marshall Fund (Brussels), the Young Presidents' Organization, the Washington State Police Chiefs Annual Conference, numerous universities, and World Affairs Councils. He is also a frequent guest commentator on national television and radio, including the Jim Lehrer NewsHour, CBS News, ABC World News Tonight, MSNBC, and Larry King Live, plus NPR, CNN, ABC, NBC, CBC and BBC radio.
He is a co-author of The Executive's Desk Book on Corporate Risks and Response for Homeland Security, published by the National Legal Center for the Public Interest (March 2003). He and his staff developed and teach graduate courses in homeland security at George Washington University, Johns Hopkins School of Arts and Sciences, and the National War College. During the past eight years, he has written and lectured extensively on the subjects of asymmetric and biological warfare and the 21st-century challenges of homeland security. He previously served as the Chairman of the Department of Military Strategy and Operations at the National War College, as a government advisor to the Defense Science Board (2000, Intelligence Requirements for Homeland Defense), as a research fellow at the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies (1994-1995), and as a fellow in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI program (1999-2000).
He was a co-developer of the nationally acclaimed Dark Winter exercise. Key players in this exercise included the Governor of Oklahoma, Frank Keating; former Senator Sam Nunn; special assistant to four presidents David Gergen; former Director of Central Intelligence Jim Woolsey; and former FBI Director William Sessions.
In June 2000, Colonel Larsen retired following 32 years of military service in the Army and Air Force. His assignments included 400 combat missions in Cobra gunships in Vietnam and duties as a military attaché, legislative assistant, and commander of America's fleet of VIP aircraft at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. His military decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Bronze Star, 17 Air Medals, and the South Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry. He has a Master of Arts degree in National Security Studies from the Naval Post Graduate School.
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