Saturday, November 6, 2010

CSIS Manufactured Terror

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080606_managingthenextdomesticcatastrophe.pdf



Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or not)?

Title: Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or not)?

Date: June 2008

Author: Christine E. Wormuth

Institution: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Bibliographic Entry: Wormuth, Christine E. “Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or not)?” June 2008. Center for Strategic and International Studies
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080606_managingthenextdomesticcatastrophe.pdf (Accessed July 21, 2008)

Electronic Link: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080606_managingthenextdomesticcatastrophe.pdf

Key Words: FEMA, Department of Defense, catastrophic event, disaster preparedness, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management force, DHS, FEMA

Summary of Key Points, Issues, Conclusions: Even with the vast number of government agencies in place to assure America’s safety, the federal government and the nation are not ready for the next catastrophe. There is still a great deal of confusion over who will be in charge during a disaster and no guidelines are in place to determine and assess the capabilities that states, cities, and towns should have to ensure they are prepared for the worst. The improvements in preparedness are evident with several additions to federal government infrastructure. The Federal Emergency Management System (FEMA) has developed more than 200 prescripted mission assignments across 27 federal agencies to strengthen and streamline response capabilities in advance of actual events. The Department of Defense is creating a trained and ready Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management force that will be able to respond rapidly during a catastrophe. As a means to progress the movement towards better homeland security and disaster preparedness, the Center for Strategic and International studies has made several recommendations: (1) merge the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council into a single organization with a single staff, (2) establish a clear chain of command inside the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure that the Secretary can carry out his or her responsibility to serve as the federal government’s coordinator for incident management, (3) state clearly that the Department of Defense will not have the lead in responding to catastrophic incidents but will be expected to play a substantial support role when needed, and (4) create a partnership between the Office of Management and Budget and the NCS Strategic Planning Directorate to lead the development of integrated budget planning across homeland security mission areas.


Name of Researcher: Ashanti Z. Corey

Institution: Integrative Center for Homeland Security, Texas A&M University

Date Posted: July 23, 2008

http://homelandsecurity.tamu.edu/framework/homeland-security-overview/managing-the-next-domestic-catastrophe-ready-or-not.html/

About CSIS

In an era of ever-changing global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and Inter- national Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decisionmak- ers. CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to the simple but urgent goal of finding ways for America to survive as a nation and prosper as a people. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent public policy institutions. Today, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. More than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focus their expertise on defense and security; on the world’s regions and the unique challenges inherent to them; and on the issues that know no boundary in an increasingly connected world. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000.


Contents
Acknowledgments iv
Executive Summary vi

1. America Unprepared 1

2. Problematic Government Relationships 15

3. Immature Processes 42

4. Anemic Implementation 64

Appendix A: Summary of Report Recommendations 83
Appendix B: BG-N Phase 4 Working Group Members 86
Appendix C: Acronyms 87

Executive Summary

America is not ready for the next catastrophe. Almost seven years have passed since the nation was attacked here at home by violent Islamist extremists who remain free and who have made clear their willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States, should they be able to acquire or build them. Almost three years have passed since Hurricane Katrina devas- tated the Gulf Coast and laid bare myriad flaws in the nation’s preparedness and response system. Simply creating the Homeland Security Council, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and U.S. Northern Command was not enough to make the country prepared. There are still no detailed, government-wide plans to respond to a catastrophe. There is still considerable confusion over who will be in charge during a disaster. There are still almost no dedicated military forces on rapid alert to respond to a crisis here at home.

There are still no guidelines to determine and assess the capabilities that states, cities, and towns should have to ensure they are prepared for the worst. To be sure, a number of significant steps have been taken, and the nation is clearly more prepared than it was seven or eight years ago. There is a National Homeland Security Strategy that provides overall direction for the federal government’s homeland security policies and programs. Hundreds, if not thousands, more people focus each and every day on improving national preparedness than before the September 11 attacks.

A National Response Framework describes how the federal government will work with state, local and tribal governments as well as the private sector and nongovernmental organizations during domestic incidents. Fifteen National Planning Scenarios have been drawn up to guide government planning for catastrophes. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed more than 200 prescripted mission as- signments across 27 federal agencies to strengthen and streamline response capabilities in advance of actual events. The Department of Defense is creating a trained and ready Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management force that will be able to respond rapidly during a catastrophe, and the National Guard has almost completed its development of 17 CBRNE Emergency Response Forces spread around the country to help bridge the gap between the immediate response to a crisis and the arrival of more extensive federal capabilities.

Although significant progress has been made in the past several years– with many achievements extremely hard-won, through the tireless work of senior leaders and public servants across the government—what ultimately matters to the American public is not how far we have come but how far away we still are from being prepared for the next catastrophe. The task of readying America to face the threats of the post–September 11 era is an enormous one and poses a fundamental challenge for the next President.

Preventing, protecting against, preparing for, and responding to a domestic catastrophe are basic tasks of government at all levels. Unfortunately, today’s efforts to provide homeland security, particularly at the federal level, are not unlike the governmental equivalent of a children’s soccer game. One can see a tremendous amount of activity under way and considerable energy on the field, but the movements are often not very well coordinated. Players tend to huddle around the ball—in this case, whatever happens to be the crisis or headline issue of the day—and follow it wherever it goes, even if in doing so they neglect their assigned positions. In such an environment, it is not impossible to score a goal, but that outcome is usually due more to luck than to skill. Given that this is not a competition the nation can afford to lose, what can be done to improve America’s odds?

The key for the next Administration will be to bring order to the relationships, processes, and implementation of its homeland security system. Which organizations at the federal, state, and local level will perform what roles, who is the lead official at each level of the response, and how do all the players work together as a team? What processes should guide how stakeholders interact and ensure that everyone is working toward the same goals? What plans are needed to prepare the government to deal effectively with future catastrophes, and how should government at all levels decide what it needs so that it can execute those plans? Finally, how can the government translate its strategies and plans into trained and ready capabilities on the ground that can be deployed effectively in accordance with comprehensive, integrated plans developed in advance of a specific catastrophe?

Many of the building blocks required to move the country toward being truly prepared to handle a catastrophe already exist in some form, but the next Administration needs to bring the pieces together, fill in the gaps, and provide the resources necessary to get the job done. If implemented, the following major recommendations –slightly condensed from their full discussion in the body of this report—would go a long way toward getting America ready to manage the next domestic catastrophe, whatever form it might take.



Recommendations

■ Merge the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council into a single organization with a single staff.

The U.S. government has artificially separated homeland security from national security. Securing the homeland is a matter of national security—and it has both domestic and international components. Dividing homeland security from national security has resulted in fractured, partial solu- tions and has greatly weakened the ability of the federal government to generate unity of effort. Merging the National Security and Homeland Security Councils and their staffs will greatly enhance the federal government’s ability to develop holistic strategies and policies, and it will ensure that the homeland security aspects of national security policy are also supported by the political and bureaucratic power of the White House.

■ Establish a clear chain of command inside DHS to ensure that the Secretary can carry out his or her responsibility to serve as the federal government’s coordinator for incident management.

The relationship between DHS and FEMA continues to be murky and confusing. If the Hurricane Katrina experience showed anything, it illustrated the perils of not having a clear understanding of who is in charge of what—both in Washington and in the field—during a catastrophe. The absence of a clear framework for the DHS-FEMA relationship has had an extremely pernicious effect on homeland security policy in the past several years and has noticeably hampered the federal government’s efforts to improve preparedness. The next Administration and Congress should work together to put into a law a clear chain of command, from the President down to the field level, for the coordination of domestic incidents.

Under this new clarified framework, the Secretary of Homeland Security will serve as the principal federal coordinator of domestic incidents as directed in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5, “Management of Domestic Incidents,” and will report directly to the President. While the FEMA Administrator should be able to advise the President directly on the subset of emergency management matters, as specified in law, the operational chain of command for the overall incident should run from the President to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and then within DHS from the Secretary to the FEMA Administrator. In the field, the DHS chain of command during an incident should extend to the 10 FEMA Regional Administrators, who would execute their responsibilities on the ground through designated “Lead Federal Coordinators,” as discussed in more detail in the following recommendation. During a catastrophe, the Lead Federal Coordinator would be the single federal official on the ground responsible for coordinating the overall federal effort with all of the other response efforts.

■ Consolidate the positions of Principal Federal Official and Federal Coordinating Officer into the single position of Lead Federal Coordinator, who would report through the FEMA Administrator to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

During and after a catastrophe, there must be one DHS official on the ground, responsible to the President and accountable for the agency’s performance. It makes no sense to have a Principal Federal Official (PFO) who reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security and lacks line authority over a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) who reports to the FEMA Administrator, particularly when the FEMA Administrator works for the Secretary and FEMA is part of DHS. The continuing existence of the PFO and FCO positions perpetuates confusion at all levels—federal, state, local—and indeed reflects the larger DHS-FEMA bureaucratic battle. It is time for this battle to end. As the relationship between DHS and FEMA is restructured, the PFO and FCO positions should be eliminated in the National Response Framework and in statute, respectively, and replaced with a single position: Lead Federal Coordinator (LFC). In practice the LFCs should typically be very senior officials in each of the 10 FEMA regional offices and they should have the authorities of the FCO as described in the Stafford Act of 1988. Ensuring that there is a single DHS senior official on the ground during a crisis—who reports through the Secretary to the President, who has the power to coordinate and distribute federal assistance (whether directly or through delegation of authority), and who already knows the state and local players—would greatly increase unity of effort.

■ State clearly that the Department of Defense will not have the lead in responding to catastrophic incidents but will be expected to play a substantial support role when needed.

The persistent debate about whether the Department of Defense (DoD) should ever lead the response to a catastrophe instead of DHS should be settled. The next Administration should restate emphatically that DHS will be the Lead Federal Coordinator during domestic incidents, but should also make clear that DoD will be expected to play a significant supporting role in catastrophes, working within the HSPD-5 framework. As outlined in the National Response Framework, the federal government should have a single, scalable framework for incident management, led by a single federal agency. The nation cannot afford to have one system for 98 percent of all events, and a different, DoD-led system for the 2 percent of events that are “high end.” At the same time, the next Administration should make very clear that DoD will no longer hold the civil support mission at arm’s length and will be expected to play a very significant supporting role in the aftermath of a catastrophic event—a role that will require that DoD resource, train, and equip its forces accordingly.

■ Initiate a robust dialogue on the subject of how to balance the need to enable the federal government to directly employ federal resources within a state or states during the most extreme circumstances with the constitutional rights of states.

The idea of expanding the role of the federal government during a domestic catastrophe is anathema to many in the homeland security community; but in light of the threats faced by the nation in the post–September 11 environment, it is only prudent to ensure that the country’s preparedness system includes the ability of the federal government to exercise its full authority under the law to save lives and protect property during a major disaster. It is not impossible to imagine scenarios in which state leadership is severely weakened in its ability to orchestrate an effective response effort, or others in which the state leadership is in place but the state’s capacity to execute decisions made by those leaders is severely degraded. In such instances, it may be appropriate for the federal government to exercise the authority granted to it under the Stafford Act more fully than is envisioned today.

The goal of adapting the current system is not to enable the federal government to “take over” management of a catastrophe over the objections of a state governor, but rather to develop an understanding with state governors in advance about the conditions under which the federal government might need to directly employ federal resources within a state or states in the most extreme circumstances in order to execute its responsibility to save lives and protect property. The principle of managing a crisis at the lowest level of government possible should remain a fundamental feature of the American approach to domestic emergency management. At the same time, the next Secretary of Homeland Security, with the President’s strong backing, should work closely with state governors to begin exploring how the current system could be adapted in a mutually acceptable way that balances the need to fully empower the federal government under existing law with maintenance of the constitutional right of states to self-governance during a catastrophe.

■ Conduct a Quadrennial National Security Review and create a National Security Planning Guidance.

There is growing consensus that the federal government needs a mechanism to develop an inte- grated set of national security priorities, assess trade-offs among these different priorities, and assign roles and responsibilities for these priorities across the interagency. To achieve these objectives, the next Administration should direct the National Security Council (NSC) to lead a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR) in the first few months of the new term. The review would engage the relevant national security agencies, focus on a select set of critical national security priorities, and produce two major documents: an integrated National Security Planning Guidance and a public National Security Strategy, both of which would include treatment of homeland security issues. The National Security Planning Guidance would elaborate on the broad priorities articulated in the QNSR; provide more specific guidance on priorities, roles, and missions; and lay out timelines for the implementation of major planning objectives. In addition, the planning guidance would be the starting point for Cabinet agencies to develop their own more detailed strategies.

■ Create a Senior Director for Strategic Planning within the merged NSC to lead interagency strategic planning efforts and oversee their implementation.

The federal government cannot develop or implement the kinds of integrated national security strategies and programs that are needed to meet the challenges of the 21st-century security environment in the absence of strong leadership and coordination at the White House level. As part of the NSC, the next President should create and empower a robust strategic planning directorate, led by a Senior Director for Strategic Planning. Rather than relying on the 1- to 2-person strategic planning offices that have sometimes been a part of the NSC organization, the next President and National Security Adviser need at least 10–15 people leading strategic planning efforts on a daily basis. This office should be responsible for leading the QNSR and developing the National Secu- rity Planning Guidance. This office also should be responsible for guiding the interagency process to develop detailed plans for responding to catastrophic events, as well as the associated effort to develop requirements for catastrophe response at the federal level that are then fed into the federal budget process.

■ Establish a robust interagency organization overseen by the NSC but housed at DHS that is responsible for the development of integrated and detailed interagency plans and for identification of specific requirements for the federal departments.

Although considerable progress has been made in 2007 and 2008, the federal government still does not have a set of detailed interagency plans associated with the 15 National Planning Sce- narios. The next Administration should establish a strong interagency organization—closely overseen by the NSC Strategic Planning Directorate but housed at DHS—that is responsible on a daily basis for developing integrated, interagency operational plans for responding to catastrophic events. These plans would be updated regularly, perhaps every year or two. Creating such plans is one of the most important steps that the federal government can take to improve national readiness, and the interagency organization should be backed strongly by the NSC, should be staffed with the best possible personnel with planning expertise, and should be high on the radar screen of the next Secretary of Homeland Security. Complementing its deliberate planning function, it should be focal point for identifying specific requirements for federal departments, which are then validated by the relevant agencies and fed into their internal resourcing systems.

■ Create a partnership between the Office of Management and Budget and the NSC Strategic Planning Directorate to lead the development of integrated budget planning across homeland security mission areas.

To more fully integrate the implementation of homeland security policy, the next Administration should develop a partnership between the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the NSC Strategic Planning Directorate charged with devising a method of examining budgets across homeland security mission areas. This process should entail a front-end review of agency budget proposals in the planning stages, across mission areas and programs to identify priorities, capability gaps, overlaps, and shortfalls at the outset of the budget cycle. This partnership will require that NSC and OMB begin reviewing the agency budget plans together over the course of the summer before the President’s budget is submitted. The final budget submission to Congress could then include proposals presented not only by mission area but also by major programs that support the mission requirements. Participating NSC staff, taking the lead role, should be drawn mainly from the Strategic Planning Directorate but should also include other members of the NSC staff with deep knowledge of the particular subject matter areas. To facilitate this integrated review across mission areas, a new OMB staff group with significant policy expertise and cross-agency purview should be developed and should play a major role in the process.

■ Substantially revise the Target Capabilities List.

The federal government has directed state and local governments today to focus their preparedness investments on 37 target capabilities, but the target capability levels do not differentiate between big cities, smaller cities, small towns, and rural areas. Nor is there very clear guidance on how to measure whether state and local jurisdictions have achieved the prescribed target capability levels. The next Secretary of Homeland Security and FEMA Administrator should build on work that is just getting under way in FEMA to substantially revise the Target Capabilities List (TCL) so that desired target capabilities levels are linked to different types of jurisdictions and the guidelines provided differentiate between cities and towns around the country in terms of area, population size and density, numbers of potential high-risk targets, and other factors.

This effort should also clearly describe performance objectives for target capabilities in commonsense terms, linking those objectives to the particular needs of different sizes and types of jurisdictions. Equally important, a revised TCL will specify how progress toward those objectives will be judged. Once the objectives and evaluative measures are developed, DHS and state and local governments will have an agreed-on basis for assessing capability development, something that does not exist today. Particularly in light of the great dissatisfaction expressed by many state and local officials with the consultation process for the original TCL, published as part of the National Preparedness Guidelines, it is critically important that FEMA to adopt a truly collaborative process in undertaking this revision.

■ Reform the DHS grants program to be a flagship component of DHS that is well managed, transparent, highly credible, and tightly linked to federal priorities.

The DHS grants program and the organization within the department that administers the program will inevitably be crucial to DHS’s success in building preparedness at the state and local levels. Recognizing that the grants program and its administration contribute strongly to how DHS is viewed beyond the Beltway, the next Secretary and FEMA Administrator should make reforming the grant program a high priority. The FEMA regional offices should become in effect the front lines of the grant program process, as they are much closer to the state and local grant recipients than is DHS headquarters in Washington. Central to the reform effort should be linking the grant program more tightly to the strategic priorities outlined in policy guidance documents such as the Guidelines and a revised Target Capabilities List. Grant applications should explain how proposed investments will achieve target capability levels, grant recipients should report progress toward target capabilities using agreed-on evaluative measures contained in a revised TCL, and federal evaluations should be undertaken in addition to the self-assessment process, perhaps as a condition of grant eligibility.

■ Host a catastrophic event tabletop exercise for very senior officials early in each new Administration.

The new Administration should bring together its Cabinet officials for a tabletop exercise focused on managing a catastrophic event in the first 60 days of the new term. Such an exercise would force Cabinet officials to become familiar with their basic homeland security responsibilities and would give them all a better understanding of the scope and type of challenges the federal gov- ernment would likely face should some catastrophe occur. This kind of exercise also would help spur Cabinet Secretaries toward focusing their agencies on critical vulnerabilities early in the next Administration.

■ Reform TOPOFF to make it much closer to a “no-notice” exercise.

Because it involves extensive advance coordination, TOPOFF—the “top officials” capstone exercise—may not offer sufficient insight into the nation’s overall preparedness for catastrophic events. Only an exercise that is “no-notice,” or close to it, will provide an accurate picture of how well the federal government can coordinate its own efforts internally and work collaboratively with state and local governments as it responds to a catastrophe. Given the practical challenges associated with major field exercises, it may be useful to focus initially on holding no-notice tabletop exer- cises at the federal and state government level to test decisionmaking and coordination processes before determining whether it is possible to proceed to a full-fledged no-notice field exercise.

■ Complete and expand the existing effort to create homeland security regional hubs that leverage the resources of the FEMA regional offices.

Common sense dictates that leaders in Washington, D.C., cannot directly manage the response to a catastrophe taking place hundreds or thousands of miles away. FEMA’s recent initiatives to rein- vigorate its regional offices and make them the essential link between Washington and the field are critical and must be fully implemented. Without this connective tissue between Washington and the state and local levels, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to realize any meaningful vision of national preparedness. The FEMA regional offices should be responsible for developing regional strategies and plans, functioning as a one-stop shop for preparedness activities and the grant programs, and building on existing regional collaborative structures. To ensure that the regional offices can be fully effective, the next Administration should establish requirements making them the principal coordinators for federal agencies in the field. Finally, a very senior official in each regional office with bureaucratic, operational, and “Washington” skills should be predesignated as the Lead Federal Coordinator for each region.

■ Create regional homeland security task forces, drawn largely from existing National Guard units, to complement the regional homeland security hubs.

Creating regional homeland security task forces from existing National Guard units would provide a military complement to the FEMA regional offices. The next Secretary of Defense and Chief of the National Guard Bureau should work closely with governors and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to organize National Guard–led homeland security task forces in each region. Not only would these task forces create a focal point for regional military planning, exercising, and training, they would ensure that each region of the country has a rapid response force able to help bridge the three- to five-day gap between the immediate aftermath of an event, when local first responders are the only capabilities on the scene, and the arrival of most federal capabilities.

■ Implement and fund a strengthened version of the National Security Professional Program and fund and implement an expanded DHS professional development and education system.

The next Administration needs to beef up the requirements in the National Security Professional Program and provide additional resources for implementing Executive Order 13434, which created it. Without a workforce that has the skills and experience to operate across all the dimensions of homeland security—prevention, protection, preparedness, response, and recovery—the nation will not be able to protect itself against future catastrophes or manage them when they do happen. Rotation through different positions in the government to gain core competencies needs to be linked explicitly to eligibility for career advancement, as it was for uniformed military officers as part of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Ideally, the professional development and education program envisioned in the executive order would also include opportunities for state- and local-level personnel to serve in the federal government. To support these rotational assignments and build a robust system of training and professional education, the next Administration should work with Congress to mandate that participating agencies fund a 3–5 percent personnel float. Complementing professional development at the interagency level, the next Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the DHS Learning and Development Strategy is appropriately funded and implemented, expand current education and development plans, and engage institutions of higher learning in a dialogue about future needs for homeland security professionals.

This is redundant to Dig's above post, so just re-read the parts I highlighted.

From PDF Page 8-14 of document:

Recommendations
Merge the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council into a single organization with a single staff.
The U.S. government has artificially separated homeland security from national security. Securing the homeland is a matter of national security—and it has both domestic and international components. Dividing homeland security from national security has resulted in fractured, partial solutions and has greatly weakened the ability of the federal government to generate unity of effort. Merging the National Security and Homeland Security Councils and their staffs will greatly enhance the federal government’s ability to develop holistic strategies and policies, and it will ensure that the homeland security aspects of national security policy are also supported by the political and bureaucratic power of the White House. [INSERT: Give us dictatorial power!!!]

■■ Establish a clear chain of command inside DHS to ensure that the Secretary can carry out his or her responsibility to serve as the federal government’s coordinator for incident management.
The relationship between DHS and FEMA continues to be murky and confusing. If the Hurricane Katrina experience showed anything, it illustrated the perils of not having a clear understanding of who is in charge of what—both in Washington and in the field—during a catastrophe. The absence of a clear framework for the DHS-FEMA relationship has had an extremely pernicious effect on homeland security policy in the past several years and has noticeably hampered the federal government’s efforts to improve preparedness. The next Administration and Congress should work together to put into a law a clear chain of command, from the President down to the field level, for the coordination of domestic incidents. Under this new clarified framework, the Secretary of Homeland Security will serve as the principal federal coordinator of domestic incidents as directed in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5, “Management of Domestic Incidents,” and will report directly to the President. While the FEMA Administrator should be able to advise the President directly on the subset of emergency management matters, as specified in law, the operational chain of command for the overall incident should run from the President to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and then within DHS from the Secretary to the FEMA Administrator. In the field, the DHS chain of command during an incident should extend to the 10 FEMA Regional Administrators, who would execute their responsibilities on the ground through designated “Lead Federal Coordinators,” as discussed in more detail in the following recommendation. During a catastrophe, the Lead Federal Coordinator would be the single federal official on the ground responsible for coordinating the overall federal effort with all of the other response efforts. Consolidate the positions of Principal Federal Official and Federal Coordinating Officer into the single position of Lead Federal Coordinator, who would report through the FEMA Administrator to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

During and after a catastrophe, there must be one DHS official on the ground, responsible to the President and accountable for the agency’s performance. It makes no sense to have a Principal Federal Official (PFO) who reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security and lacks line authority over a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) who reports to the FEMA Administrator, particularly when the FEMA Administrator works for the Secretary and FEMA is part of DHS. The continuing existence of the PFO and FCO positions perpetuates confusion at all levels—federal, state, local—and indeed reflects the larger DHS-FEMA bureaucratic battle. It is time for this battle to end. As the relationship between DHS and FEMA is restructured, the PFO and FCO positions should be eliminated in the National Response Framework and in statute, respectively, and replaced with a single position: Lead Federal Coordinator (LFC). In practice the LFCs should typically be very senior officials in each of the 10 FEMA regional offices and they should have the authorities of the FCO as described in the Stafford Act of 1988. Ensuring that there is a single DHS senior official on the ground during a crisis—who reports through the Secretary to the President, who has the power to coordinate and distribute federal assistance (whether directly or through delegation of authority), and who already knows the state and local players—would greatly increase unity of effort.

■■ State clearly that the Department of Defense will not have the lead in responding to catastrophic incidents but will be expected to play a substantial support role when needed.
The persistent debate about whether the Department of Defense (DoD) should ever lead the response to a catastrophe instead of DHS should be settled. The next Administration should restate emphatically that DHS will be the Lead Federal Coordinator during domestic incidents, but should also make clear that DoD will be expected to play a significant supporting role in catastrophes, working within the HSPD-5 framework. As outlined in the National Response Framework, the federal government should have a single, scalable framework for incident management, led by a single federal agency. The nation cannot afford to have one system for 98 percent of all events, and a different, DoD-led system for the 2 percent of events that are “high end.” At the same time, the next Administration should make very clear that DoD will no longer hold the civil support mission at arm’s length and will be expected to play a very significant supporting role in the aftermath of a catastrophic event—a role that will require that DoD resource, train, and equip its forces accordingly. o balance the need to enable the federal government to directly employ federal resources within a state or states during the most extreme circumstances with the constitutional rights of states.

The idea of expanding the role of the federal government during a domestic catastrophe is anathema to many in the homeland security community; but in light of the threats faced by the nation in the post–September 11 environment, it is only prudent to ensure that the country’s preparedness system includes the ability of the federal government to exercise its full authority under the law to save lives and protect property during a major disaster. It is not impossible to imagine scenarios in which state leadership is severely weakened in its ability to orchestrate an effective response effort, or others in which the state leadership is in place but the state’s capacity to execute decisions made by those leaders is severely degraded. In such instances, it may be appropriate for the federal government to exercise the authority granted to it under the Stafford Act more fully than is envisioned today. The goal of adapting the current system is not to enable the federal government to “take over” management of a catastrophe over the objections of a state governor, but rather to develop an understanding with state governors in advance about the conditions under which the federal government might need to directly employ federal resources within a state or states in the most extreme circumstances in order to execute its responsibility to save lives and protect property. The principle of managing a crisis at the lowest level of government possible should remain a fundamental feature of the American approach to domestic emergency management. At the same time, the next Secretary of Homeland Security, with the President’s strong backing, should work closely with state governors to begin exploring how the current system could be adapted in a mutually acceptable way that balances the need to fully empower the federal government under existing law with maintenance of the constitutional right of states to self-governance during a catastrophe.

■■ Conduct a Quadrennial National Security Review and create a National Security Planning Guidance.
There is growing consensus that the federal government needs a mechanism to develop an integrated set of national security priorities, assess trade-offs among these different priorities, and assign roles and responsibilities for these priorities across the interagency. To achieve these objectives, the next Administration should direct the National Security Council (NSC) to lead a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR) in the first few months of the new term. The review would engage the relevant national security agencies, focus on a select set of critical national security priorities, and produce two major documents: an integrated National Security Planning Guidance and a public National Security Strategy, both of which would include treatment of homeland security issues. The National Security Planning Guidance would elaborate on the broad priorities articulated in the QNSR; provide more specific guidance on priorities, roles, and missions; and lay out timelines for the implementation of major planning objectives. In addition, the planning guidance would be the starting point for Cabinet agencies to develop their own more detailed strategies.

■■ Create a Senior Director for Strategic Planning within the merged NSC to lead interagency strategic planning efforts and oversee their implementation.
The federal government cannot develop or implement the kinds of integrated national security strategies and programs that are needed to meet the challenges of the 21st-century security environment in the absence of strong leadership and coordination at the White House level. As part of the NSC, the next President should create and empower a robust strategic planning directorate, led by a Senior Director for Strategic Planning. Rather than relying on the 1- to 2-person strategic planning offices that have sometimes been a part of the NSC organization, the next President and National Security Adviser need at least 10–15 people leading strategic planning efforts on a daily basis. This office should be responsible for leading the QNSR and developing the National Security Planning Guidance. This office also should be responsible for guiding the interagency process to develop detailed plans for responding to catastrophic events, as well as the associated effort to develop requirements for catastrophe response at the federal level that are then fed into the federal budget process.

Establish a robust interagency organization overseen by the NSC but housed at DHS that is responsible for the development of integrated and detailed interagency plans and for identification of specific requirements for the federal departments. Although considerable progress has been made in 2007 and 2008, the federal government still does not have a set of detailed interagency plans associated with the 15 National Planning Scenarios. The next Administration should establish a strong interagency organization—closely overseen by the NSC Strategic Planning Directorate but housed at DHS—that is responsible on a daily basis for developing integrated, interagency operational plans for responding to catastrophic events. These plans would be updated regularly, perhaps every year or two. Creating such plans is one of the most important steps that the federal government can take to improve national readiness, and the interagency organization should be backed strongly by the NSC, should be staffed with the best possible personnel with planning expertise, and should be high on the radar screen of the next Secretary of Homeland Security. Complementing its deliberate planning function, it should be focal point for identifying specific requirements for federal departments, which are then validated by the relevant agencies and fed into their internal resourcing systems.

■■ Create a partnership between the Office of Management and Budget and the NSC Strategic Planning Directorate to lead the development of integrated budget planning across homeland security mission areas.
To more fully integrate the implementation of homeland security policy, the next Administration should develop a partnership between the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the NSC Strategic Planning Directorate charged with devising a method of examining budgets across homeland security mission areas. This process should entail a front-end review of agency budget proposals in the planning stages, across mission areas and programs to identify priorities, capability gaps, overlaps, and shortfalls at the outset of the budget cycle. This partnership will require that NSC and OMB begin reviewing the agency budget plans together over the course of the summer before the President’s budget is submitted. The final budget submission to Congress could then include proposals presented not only by mission area but also by major programs that support the mission requirements. Participating NSC staff, taking the lead role, should be drawn mainly from the Strategic Planning Directorate but should also include other members of the NSC staff with deep knowledge of the particular subject matter areas. To facilitate this integrated review across mission areas, a new OMB staff group with significant policy expertise and cross-agency purview should be developed and should play a major role in the process.

■■ Substantially revise the Target Capabilities List.
The federal government has directed state and local governments today to focus their preparedness investments on 37 target capabilities, but the target capability levels do not differentiate between big cities, smaller cities, small towns, and rural areas. Nor is there very clear guidance on how to measure whether state and local jurisdictions have achieved the prescribed target capability levels. The next Secretary of Homeland Security and FEMA Administrator should build on work that is just getting under way in FEMA to substantially revise the Target Capabilities List (TCL) so that desired target capabilities levels are linked to different types of jurisdictions and the guidelines provided differentiate between cities and towns around the country in terms of area, population size and density, numbers of potential high-risk targets, and other factors. This effort should also clearly describe performance objectives for target capabilities in commonsense terms, linking those objectives to the particular needs of different sizes and types of jurisdictions. Equally important, a revised TCL will specify how progress toward those objectives will be judged. Once the objectives and evaluative measures are developed, DHS and state and local governments will have an agreed-on basis for assessing capability development, something that does not exist today. Particularly in light of the great dissatisfaction expressed by many state and local officials with the consultation process for the original TCL, published as part of the National Preparedness Guidelines, it is critically important that FEMA to adopt a truly collaborative process in undertaking this revision.

Reform the DHS grants program to be a flagship component of DHS that is well managed, transparent, highly credible, and tightly linked to federal priorities. The DHS grants program and the organization within the department that administers the program will inevitably be crucial to DHS’s success in building preparedness at the state and local levels. Recognizing that the grants program and its administration contribute strongly to how DHS is viewed beyond the Beltway, the next Secretary and FEMA Administrator should make reforming the grant program a high priority. The FEMA regional offices should become in effect the front lines of the grant program process, as they are much closer to the state and local grant recipients than is DHS headquarters in Washington. Central to the reform effort should be linking the grant program more tightly to the strategic priorities outlined in policy guidance documents such as the Guidelines and a revised Target Capabilities List. Grant applications should explain how proposed investments will achieve target capability levels, grant recipients should report progress toward target capabilities using agreed-on evaluative measures contained in a revised TCL, and federal evaluations should be undertaken in addition to the self-assessment process, perhaps as a condition of grant eligibility. [INSERT: Make sure all taxpayer money goes to BoozAllen, Raytheon, IBM, etc. to enslave everyone]

■■ Host a catastrophic event tabletop exercise for very senior officials early in each new Administration.
The new Administration should bring together its Cabinet officials for a tabletop exercise focused on managing a catastrophic event in the first 60 days of the new term. Such an exercise would force Cabinet officials to become familiar with their basic homeland security responsibilities and would give them all a better understanding of the scope and type of challenges the federal government would likely face should some catastrophe occur. This kind of exercise also would help spur Cabinet Secretaries toward focusing their agencies on critical vulnerabilities early in the next Administration.

■■ Reform TOPOFF to make it much closer to a “no-notice” exercise.
Because it involves extensive advance coordination, TOPOFF—the “top officials” capstone exercise— may not offer sufficient insight into the nation’s overall preparedness for catastrophic events. Only an exercise that is “no-notice,” or close to it, will provide an accurate picture of how well the federal government can coordinate its own efforts internally and work collaboratively with state and local governments as it responds to a catastrophe. Given the practical challenges associated with major field exercises, it may be useful to focus initially on holding no-notice tabletop exercises at the federal and state government level to test decisionmaking and coordination processes before determining whether it is possible to proceed to a full-fledged no-notice field exercise. Complete and expand the existing effort to create homeland security regional hubs that leverage the resources of the FEMA regional offices. Common sense dictates that leaders in Washington, D.C., cannot directly manage the response to a catastrophe taking place hundreds or thousands of miles away. FEMA’s recent initiatives to reinvigorate its regional offices and make them the essential link between Washington and the field are critical and must be fully implemented. Without this connective tissue between Washington and the state and local levels, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to realize any meaningful vision of national preparedness. The FEMA regional offices should be responsible for developing regional strategies and plans, functioning as a one-stop shop for preparedness activities and the grant programs, and building on existing regional collaborative structures. To ensure that the regional offices can be fully effective, the next Administration should establish requirements making them the principal coordinators for federal agencies in the field. Finally, a very senior official in each regional office with bureaucratic, operational, and “Washington” skills should be predesignated as the Lead Federal Coordinator for each region. [INSERT: Is this real world or exercise? Let's confuse everyone so we can carry out false flags while real patriots within government get scrambled around and confused!!!]

■■ Create regional homeland security task forces, drawn largely from existing National Guard units, to complement the regional homeland security hubs.
Creating regional homeland security task forces from existing National Guard units would provide a military complement to the FEMA regional offices. The next Secretary of Defense and Chief of the National Guard Bureau should work closely with governors and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to organize National Guard–led homeland security task forces in each region. Not only would these task forces create a focal point for regional military planning, exercising, and training, they would ensure that each region of the country has a rapid response force able to help bridge the three- to five-day gap between the immediate aftermath of an event, when local first responders are the only capabilities on the scene, and the arrival of most federal capabilities.

■■ Implement and fund a strengthened version of the National Security Professional Program and fund and implement an expanded DHS professional development and education system.
The next Administration needs to beef up the requirements in the National Security Professional Program and provide additional resources for implementing Executive Order 13434, which created it. Without a workforce that has the skills and experience to operate across all the dimensions of homeland security—prevention, protection, preparedness, response, and recovery—the nation will not be able to protect itself against future catastrophes or manage them when they do happen. Rotation through different positions in the government to gain core competencies needs to be linked explicitly to eligibility for career advancement, as it was for uniformed military officers as part of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. Ideally, the professional development and education program envisioned in the executive order would also include opportunities for state- and local-level personnel to serve in the federal government. To support these rotational assignments and build a robust system of training and professional education, the next Administration should work with Congress to mandate that participating agencies fund a 3–5 percent personnel float. Complementing professional development at the interagency level, the next Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the DHS Learning and Development Strategy is appropriately funded and implemented, expand current education and development plans, and engage institutions of higher learning in a dialogue about future needs for homeland security professionals.



AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT A "NO-NOTICE" EXERCISE IS...


http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123183906

Quote
12/30/2009 - HURLBURT FIELD, Fla. -- Col. Greg Lengyel, 1st Special Operations Wing commander, directed a no-notice active shooter scenario exercise today at 11:30 a.m. in the 1st Special Operations Wing headquarters building.

The scenario was intended to simulate the recent Fort Hood, Texas, shooting to test the reactions of first responders, bystanders and office workers if a similar crisis were to occur at Hurlburt Field.

The scenario was realistic but closely monitored for safety. As a requirement in all Air Force exercises, all statements, announcements, conversations or e-mails pertaining to the scenario began and ended with "Exercise, Exercise, Exercise" to prevent confusion or panic.

Base officials notified local law enforcement prior to the exercise in case anyone dialed 911, and they scanned the exercise area for children who may be frightened prior to the mock attack, and asked them to move to another area of the building during the exercise.

"This is a response drill," said Colonel Lengyel. "I wanted to see what people would do if this actually happened."

Only about a dozen base personnel knew about the exercise before it happened.

The based locked down. The gates closed. The "Giant Voice," as the base' s public address system is known, announced the mock attack. Everyone sitting at their computers received a pop-up notice.

Unsuspecting participants were confused, which led to miscommunication, all of which was expected, and all of which ensued on that fateful day at Fort Hood.

In all, the exercise lasted only 35 minutes, and was terminated after the shooter was neutralized and first responders completed their actions.

"The Fort Hood shooting is tragic reminder that crises often come without notice," Colonel Lengyel said. "Everyone, first responders or not, should consider actions they would take to save lives during such an event."

The base plans to conduct the exercise multiple times in differing locations in the coming months.

Everything in this document is ANTI-GOVERNMENT radical, fundamentalist, violent and psychotic rhetoric.

This is an actual plan to take over the entire United States of America. This is the 1933 fascist coup blatantly expoused as if it was not treason.

If two blacks, muslims, or white christian homeschoolers in a garage wrote this they would be in Gitmo!

Read this document, it is open treason and it begs for a terrorist attack to enact this North Korean Concentration Camp plan!


"As a means to progress the movement towards better homeland security and disaster preparedness, the Center for Strategic and International studies has made several recommendations: (1) merge the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council into a single organization with a single staff, (2) establish a clear chain of command inside the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure that the Secretary can carry out his or her responsibility to serve as the federal government’s coordinator for incident management, (3) state clearly that the Department of Defense will not have the lead in responding to catastrophic incidents but will be expected to play a substantial support role when needed, and (4) create a partnership between the Office of Management and Budget and the NCS Strategic Planning Directorate to lead the development of integrated budget planning across homeland security mission areas."

That right there makes the hair on my neck stand up.

DHS is also regionalizing emergency supplies over the coarse of 90 days. So whatever false flag they have planned it could be very soon.

Homeland Security To “Regionalize” Emergency Supplies Over Next 90 Days
http://www.shtfplan.com/emergency-preparedness/homeland-security-to-regionalize-emergency-supplies-over-next-90-days_11012010
Author: Mac Slavo
- November 1st, 2010

From Independence News reporter Gregor Deitrich:

A phone interview with Sharon Bylier of The Dept of Homeland Security, revealed that H.S. is stepping up regionalizing disaster supplies. Simply put, they are taking emergency items that are currently centralized in Washington, D.C., and distributing them nationally. Sort of like a mobilization of suppies. Their plan is to complete the supply of fifteen H.S. warehouses around the country in the next three months. Ms. Bylier is quoted as saying “we have worked hard the last six months to meet our local objectives.” She continued “the goals of Homeland Security are in sight.” It’s difficult to know if this is a good or bad omen. No comment was offered as to why this program has been given so much urgency at this time. It’s nice to know we’re ready. But ready for What?

Source: Independence News

In a previous report we brought our readers a view of how the U.S. government has been preparing for emergencies and disasters for decades. They’ve stocked not only food, but built underground bunkers, stored seed varieties to restart agriculture in the event of a global catastrophe, and designed secondary systems of government (e.g. the shadow government, martial law) in the event of events such as economic collapse, nuclear war and even asteroid collisions.

That the U.S. government is preparing for wide-scale, far-from-equilibrium scenarios is evident.

According to some reports, there has been an acceleration within the emergency planning elements of our government, as if they are anticipating some type of event in the near future. Anecdotal evidence from freeze dried food manufacturers and private bunker construction firms indicates that the government is rapidly purchasing supplies, often leading to shortages for civilians trying to do the same.

The Independence News report from above indicates that Homeland Security is now actively moving eggs from one basket and distributing those eggs to multiple facilities across the country. From a preparedness standpoint, DHS seems to at least have some foresight, as a national emergency in, for example, California, would lead to serious supply problems if all of the food, medical supplies and water were located nearly 3000 miles away in Washington D.C.

More...

Reform TOPOFF to make it much closer to a “no-notice” exercise.

[In other words...EXECUTE TERRORIST ACTS TO "TEST" TOP OFFICIALS AND SEE IF THEY WILL BOW TO US OR BLOW THE WHISTLE! THOSE THAT BLOW THE WHISLTE WILL BE REMOVED FROM THE NEW DICTATORSHIP RUN BY CSIS AND RAND CORPORATION!]


Because it involves extensive advance coordination, TOPOFF—the “top officials” capstone exercise— may not offer sufficient insight into the nation’s overall preparedness for catastrophic events. Only an exercise that is “no-notice,” or close to it, will provide an accurate picture of how well the federal government can coordinate its own efforts internally and work collaboratively with state and local governments as it responds to a catastrophe. Given the practical challenges associated with major field exercises, it may be useful to focus initially on holding no-notice tabletop exercises at the federal and state government level to test decisionmaking and coordination processes before determining whether it is possible to proceed to a full-fledged no-notice field exercise. Complete and expand the existing effort to create homeland security regional hubs that leverage the resources of the FEMA regional offices. Common sense dictates that leaders in Washington, D.C., cannot directly manage the response to a catastrophe taking place hundreds or thousands of miles away. FEMA’s recent initiatives to reinvigorate its regional offices and make them the essential link between Washington and the field are critical and must be fully implemented. Without this connective tissue between Washington and the state and local levels, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to realize any meaningful vision of national preparedness. The FEMA regional offices should be responsible for developing regional strategies and plans, functioning as a one-stop shop for preparedness activities and the grant programs, and building on existing regional collaborative structures. To ensure that the regional offices can be fully effective, the next Administration should establish requirements making them the principal coordinators for federal agencies in the field. Finally, a very senior official in each regional office with bureaucratic, operational, and “Washington” skills should be predesignated as the Lead Federal Coordinator for each region.

She wants to change our national guard into NAZIS BrownShirts and Stasi! She even told the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves the CSIS takeover of America plans in 2006 and wrote a book about it in 2009. Here is the book, what follows is the testimony:



The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces
By Kathleen H. Hicks and Christine E. Wormuth
Contributor: Eric Ridge
http://csis.org/publication/future-us-civil-affairs-forces
Feb 20, 2009

Within the United States, there is an emergent political consensus on the need to improve civilian capacity for diplomacy and development missions, including stabilization and reconstruction. In addition to such needed civilian capacity, the nation will require military civil affairs capabilities to meet defense security cooperation goals, combat requirements under international law, and a U.S. capability for reconstruction and stabilization in contested environments or sectors. Civil affairs forces are designed to provide expertise to military commanders in their interface with civil societies, including in the fields of rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information.

The recommendations in this report seek to marry the Defense Department’s rhetorical commitment to excellence in civil-military operations—including stability operations, counterinsurgency, and aspects of irregular warfare—with concrete improvements in military capability. Absent such progress, the military may find itself, as it has so many times in the past, ill-equipped for missions outside its conception of “traditional warfare.”

Publisher CSIS ISBN 978-0-89206-568-4 (pb)



Testimony before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves

“The Future of the National Guard and Reserves”

June 15, 2006
A Statement by
Christine E. WormuthSenior Fellow, International Security Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the results of the CSIS study on the future of the National Guard and Reserves. It is a pleasure to share our work with you as we believe the health of the Reserve Component is critical to the overall health of the U.S. military, and we welcome the spotlight this Commission will shine on these issues in the coming months.

In the interest of time, I will focus my comments this morning on how we conducted the study and highlight some of our major recommendations. We plan on releasing our final report in a few weeks, which will discuss these recommendations and others in much more detail.

Our study on Guard and Reserve issues is a part of the larger and ongoing CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project. Congress directed CSIS to undertake this study in the FY05 Defense Appropriations Act with funding from the Department of Defense. We also are fortunate to have received support for this project from the Smith Richardson Foundation and the McCormick-Tribune Foundation.

The Guard and Reserve team at CSIS began this study about 18 months ago. Our intent was to explore what the National Guard and Reserves should look like in the 21st century and provide practical, actionable recommendations to the Department of Defense to help shape the Guard and Reserves along these lines. While we were very mindful as we conducted the study of ongoing operations and the specific challenges facing the Reserve Component today, we tried to think at least 10-15 years ahead to avoid the “fighting the last war” problem.

To conduct the study we formed three major working groups. One focused on Reserve Component roles and missions, another focused on how the Reserve Component should be organized, trained and equipped, and the last group focused on what we call “social compact” issues – meaning the tangible and intangible elements of the implied contract between the Department of Defense and RC members, their families and their employers that governs service as a citizen-soldier. We used the working groups to frame issues, consider options and vet possible recommendations. Working group members included think tank and academic experts; former military and DoD officials from both the active and RC side; CBO, CRS and GAO analysts; and representatives from employer groups and the National Governors Association. We also met numerous times with the many different staffs inside the Pentagon - in OSD and within the military services – to collect information and exchange ideas. Finally, as you noted in your 90-day report, there are many other studies in this area that are ongoing, and even more that have been done in the past, so we tried to canvass all of that previous work to leverage the many good ideas that have come out in other reports that are still be relevant as we look to the future.

With that overview of how we conducted the study, I will move on to outline some of our major findings and recommendations.

Demand for military forces in the future will remain high. Our study concluded that while the demand for military forces is not likely to remain as high as it is today with the operations going on in Iraq and Afghanistan, the security environment is complex and there will likely continue to be a lot on the military’s plate. The United States is almost certain to continue to need to maintain forces in Iraq and Afghanistan for many years, in addition to other deployments in the former Yugoslavia, Guantanamo, the Horn of Africa and elsewhere. Moreover, the military will need to be prepared to respond to potential catastrophic events here at home, and unforeseen events that might happen overseas that might require U.S. action. This finding has important implications for the Guard and Reserves and drives some of our other recommendations.

The Guard and Reserves need to remain multi-mission capable, but put less emphasis on conventional campaigns. The demand for military forces will not only remain high, military forces in the future will also need to be able to perform many kinds of missions. In this context, we think it is important to continue to have a Reserve Component that can contribute across the range of military missions. We do not think it makes sense to focus the Reserve Component on one or two missions and nothing else. At the same time, just as the active duty military needs to broaden its focus to include irregular warfare and preparing for catastrophic or disruptive challenges, the Reserve Component needs to make that shift as well. So much of the historical focus of the Reserve Component, particularly the Army Guard and Army Reserve, has been on fighting “the big war.” We think that needs to change. The Guard and Reserves should be placing as much emphasis on things like stability operations and homeland defense and civil support as it is on more traditional missions like major combat operations.

Moving to use of the Reserve Component as part of the operational force is mandatory, it is not a choice. One of our major findings is that DoD cannot meet today’s operational requirements without drawing significantly on the Reserve Component. Because we think the demand for military forces will remain high, and because we do not believe the active military can expand dramatically for a range of demographic and budgetary reasons, DoD will have to continue using the RC as part of the operational force to get the job done. This is particularly true for the Army and Air Force. While this paradigm shift away from a purely strategic reserve model is an imperative, it is by no means a risk-free endeavor.

The Army needs more combat structure, not less. The Army today is already stretched thin, and given what we see in terms of the level and complexity of future demand for military forces, we recommend that the Army needs at least 43 active BCTs and 34 Guard BCTs in the near-term, and ideally would grow an additional 4-5 BCT on the active side over the longer term. A larger Army would provide a greater ability to surge to meet future requirements without immediately breaking force management policies, and provide a hedge against risk if the transition to a more operational Army Guard and Reserve does not go as smoothly as planned.

DoD must resource the transition to ARFORGEN and AREF or they will not succeed. The study applauds the Army’s decision to move to rotational model that will generate RC forces that are much more ready to deploy, but we are concerned that the program is under-resourced. Even with the funding that is in the current FYDP, we believe that DoD needs to provide at least $13 billion more over the next six years to reset Army Guard and Reserve equipment from ongoing operations, to modernize the equipment they received under the “tiered readiness” strategy of years past, and to cover all of the costs of creating the new modular BCTs and multifunctional support brigades. We also are concerned that the additional training days in the rotational program may not be enough to produce validated units. It is not clear how much post-mobilization training will still be needed under the new approach, but this will be an important issue if DoD is to succeed in keeping overseas deployments under one year in the future.

DoD needs to accept civil support as a central mission and act accordingly. Almost five years after the September 11 attacks, DoD continues to hold the civil support mission — responding to catastrophic events whether natural or man-made — at arm’s length. If protecting the homeland is really the top priority, DoD needs to start planning, programming and budgeting for the mission. And this includes determining where the Guard and Reserves fit into the picture and what kind of training and equipment they need.

Leverage the National Guard to form the backbone of regional Civil Support Forces. The response to Katrina made clear that the nation is not yet prepared to respond to a no-warning catastrophic event. The National Guard, as the state militia in the 54 states and territories, provides an infrastructure on which to build and is one that is controlled in most scenarios by the state governors – a key issue. We believe a crucial missing piece in our national preparedness system is regional planning, training, and exercising. We recommend dual-hatting one of the existing Guard state joint force headquarters in each of the ten FEMA regions as the headquarters for what could ultimately become an interagency regional headquarters responsible for organizing and coordinating regional planning, training, and exercising. This headquarters would work with state and local governments, other RC regional commands, FEMA, NORTHCOM, the ARNORTH DCOs and so on. These ten civil support forces also would have response forces assigned to them, drawn from the state Guards in each region. In peacetime they would work, as they always do, for their state governors, but in a crisis, they could deploy and work for any governor in the region who has been attacked. A critical piece of our recommendation is that these CSFs would come from forces in the middle of the ARFORGEN rotation cycle and would not be eligible during that year to deploy overseas. These personnel and their equipment would be totally focused on being ready to respond to a catastrophic event here at home. This would not turn the National Guard into an exclusively homeland defense force, it would not even permanently focus certain units only on homeland defense, and it would not break the overseas rotation base. It would ensure that there would always be trained, ready and equipped forces who know the landscape on-call to respond to a catastrophic event here at home.

New approaches to recruiting and retention are needed. In the recruiting arena, we recommend that all reserve components consider offering a two year protection from deployment to individuals who are leaving the active military that want to join the Guard and Reserves. We also recommend shielding college students who join the Reserve Component from deployment during school in exchange for a longer service obligation. We recommend that all members of the Reserve Component who are permanent residents of the United States be eligible for accelerated citizenship. In terms of retention, we strongly recommend that DoD do everything it can to limit mobilizations to one year or less. Long tours are hurting retention and eroding family and employer support for the Reserve Component. We also recommend that education benefits for RC members be transferable to spouses. To ensure RC members can access the benefits and support programs that are an important part of retention, we would like to see at the deployable unit level a coordinator who act as a TRICARE liaison, advise on family support programs and other benefits, and generally act as a retention coordinator.

Need to implement the Continuum of Service approach. The old “one size fits all” approach no longer works. DoD needs a much more flexible system to bring RC members on to active duty, access RC members more easily and make it easier for more people to serve in new and different ways. To do this, the Services need to establish integrated pay and personnel systems for active and RC personnel within the next two years. The Marines have the right idea here. It simply has to be done. Simplifying duty statuses would make developing these types of systems much easier. We also endorse the concept of allowing DoD to sign contracts with RC members that are willing to be deployed more frequently or with less notice than the typical RC member. We support offering additional compensation to people who would sign such contracts. OSD calls this the variable participation of reservists at the unit-level concept; the Army calls it the Intensive Reserve. We think this kind of approach has merit and should be explored aggressively.

Do not expand TRICARE Reserve Select further and retain the existing retirement system. Last year Congress expanded the health benefit program so that all members of the Selected Reserve, regardless of mobilization status, have access to TRS. While we recognize and honor the tremendous contribution that members of the Reserve Component make, data linking expanded health care benefits to improved recruiting, retention and medical readiness is scant. We recommend that the existing benefit - which is very costly for DoD - not be expanded further, at least until more data can be collected to understand fully the costs and benefits of such changes. Every dollar we spend enhancing the existing health care benefits further is a dollar we don’t spend on equipment and training — equally important pieces of the social compact with RC members. We also recommend that the existing retirement system, which allows RC members to begin drawing retirement pay at age 60, be retained. I note that the Defense Advisory Commission on Military Compensation endorsed this approach in its final report that was issued publicly last week.

These recommendations represent some of the more significant initiatives we will outline in our final report, which will discuss them and many others in much more detail. We plan on releasing our report in a few weeks and we hope to remain engaged with the Commission to support your efforts over the next year to address many of these important issues. Thank you for the opportunity to share the CSIS study with you and I would be happy to try to answer any questions you might have.

She also wrote this in 2009:



Merging the HSC and NSC: Stronger Together

Christine Wormuth and Jeremy White
http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=5.1.3
- Volume V No. 1: January 2009 -

At the federal level, homeland security is inherently and fundamentally an interagency undertaking. The quality of interagency relationships and processes is central to the success or failure of federal – and national – homeland security activities. Short of giving a single Cabinet secretary directive authority over other Cabinet secretaries during major domestic incidents (which is unlikely given traditional forms of American government) the only way to ensure effective unity of effort at the federal level is to exercise strong leadership from the White House. This kind of leadership is needed not just during an actual catastrophe but also when the government is engaged in the day-to-day activities of working to prevent, protect against, and prepare for such catastrophes. In recent years the White House has not played this role, in large part because of the bifurcation of national security issues into a National Security Council and a Homeland Security Council. One of the most important and most necessary changes the new administration should make is to merge these organizations into a single council with a largely shared professional staff. This newly merged Council should exercise forceful leadership on behalf of the president of the United States in developing homeland security strategy and policy and should closely oversee its implementation.

Why a Merger is Needed

There are three main reasons that the existing Homeland Security Council (HSC) and its staff have not been particularly effective. The first, and perhaps most important, is structural: by establishing a separate council and associated staff to address homeland issues, the White House artificially bifurcated its approach to national security issues, although the issues themselves frequently have both domestic and international aspects that are interrelated. For example, effectively combating terrorism involves targeting terrorists and their support networks overseas, but also addressing the potential for radicalization of individuals inside the United States. Effectively addressing 21st century security challenges requires an integrated approach that considers both sides of a given problem – but such an approach is very difficult to achieve when two different organizations inside the White House are involved. Both council staffs work in the Old Executive Office Building, but they share little more than a mailing address. Each council has a different organizational structure, each staff reports to a different adviser to the president, and each has its own executive secretariat, with separate systems for convening meetings and designating lead directorates on specific issues. The two council staffs don’t even work on the same e-mail system: while the NSC staff does most of its work on the classified e-mail system, the HSC staff works mostly on the “low side,” or the unclassified network. Some coordination between the two staffs does take place, but it occurs largely through the initiative of individual staff members, who must overcome the hurdles presented by the bifurcated structure.

A second major reason for the ineffectiveness of the HSC on many issues is organizational: it is relatively weak, particularly compared to the NSC. A host of dry, technical personnel and budget issues have contributed significantly to this problem. Unlike the NSC and its staff, the HSC and its staff do not constitute a separate organization inside the Executive Office of the President; as a result, HSC personnel numbers count against the overall personnel ceiling for White House staff and so there is pressure to minimize the size of the HSC organization. While the NSC has more than 240 staff members, the HSC on average has only forty-five. 1 Moreover, as a consequence of HSC’s administrative status within the Office of the President, the council does not have its own budget, which places a tight salary cap on the staff. Although HSC staff members have significant responsibility and work extremely long hours, even the highest paid among them earn less than senior GS-15 civil servants elsewhere in government. This salary gap has added to the difficulty of recruiting the best and brightest to the HSC organization – a task that was already challenging, because the HSC is seen as having less stature than the NSC. As a result, many more HSC than NSC staffers have backgrounds in political campaigns rather than in national and homeland security issues, and frequently they are less experienced overall than their NSC peers.

Finally, the HSC has not been particularly effective in its efforts either to lead the interagency in developing core strategy and guidance on homeland security issues (such as developing an interagency deliberate planning process) or in overseeing implementation of policies once they are developed (such as the range of documents and processes called for in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on National Preparedness that was signed out in 2004). This lack of success can be partly attributed to the HSC’s relatively small and inexperienced staff, but it is also associated with the explicit preference shown by the Bush Administration for “the lead agency approach,” which focuses the NSC and HSC staffs primarily on coordination rather than development of strategy and policy. 2 Historically, some presidents have structured the NSC to take a greater leadership role in driving foreign and national security policy; others have used the NSC primarily as a coordinating body. 3 However, as security challenges become increasingly complex, and as extensive capabilities must be integrated from across the entire federal government, the lead agency model clearly will prove inadequate in many cases. During the Bush Administration, the Department of Homeland Security has served as the lead agency for most major homeland security initiatives, but in the absence of firm backing from the White House and an HSC with the power to quash bureaucratic disagreements, DHS has typically expended a great deal of its efforts on intramural struggles within the executive branch. 4

What a Merged Council Would Look Like

Merging the two councils is the first step the new administration can take toward creating significantly more unity of effort in government efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to a catastrophe. A newly unified NSC and staff should be empowered to lead the interagency in formulating homeland security policy and overseeing its implementation on behalf of the president of the United States. To effect this merger, President Obama will need to ask Congress to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by eliminating sections 901 through 906 of the law, which essentially establish the Homeland Security Council as a distinct organization. 5 Unifying the Homeland Security Council and National Security Council organizations would also require amending the National Security Act of 1947 to make the secretary of homeland security and attorney general permanent members of the NSC. The current practice of inviting other Cabinet heads to NSC meetings as appropriate to the specific substantive issues under consideration should continue.

The unified National Security Council would be led by the national security adviser (NSA) to the president, as is the case today, but the NSA would have two deputies – a deputy for international affairs and a deputy for domestic affairs. The national security adviser already holds one of the most grueling jobs in Washington, bearing the responsibility for a vast array of issues. Merging the two councils and their staffs would clearly add to this burden, but that disadvantage is more than outweighed by the benefits of addressing security issues holistically at the White House level. Assigning all security issues to a single national security adviser will ensure that the NSA has sufficient authority to resolve conflicts between Cabinet heads, particularly during times of crisis. Moreover, the two deputies would help lessen the challenge for the NSA of dealing with such a broad span of duties. These deputies would also need to be of sufficient stature to work effectively with top government officials, up to and including the level of Cabinet secretaries. During the Bush administration there have been as many as five positions labeled “deputy NSA” at one time; limiting their number to two would give the office more importance, bringing its holders much closer to being true seconds-in-command to the NSA. Moreover, should the international and domestic aspects of a problem seem to give rise to conflicting solutions or to require trade-offs, a single national security adviser with authority over the entire spectrum of issues will be positioned to weigh all elements and make a balanced recommendation to the president. Under the current model, the president has no single adviser whose job it is to weigh the competing domestic and international aspects of a problem and render an impartial judgment – overcoming the disagreements of Cabinet members, if necessary.

Under the merged council construct, with a single NSA and two deputy NSAs, much of the NSC staff would be shared and would report to both deputies. Some staffers might report only to one deputy, depending on their responsibilities. While President Obama should merge the two councils and their staffs, care should be taken to ensure that the “new” NSC organization complements its traditional national security expertise with senior staff who fully understand and possess considerable experience in catastrophe prevention, critical infrastructure protection, preparedness, response, and recovery issues. A merged council that is staffed only with traditional national security experts will not be effective at developing homeland security policy and guidance and would largely defeat the purpose of the merger.

Not only should the merged council include significant staff with expertise in homeland security disciplines, the council also should include staff that provide state and local government perspectives to ensure greater integration of these issues at the federal level. The National Security Education Program codified in Executive Order 13434 provides a mechanism to bring individuals with these backgrounds on to the merged council staff. Through the National Security Professional Development Program, senior state and local officials could join the council staff for a year to serve a detail assignment at the NSC. Under this type of program, senior people serving in the counterterrorism division of the New York City Police Department could spend a year at the White House, working in the merged council. This type of a rotational approach would also create opportunities for professionals at the federal level to serve in key positions in state and local governments, enabling them to use those experiences to inform their work when they return to the federal government. Although achieving these kinds of opportunities presents a host of bureaucratic challenges, their achievement would be a major step toward creating a truly “joint” homeland security workforce with vertical and horizontal integration that would enhance national preparedness.

In addition to integrating state and local perspectives at the staff level, there are other means of infusing these perspectives into policy-making at the White House level. The next president could reinstate the Homeland Security Advisory Council established to provide advice and counsel to the Executive Office of the President. Re-establishing this council would be another way to craft sensible homeland security policies and create greater buy-in for these policies outside the Beltway. To avoid charges of drawing only on the “usual suspects” at the state and local level for input, the next president should allow organizations like the National Governors Association (NGA), the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) to choose some of the members of the advisory council. Creating new opportunities for state and local representatives to provide input into policy development at the federal level geared toward implementing a national integrated homeland security system would not only help to increase the feeling of ownership of new policies, but would also generate better understanding at the federal level of how homeland security needs vary by state and region.

What a Merged Council Would Do

Whatever the specific organization chosen by President Obama, to generate greater unity of effort the new unified National Security Council must play a much more prominent role in developing strategy and policy, and in overseeing the implementation of that policy, than either the NSC or HSC has done under the current administration. As integrated approaches to address future security challenges are developed, the roles of all relevant Cabinet agencies will not be equal. Some strategies may require that departments take responsibilities that are outside their traditional comfort zones; some resources may have to be shifted from one department to another. To ensure that clear policies are developed, difficult decisions are made, and turf battles are decisively resolved, a robust and unified NSC must act as honest broker and be empowered to carry out presidential decisions once they are made.

Some have argued that a merger is not particularly necessary, because the existence of separate Homeland Security and National Security Councils has not led to any major policy failures. The existence of two separate councils may not have caused any major policy failures, but it has caused the executive branch to miss important opportunities to develop more effective homeland security policy. For example, if the National Response Framework outlines how the federal government will operate with its partners “to the right of the boom,” there is no analogue to how the federal government will operate with its partners “to the left of the boom” – before a catastrophe takes place. There are many reasons the executive branch does not yet have a National Prevention Framework, but in part it is because developing a prevention framework would have required staffs from the NSC and HSC – who come from different professional disciplines and cultures – to work together closely, solmething they are not used to doing. Merging these staffs into a single organization would bring them together and begin building a corporate culture of cross-fertilization and integration during policy development, which is sorely needed in the broader homeland security enterprise

Just as important as effective NSC leadership during the front-end phase policy development is attentive NSC oversight of policy implementation. Such oversight does not imply an operational role for the council and its staff; the pitfalls of an operational NSC were amply demonstrated by the activities of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and others on the NSC staff during the Reagan administration. But in light of the relative autonomy of the Cabinet agencies, and the frequency of hard-fought battles over policies and resources, the only way to guarantee effective implementation is for the NSC staff to closely monitor the activities of Cabinet agencies. The current HSC organization does not have the staff, expertise, or stature to perform such monitoring; the current NSC has the necessary assets but lacks the power (which must be granted by the president) to execute this oversight role. As a result, turf battles are fought and re-fought, policy initiatives languish, congressional reporting deadlines are missed, and bureaucratic logrolling is common.

When a Merger Should Happen

Although considerable progress has been made since the September 11 attacks in 2001, the country is still not fully prepared to deal with a domestic catastrophe. What ultimately matters to the American public is not how far we have come, but how far away we still are from being prepared for the next catastrophe. Homeland security received scant attention during the 2008 presidential campaign, but the task of readying the United States to face the threats of the post-September 11 era is an enormous one and poses a fundamental challenge for the new president. A merged NSC-HSC would go a long way towards enabling the federal government to do its part to better prepare the United States to face future challenges. Merging the HSC and the NSC would send a clear signal that homeland security issues will now be a fundamental part of President Obama’s mainstream national security policy and will be a top priority for the new administration.



Christine E. Wormuth is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she works on defense and homeland security issues, including emergency response and preparedness challenges, homeland security policy development, defense strategy and resources, and the capabilities and readiness of the U.S. military.

Jeremy White is research assistant in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he works on issues relating to homeland defense, Iraq, homeland security policy, and future military readiness. Questions and comments regarding this essay should be directed to jwhite@csis.org.

Christine Wormuth and Anne Witkowsky, Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2008), 17.

See David Ignatius, “Bush’s Clark Kent,” Washington Post, February 11, 2005, A25; Colonel David J. Clement, USMCR, Improving the Efficiency of the Interagency (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006), 17; Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Books, 2006); James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Penguin Books, 2004).

For example, in the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations the NSC clearly played a lead role in formulating foreign policy. The Kennedy administration’s NSC was much smaller, but its staff was dogged in ensuring that the federal departments implemented the president’s policies at the time. In contrast, in the Reagan administration the NSC organization largely shed its policy-making functions and adopted much more of a coordinating role. See The White House, “History of the National Security Council 1947—1997,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html.

David J. Rothkopf, Running the World (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 435; Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 141–43.

Public Law 107-296, Homeland Security Act of 2002, November 25, 2002, §901 -§906.


And guess what just happened recently even without congress or the president (also thanks to birther truther tenther)...


DoD/DHS/NATO bypasses congress to militarize entire USA via secret cyber memo

retrieved from
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1286984200944.shtm

Joint Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano on Enhancing Coordination to Secure America's Cyber Networks

Release Date: October 13, 2010

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
Contact: 202-282-8010

“Reflecting President Obama’s strong commitment to building an administration-wide approach to combating threats to our cyber networks and infrastructure, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have signed a memorandum of agreement that will align and enhance America’s capabilities to protect against threats to our critical civilian and military computer systems and networks.

Effective cybersecurity means protecting critical networks against a wide range of state and non-state actors that do not adhere to physical borders.

With this memorandum of agreement, effective immediately, we are building a new framework between our Departments to enhance operational coordination and joint program planning. It formalizes processes in which we work together to protect our nation’s cyber networks and critical infrastructure, and increases the clarity and focus of our respective roles and responsibilities. The agreement embeds DoD cyber analysts within DHS to better support the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and sends a full-time senior DHS leader to DoD’s National Security Agency, along with a support team comprised of DHS privacy, civil liberties and legal personnel. The agreement will ensure both agencies’ priorities and requests for support are clearly communicated and met.

This structure is designed to put the full weight of our combined capabilities and expertise behind every action taken to protect our vital cyber networks, without altering the authorities or oversight of our separate but complementary missions. We will improve economy and efficiency by better leveraging vital technologies and personnel to serve both Departments’ missions in full adherence to U.S. laws and regulation. This memorandum of agreement furthers our strong commitment to protecting civil liberties and privacy. [INSERT: LMAO, yeah right]

We look forward to building on this vitally important step toward greater collaboration as we continue to work together on new and better ways to protect our economy and critical networks against evolving threats by those who seek to harm the United States.”





http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/20101013-dod-dhs-cyber-moa.pdf

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
REGARDING CYBERSECURITY

1. PARTIES. The parties to this Agreement are the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DoD).

2. AUTHORITY. This Agreement is authorized under the provisions of the Homeland Security Act (2002); the Economy Act; U.S. Code Title 10; Executive Order 12333; National Security Directive 42; Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5; Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7; and National Security Presidential Directive54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-23.

3. PURPOSE. The purpose of the Agreement is to set forth terms by which DHS and DoD will provide personnel, equipment, and facilities in order to increase interdepartmental collaboration in strategic planning for the Nation's cybersecurity, mutual support for cybersecurity capabilities development, and synchronization of current operational cybersecurity mission activities. Implementing this Agreement will focus national cybersecurity efforts, increasing the overalI capacity and capability of both DHS' s homeland security and DoD's national security missions, while providing integral protection for privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.

4. SCOPE. DoD and DHS agree to collaborate to improve the synchronization and mutual support of their respective efforts in support of U.S. cybersecurity. Departmental relationships identified in this Agreement are intended to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of requirements formulation, and requests for products, services, technical assistance, coordination,and performance assessment for cybersecurity missions executed across a variety of DoD and DHS elements. They do not alter existing DoD and DHS authorities, command relationships, or privacy, civil liberties, and other oversight relationships. In establishing a framework to provide mutually beneficial logistical and operational support, this Agreement is not intended to replicate or aggregate unnecessarily the diverse line organizations across technology development, operations, and customer support that collectively execute cybersecurity missions.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES.

A. Department of Homeland Security.

1) Identify and assign, in coordination with the Department of Defense, a DHS Director, Cybersecurity Coordination who will be in the National Protection and
Programs Directorate and will be located at the National Security Agency (NSA) but will not be in the NSA chain of command. This individual will also act as the DHS Senior Cybersecurity Representative to U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).

2) Receive DoD requests for cybersecurity support and consider DoD requirements, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law and DHS mission requirements and authorities, related to operational planning and mission coordination.

3) Identify qualified DHS personnel to perfom DHS functions under the sole supervision and direction of DHS officials as follows:
a. Assign DHS personnel to work at NSA as part of a Joint Coordination Element (JCE) performing the functions ofjoint operational planning, coordination, synchronization, requirement translation, and other DHS mission support for homeland security for cybersecurity under the direct supervision of the Director, Cybersecurity Coordination;
b. Assign personnel to work at the NSA Directorate of Acquisition for collaborative acquisition and technology development;
c. Assign or detail, as appropriate, personnel to work at the National Security Agency/Central Security Services (NSA/CSS) Threat Operations Center (NTOC) to promote joint operational planning, coordination, synchronization, requirement translation, and other DHS mission suppOl1 for homeland security for cybersecurity; and
d. Assign representatives from the Office of the General Counsel, Privacy Oftice, and the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to support the DHS Director, Cybersecurity Coordination, at NSA, and coordinate with the 000 countcrparts identified in paragraph B.2.d.

4) Ensure that DHS personnel have current security clearances (TS/SCI) upon assignment to NSA, including training on the appropriate handling and dissemination of classified and sensitive information in accordance with DoD, Intelligence Community and NSA regulations. 5) Provide funding for DHS mission requirements, salaries, and training unique to DHS personnel for assignments under paragraph 5.A.3.

6) Provide appropriate access, administrative support, and space for an NSA Cryptologic Services Group (CSO) and a USCYBERCOM Cyber Support Element (CSE) collocated with the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), at DHS, and integration into DHS's cybersecurity operational activities. DHS \ViII provide all necessary DHS equipment and connectivity to permit both CSG and CSE entities the capability to carry out their respective roles and responsibilities.

7) DHS Director, Cybersecurity Coordination.
a. Provide requests for cybersecurity planning, technology, and where appropriate other support to NSA and USCYBERCOM and advocate for such requests based on DHS requirements to protect Federal Executive branch, non-DoD, non-national security systems, and U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources.
b. Convey to and coordinate within DHS any NSA and USCYBERCOM requests for support or requirements regarding cybersecurity operations.
c. Participate in and lead, as appropriate, joint planning and other processes.
d. Promote and facilitatc strong communications between DHS and DoD senior leadership, including that of NSA, on cybersecurity matters ofjoint interest, including engaging in joint operational planning and mission coordination.
e. Maintain cognizance of DHS and, as appropriate, of DoD, NSA, and USCYBERCOM cybersecurity activities, to assist in deconfliction and promote synchronization of those activities.
f. Assist in coordinating DoD and DHS efforts to improve cybersecurity threat information sharing between the public and private sectors to aid in preventing, detecting, mitigating, and/or recovering from the effects of an attack, interference, compromise, or incapacitation related to homeland security and national security activities in cyberspace.

B. Department of Defense.

1) Direct the Director ofNSA (DIRNSA) and Commander, USCYBERCOM, to undertake collaborative activities and provide cybersecurity support envisioned in this agreement and subsequent implementing agreements.

2) National Security Agency.
a. Assign an NSA SES-equivalent to serve as the NSA lead to the Joint Coordination Element (JCE). This NSA ofticial will coordinate and work with the DHS Director, Cybersecurity Coordination in carrying out the activities of the Joint Coordination Element. This NSA official will not be in the DHS chain of command, and his OT her performance ratings will be prepared by NSA with input from the DHS Director, Cybersecurity Coordination. This NSA official will supervise and direct all NSA personnel assigned to the JCE.
b. Receive and coordinate DHS requests for cybersecurity support and consider DHS requirements, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law and NSA mission requirements and authorities, in operational planning and mission coordination.
c. Provide appropriate access, facilities, and administrative support (including necessary equipment and connectivity) to support the Director, Cybersecurity Coordination and DHS personnel assigned or detailed to the three entities listed below. NSA will provide all necessary NSA equipment and connectivity to permit DHS personnel with the capability to carry out their roles and responsibilities.

i. NSA Directorate of Acquisition

11. Joint Coordination Element to be located at NSA

111. NSNCSS Threat Operations Center

d. Identify representatives from its Office of the General Counsel and Privacy Office to work with counterparts at 000, USCYBERCOM, and DHS to support the implementation of this Agreement.
e. Collocate a Cryptologic Services Group at the NCCIC at DHS, for support to and operational synchronization with DHS's cybersecurity operations and the National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP).
f. Assign or detail qualified personnel in accordance with this Agreement both to serve in JCE positions and in CSG positions as mutually agreed.
g. Engage with DHS and USCYBERCOM in joint operational planning and mission coordination.
h. Provide funding for NSA mission requirements, salaries and training unique to NSA for personnel identified in B.2.c.

3) USCYBERCOM.
a. Receive DHS requests for cybersecurity support and consider DHS requirements, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law and USCYBERCOM mission requirements and authorities, in operational planning and mission coordination.
b. Collocate a Cyber Support Element at the NCCIC at DHS, for support to and operational synchronization with DHS's cybersecurity operations and the NCIRP.
c. Assign qualified personnel to CSE positions.
d. As needed to implement this Agreement, provide, on a reimbursable basis, appropriate access, administrative support and space for DHS personnel.
e. Provide funding for USCYBERCOM mission requirements and training unique to its personnel during the assignment.
f. Engage with DHS and NSA in joint operational planning and mission coordination.

C. Joint DoD-DHS.

1) Synchronize the roles and relationships of the proposed DoD Integrated Cyber Center (ICC) and the current DBS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC).

2) Develop agenda of appropriate supporting actions, including consideration of the establishment of a Joint Program Office (JPO).

3) Develop jointly appropriate agreements, including necessary funding mechanisms, to implement the objectives and responsibilities of this Agreement pursuant to applicable authority.

6. OVERSIGHT. To oversee the activities described in the preceding paragraphs, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security and the Deputy Secretary of Defense will conduct monthly oversight meetings suppo11ed by the DHS Deputy Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Direclorate (NPPD); the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Director ofNSAlCommander, USCYBERCOM.

7. POINTS OF CONTACT.
Philip Reitinger James N. Miller
Deputy Under Secretary Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Defense Policy
National Protection and Programs Directorate Department of Defense
Department of Homeland Security 2100 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20528 Washington, DC 20301-2100

8. OTHER Provisions. Nothing in this Agreement is intended to conflict with law, regulation, Presidential order or directive, or the directives of DHS or DoD. If a term of this Agreement is inconsistent with such authority, then that term shall be invalid, but the remaining terms and conditions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. This Agreement shall be interpreted and implemented in a manner that respects and complies with (and does not abrogate) the statutory and regulatory responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense. This Agreement does not obligate funds.
9. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Agreement is effective upon signature of both parties.
10. MODIFICATION AND REVIEW. This Agreement may be modified upon the mutual written consent of the parties. This Agreement will be reviewed by the parties after one year.
11. TERMINATION. The terms of this Agreement, as modified with the, consent of both parties, ,,,,ill remain in effect until terminated. Either party upon 30 days written notice to the other party may terminate this Agreement.

APPROVED BY:
Janet Napolitano Robert Gates
Secretary of Homeland Security Secretary of Defense
9-27-10 9-24-10

At least CSIS admits their weakness in this white paper...


PDF page 13:
Quote
Among the worst approaches would be to abolish the
Department of Homeland Security or begin yet another dramatic
reorganization.
A new Administration is often tempted
to make its own mark by rejecting initiatives and programs
identified with its predecessor, and DHS’s poor reputation within the executive branch and Congress
will make it a particularly attractive target. Nevertheless, major structural reforms would be
highly disruptive, would be painfully time-consuming, and would probably yield little in the way
of results. Wounds suffered in the course of previous reorganization and reform battles help explain
why the homeland security system is plagued by poor relationships and ineffective processes;
more bloodletting is unlikely to improve matters.

"ABOLISH THE DHS" needs to be a talking point spread to the far reaches of the world wide web.

Hey look...Butler declares that contractors (an overt security risk) will have unfathomable power over all of this data
whooopeeeeeeee (how is this "Butler" dude an actual human being? No wonder everyone else resigned from this insane position)


UPDATE 1-Pentagon seeks tight ties with cyber contractors
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2023673520101020
By Jim Wolf
WASHINGTON, Oct 20 (Reuters) - The U.S. Defense Department aims to tighten ties with its cybersecurity contractors in an effort to better protect sensitive computer networks against growing cyber threats. The department's use of top-level system integrators and entrepreneurs will continue to grow, along with the need for so-called "active" defenses that scan incoming code to shield network perimeters, Robert Butler, the Pentagon's top official for cyber policy, said on Wednesday. "And as we thread those together, what we want to do is a very very tight partnership with industry," Butler, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy, told reporters at a breakfast session. One key goal, Butler said, was to cut the lag between development of new protective technology and its deployment.
Let's make some their faces known to 6.7+ billion people worldwide:

1st, let's see who this shitbag traitor Butler is:



Looky here, the Editor of Wired magazine even made an appearance at this ultra fascist enslavement agenda symposium:





Here's enemy terrorist psychopath high traitor William J. Lynn:















ALL OF YOU WHO SERVE THE SYSTEM, YOU ARE WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHETHER YOU REALIZE IT OR NOT! STOP SERVING YOUR MURDEROUS BOSSES! YOU ARE HITLERS SA IN THE 21ST CENTURY. YOU ARE BEING TOLD THAT YOU NEED TO GIVE UP YOUR RIGHTS (PRIVACY/RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE) IN ORDER TO HAVE GREATER SECURITY. I AM NOT SAYING THIS, YOUR OWN CRIMINAL LED GOVT. PUPPET BOSSES ARE TELLING YOU THEMSELVES! WAKE THE F*CK UP!!!

http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2009/07/01/dhs-expanding-data-collection-on-employees.aspx

DHS requires more personal information from employees, contractors

New data elements include financial history and mother's maiden name


* By Alice Lipowicz
* Jul 01, 2009

The Homeland Security Department is updating and expanding its record collection to include new categories of personal information on all employees, contractors and volunteers who regularly need access to DHS facilities. The new categories of information include maiden name, mother's maiden name, clearance level, identifying physical information, financial history, duty date and weapons-bearer designation, states a Federal Register notice on June 25 .

Other information to be collected includes date of birth, Social Security Number, organizational and employee affiliations, fingerprints, digital color photograph, digital signature and telephone phone numbers.

The Personal Identity Verification Management System is being updated to support implementation of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 that covers physical and logical access to federal facilities. Public comment will be taken until July 27.

The system covers all DHS employees, contractors and their employees, consultants and volunteers who require long-term access to DHS facilities and computer systems, the department said. The system also has been expanded to cover federal emergency responders, foreign nationals on assignment and other federal employees detailed to DHS.

Personal information that is provided to DHS may be shared in DHS, as well as with appropriate federal, state, local and tribal agencies on a need-to-know basis, the notice states.
_________________________________________________________
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/E9-14905.htm

[Federal Register: June 25, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 121)]
[Notices]
[Page 30301-30305]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr25jn09-49]


DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
[Docket No. DHS-2008-0167]
Privacy Act of 1974; DHS/All--026 Personal Identity Verification
Management System Systems of Records
AGENCY: Privacy Office; DHS.
ACTION: Notice of Privacy Act system of records.



Christine E. Wormuth

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs

http://www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=184

Christine E. Wormuth is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs. As Principal Deputy, she advises the Assistant Secretary of Defense on the homeland defense activities of the Department and regional security matters for the countries of the Western Hemisphere. In addition, she is responsible for management of the Department’s participation in interagency activities concerning homeland security and relations with the Department of Homeland Security.

Before returning to the Department of Defense, Ms Wormuth was a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ms. Wormuth worked on defense and homeland security issues, including emergency response and preparedness matters, homeland security policy development, defense strategy and resources, and the capabilities and readiness of the U.S. military. In 2007, she served as the staff director for the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, also known as “The Jones Commission.” As staff director, she traveled with the Commission to Iraq, focusing on the readiness of Iraqi police forces. In 2006, Ms. Wormuth authored a major study on the future of the National Guard and Reserves. In 2005, Ms. Wormuth was a contributing author for the Center’s Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II study.

Prior to joining CSIS, Ms Wormuth was a Principal at DFI Government Services, a defense consulting firm, where she developed and managed a wide range of projects for government clients within the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.

Ms. Wormuth began her public service career in the Policy Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1996 through 2002. She served as the French desk officer during and after the September 11 attacks and, from 2000-2001, was the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Policy, focusing on defense program and legislative issues. Ms. Wormuth spent more than two years in the Policy Strategy office, where she focused on defense strategy, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review process and a range of European issues. She entered government as a Presidential Management Intern and received a Masters of Public Policy from the University of Maryland. She holds a Bachelor of Arts in political science and fine art from Williams College and is a member of Women in International Security.



Le Who's Who of Obama Nominations
http://www.iris-france.org/docs/pdf/up_docs_bdd/20090407-144454.pdf
[AN EXCELLENT RESOURCE!]

Christine Wormuth:

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs. Senior Fellow at the CSIS, she works on defense and homeland security issues, including emergency response and preparedness challenges, homeland security policy development, defense strategy and resources, and the capabilities and readiness of the U.S. military. In 2007, she served as staff director for the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, also known as “The Jones Commission.” She has worked in the Policy Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was a French desk officer during and after the September 11 attacks, and was special assistant to the under secretary for policy.

SMART SECURITY 2010
May 24-25, 2010
NRECA Conference Center, Arlington, VA
Towards Seamless Interoperability and Trust
The Intersection between Homeland Security and Homeland Defense

http://www.ideea.com/SmartSecurity2010/

PARTNERSHIP FOR A SAFER SOCIETY

SEVENTY YEARS at the forefront of technology has taught us a thing or two. Such as how to develop cost-effective solutions that provide countries with the capabilities to protect themselves against various kinds of threats. But threat profiles are constantly evolving, and much of our work today concerns developing technology for the increasing demands for security in the civil sector. It’s about network-based solutions that improve flows or safeguard buildings. Solutions that enable threats to be discovered before they develop into catastrophes – and that provide the tools for handling crises more effectively. In brief – solutions for partnership. Partnership for a safer society.

SMART SECURITY 2010
T a b l e o f C o n t e n t s
Schedule of Events 2 - 7
Sponsors 8
Speaker Biographies 10-16
Smart Security 2010 Management

Corporate Patrons

PLATINIUM
CSC

GOLD
SAAB

SILVER
UKTI

SPONSORS
OPERATIONAL RESEARCH CONSULTANTS
CHRISTINE ROBINSON & ASSOCIATES LLC INTELLIGENT COMMUNITY FORUM
WORKFLOW MANAGEMENT CONSORTIUM

SUPPORTERS
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
CENTER FOR ADVANCED DEFENSE STUDIES
COMMON DEFENSE QUARTERLY

Organizer:
IDEEA, Inc.
6233 Nelway Drive
McLean, VA 22101-3141
Tel: 703 760 0762 Fax: 703 760 0764
Individuals with disabilities requiring special
accommodations should contact Quentin
Whiteree at (703) 760 0762 at least two weeks
prior to the event.
Smart Security 2010 Handbook
Editor-in-Chief
Quentin Whiteree
Editor
Carole H. Whiteree
Marketing
Emma Lynch

S c h e d u l e o f E v e n t s
DAY ONE – MAY 24th, 2010:
0815-0830 WELCOME
 Congressman Jim Moran
0830-0900 MULTI-AGENCY COLLABORATION; BEYOND 9/11 AT THE PENTAGON
 James Schwartz, Fire Chief, Arlington County
Introduced by Mary Hynes, Arlington County Board
0900-0915 BREAK
0915-1015 SECURING THE NATION
 Todd Keil, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, U.S. DHS
 Prof. Adam Ogilvie-Smith, Office for Security & Counter Terrorism, Home Office, UK
1015-1045 OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR
 Dr. Thomas Cellucci, Chief Commercialization Officer, Science & Technology
Directorate, DHS
1045-1115 THE TECHNOLOGY OF TERROR
 Aaron B. Fuller III, President, Enforcement, Security & Intelligence, N.American Public Sector, CSC
1115-1230 CYBERSECURITY AND THE PROTECTION OF THE HOMELAND
 Don Kent, VP of Government Relations, Navigators Global LLC
 Jenny Menna, Critical Infrastructure Cyber Protection & Awareness and Global Cyber
Security, National Cyber Security Division, (NCSD), DHS
 L. Russell Records, Chief Technology Officer, CENR, CSC
 Dr. Peter Sharfman, Director, Policy Analysis, MITRE Corporation
Moderated by: Sam Visner, VP, Strategy and Bus. Dev., Enforcement, Sec. and Intel.
Division, CSC Page 5

Terry Shear
Homeland Security Sector Specialist
Tel: 202 588 6670
Email:terry.shear@fco.gov.uk
Ryan Nalty
Business Development Associate
Tel: 202 588 6691
Email: ryan.nalty@fco.gov.uk Page 6

SMART SECURITY 2010

1230-1400 LUNCHEON: KEYNOTE: TECHNOLOGY – LEADING THE WAY TOWARD A
SECURE FUTURE
 Christine Wormuth, Principal Dep. Asst Sec for Homeland Defense DoD
1400-1430 HEART OF THE NATION – THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA
 Maj.Gen. Kathleen Fick, Director of Intelligence, National Guard Bureau
Introduced by Vance Renfroe, President, Renfroe Associates International
1430-1500 POPULATION RESILIENCY
 Brian Kamoie, JD, MPH, Senior Director for Preparedness Policy, National Security Staff, The White House
Introduced by Christine F. Robinson, Principal, Christine Robinson & Associates
1500-1615 ENABLING TECHNOLOGY FROM GOVERNMENT LABS
 Hon. Jay M. Cohen, The Chertoff Group
 Dr. Mark S. Maurice, Manager, International Programs, Air Force Research Laboratory
1615-1700 PEOPLE CENTRIC SECURITY – THE HUMAN SCIENCES
 David E.A. Johnson, Executive Director, CADS
 Rafi Sela, President, AR Challenges, Israel, United States & Canada
1700-1830 CONFERENCE RECEPTION
Martin O’Malley, Governor• Anthony G. Brown, Lt. Governor Department of Business and Economic Development
Mario Armstrong, NPR/CNN Tech Guru
DAY TWO – MAY 25th, 2010
0800-0830 KEYNOTE
 Dennis Wisnosky, Chief Technical Officer & Chief Architect of Business Mission Area,
OSD, DCMO
0830-0900 EXPERIENCES FROM OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
 MGen. Gabriele Salvestroni, Def. & Def. Cooperation Attache, Embassy of Italy
0900-0930 HARNESSING GOVERNMENT & COMMERCIAL EXPERTISE
 Jan Wiberg, Director of the Security Product Portfolio SAAB Security
Moderator: Rosemary Budd, President, Ft. Meade Alliance
0930-1000 TECHNOLOGY DRIVERS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS
 David Shepherd, Program Manager, Threat Vectors Analysis, DHS
 Stephen Swain, CEO, Security Innovation & Technology Consortium, Shrivenham, UK
Moderator: Rosemary Budd, President, Ft. Meade Alliance
1000-1030 FEDERATED IDENTITY
 Daniel E. Turissini, CEO, Operational Research Consultants, Inc.
Moderator: Rosemary Budd, President, Ft. Meade Alliance
1030-1045 BREAK
1045-1215 DEVELOPING THE TOOLSETS FOR INTEROPERABILITY
 Pisey Frederick, NTAC Fellow for National Information Exchange Model (NIEM)
 John Osterholz, VP, Cyber Warfare & Cyber Security, BAE Systems
 Riley Repko, Senior Advisor, Cyber Operations & Transformation for Air Force
Moderator: Nathaniel Palmer, Chief BPM Strategist, SRA International, Inc.Page 9
1230-1400 LUNCH – CYBER SECURITY IN THE AIR FORCE
 LTGEN. William T. Lord, USAF, Chief of Warfighting Integration and Chief Information
Officer, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
1400-1500 INTER-AGENCY, INTER-GOVERNMENT INFORMATION EXCHANGE:
PERSPECTIVES
 INDUSTRY: Terry Morgan, Chairman, Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium
 SECURITY: Peter Varnish, OBE, Geopolitical Solutions Ltd
1500-1600 BRIEFING: PROTECTION OF THE AIRSPACE
 Patricia Craighill, Assistant Director, NEXTGEN JPDO & Special advisor to the SAF/XC
 William Oliver, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air & Marine, DHS



S p e a k e r s
The real Al-Qaeda

Rosemary M. Budd, Principal, Booz Allen Hamilton - North East (NE) Director – BRAC and Cybersecurity has 30+ years experience as a contractor in the U.S. Federal Government Intelligence and Defense Communities. She has a strong technical background in communications and networking for key mission systems. Rosemary is responsible for the Booz Allen implementation of NE BRAC and Cyber efforts. Ms. Budd earned M.S. and B.S. degrees in Computer Science from the University of Maryland. She serves as the President of the Ft. Meade Alliance (FMA), is Chairman of the FMA Executive Committee and Board of Directors; a member of the Board of Directors for the Maryland Tech Council and Central Maryland Regional Transit organizations. For the Central MD AFCEA chapter, Ms. Budd served as Vice President of Programs and Out- reach; and is a co-founder of the Women in Intelligence Group (WIIG). Ms. Budd is a member of the BWI Business Partnership.

Thomas A. Cellucci, PhD, MBA, accepted a five-year appointment from the Department of Homeland Security in August 2007 as the federal Government’s first Chief Com- mercialization Officer (CCO). He is responsible for initiatives that identify, evaluate and commercialize technology for the specific goal of rapidly developing and deploying products and services that meet the specific operational requirements of the DHS’s Operating Components and other DHS stakeholders such as First Responders and Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources owners and operators. Dr. Cellucci has also developed and continues to drive the implementation of DHS-S&T’s outreach with the private sector to establish and foster mutually ben- eficial working relationships to facilitate cost-effective and efficient product/service development efforts. This led to the establishment of the DHS-S&T Commercialization Office in October, 2008. Cellucci earned a PhD in Physical Chemistry from the University of Pennsylvania, an MBA from Rutgers University and a BS in Chemistry from Fordham University.

Hon. Jay M. Cohen, Rear Admiral, USN (ret.) was commissioned in 1968 upon graduation from the United States Naval Academy. He holds a joint Ocean Engineering degree from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and Master of Science in Marine Engineering and Naval Architecture from MIT. Cohen was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in October 1997 and reported to the Joint Staff as Deputy Director for Operations. In June 1999, he assumed duties as Director Navy Y2K Project Office responsible for transitioning all Navy computer systems into the new century. After an unprecedented five and a half year assignment as Chief of Naval Research, Rear Admiral Cohen retired from the Navy on February 1, 2006. Cohen was sworn in as Under Secretary for Science & Technology at the Department of Homeland Security (responsible for DHS Research, Development, Test and Evaluation) on August 10, 2006. Since leaving government, Rear Admiral Cohen is now a principal in The Chertoff Group, serves on numerous corporate boards and is CEO of JayMCohen LLC.

Pisey Fredrick was recently the NTAC Fellow for NIEM, NIEM, the National Information Exchange Model, is a partnership of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security. She has 11 years of experience in information technology, including seven years of experience using SOA/ Web Services Specification, such as XML Schema/XSLT/ SOAP/WS-Addressing/WSDL, in the implementation of Web/ SOA-based services. She has experience with various and related data model standards such as Global Justice XML Data Model (GJXDM), ANSI/NIST ITL, EFTS/EBTS, and NIEM. Ms. Frederick authored and implemented a biometric interface messaging format standard using XML/ SOAP technology, the US-VISIT (IDENT) Exchange Messages (IXM) Specification, an SOA-based standards application profile/GJXDM IEPD-based messaging structure. Ms. Frederick has her M.S. in software engineering from the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University and her B.S. in management information systems from the School of Commerce at the University of Virginia.

Aaron B. Fuller III is President of CSC’s Enforcement, Security and Intelligence (ESI) Group focused on high priority programs with an emphasis on sensitive information. Clients include intelligence agencies and programs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U. S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Justice, and others. ESI includes the Global Security Solutions (GSS) unit that provides security capabilities throughout CSC for both client delivery and internal systems. The NPS Identity and Privacy High Growth Market Segment and several CSC Centers of Excellence are hosted in ESI. Mr. Fuller joined CSC in April 1998, as a vice president. At BDM International (1991-1998) he was senior vice president and operating unit executive. He has served in senior management positions at General Research Corporation and Booz-Allen & Hamilton. From 1975-1980 he was a senior economist at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a Wash- ington, D.C. defense think tank. He has a BA from Claremont McKenna College (Claremont, CA) and an MA from the University of Virginia.

Mary Hynes, an Arlington County resident for more than 30 years, was elected to the Arlington County Board in November 2007. Previously, Ms. Hynes served on the Arlington School Board from 1995 to 2006, chairing it on three occasions. A cornerstone of Ms Hynes’ work as a member of the County Board is ensuring that Arlington County excels in its preparation, response and recovery from emergencies. In addition to protecting and providing for Arlington’s 200,000 residents and 240,000 workers, Arlington County is home to and has a special responsibility for responding to emergencies at government facilities such as Reagan National Airport and the Pentagon. Since joining the Arlington County Board, Ms. Hynes has worked with citizens and staff to revamp and enhance community involvement in preparedness.

LTC (Ret.) Dave Johnson is Executive Director of the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in Washington, DC. A former Army Special Forces Officer and Strategist, he is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, the Command and General Staff Course, and recipient of the Diplome des Etudes Superieurde Defense from the Joint Defense College (France). He has held a wide variety of command and staff positions on multiple overseas contingency operations, as well as providing support to Law Enforce- ment Agencies for counter-narcotics operations along the Southwest border of the United States. From 2006-2009, he was Director of Digital Security Products with Intel Corporation.

Brian Kamoie, JD, MPH, is Senior Director for Preparedness Policy on the White House National Security Staff. In this role he leads the development of national policy related to all-hazards preparedness, domestic critical infrastructure protection and population resiliency, preparedness grants, and national security professional development. Prior to this, Kamoie served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response and Director of the Office of Policy, Strategic Planning & Communications at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Earlier, Kamoie was Associate Professor of Health Policy and Health Services Management and Leadership at The George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services. He is a 2009 senior fellow of The George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute, and continues to serve on the adjunct faculty as Associate Professorial Lecturer in the School of Public Health and Health Services. Kamoie received his bachelor’s degree in policy studies and political science from Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pa. and his law degree and master’s degree in public health from The George Washington University in Washington, D.C., where he served as managing editor of The George Washington Law Review.

Todd M. Keil was appointed in December 2009 by President Barack Obama to serve as the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. His office is responsible for protecting the assets of the United States essential to the nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of life. He brings to the national infrastructure protection mission more than 22 years of experience in global security operations and management, intelligence and law enforcement, and threat assessment and risk mitigation. His recent experience in private industry includes senior consulting in risk mitigation, executive and facility security, and worldwide threat management. Prior to this, Mr. Keil held several key positions at the U.S. Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service, including Regional Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Mr. Keil holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Criminal Justice from Ripon College in Ripon, Wisconsin. He has also studied at the University of Bonn in Germany and the American University in Washington, D.C.

Donald H. Kent Jr. is a vice president at Navigators Global, based out of the Washington, D.C. office. In this role, Mr. Kent provides strategic, policy, and communication counsel to corporations, associations and other clients as they work with the Department of Homeland Security on issues related to transporta-tion, security, cyber, technology, emergency management, and immigration, among others. Prior to joining Navigators, Mr. Kent served as Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security. Prior to his work at DHS, Mr. Kent spent 8 years on Capitol Hill working in senior positionsincluding Policy Advisor and Director of Transportation Policy for the Assistant Majority Leader, Senator Don Nickles (R-OK). For his service to DHS, Mr. Kent received the Secretary’s Award from Secretary Mi- chael Chertoff, the Meritorious Public Service Award from the United States Coast Guard Commandant

Admiral Thad Allen, and a distinguished service award from Immigration and Customs Enforcement Assistant Secretary Julie Myers. Mr. Kent graduated from Roanoke University in 1995 with a double major in criminal justice and sociology. Lt. Gen. William T. Lord is the Chief of Warfighting Integration and Chief Information Officer, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. General Lord leads five directorates and two field operating agencies consisting of more than 1,000 military, civilian and contractor personnel sup- porting a portfolio valued at $17 billion. He integrates Air Force warfighting and mission support capabilities by networking space, air and terrestrial assets. Additionally, he shapes doctrine, strategy, and policy for all communications and information activities while driving standards and governance, innovation, and architectures for information systems and personnel. General Lord is a 1977 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. He holds a bachelor’s degree in biological and life sciences, and master’s degrees in business administration and national resource strategy.

Dr. Mark Maurice is Director of the International Office at the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) in Arlington, VA. Mark is also the Vice- President International for the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and is a member of their Board of Directors. From 1980 to 1993, Mark worked in the Air Vehicles Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, developing non-intrusive aero-diagnostics. In 1993, he became the Chief of Aeronautical Engineering at the European Office of Aerospace Research and Development, in London, UK, and served as a scientific liaison between AFRL and those doing similar research in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Former Soviet Union. In 1997, Mark returned to Air Vehicles Directorate for a two-year assignment as the Assistant to the Chief Scientist. Mark received his Ph.D. in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Dayton, in 1992.

Congressman James P. Moran was first elected in 1994 and is currently carrying out his tenth term as U.S. Representative from Northern Virginia. A senior member of the Appropriations Committee, Congress- man Moran Chairs the Subcommittee on the Interior and Environment and also serves on the Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services Subcommittees. In the mid-1990’s, Congressman Moran co-founded the New Democratic Coalition, a group of approximately 75 middle of the road House Democrats committed to fiscal responsibility, free and fair trade, technology, and maintaining America’s security and economic competitiveness. As a member of the powerful Ap- propriations Committee, Jim has left his mark on the region by boosting investments in federal research and development, steering federal dollars to generate defense and technology jobs in Northern Virginia. Jim graduated from the University of Pittsburgh’s Gradu- ate School of Public and International Affairs with a master’s degree in Public Administration in 1970 after receiving a B.A. in Economics from the College of the Holy Cross in 1967.

Terry Morgan is the Director, Net-Centric Strategy for Cisco System’s Global Government Solutions Group (GGSG) and currently serves as the Chairman Emeritus, Executive Council, Network Centric Operation Industry Consortium. He has been Cisco’s Executive Council member since the NCOIC was established in 2005. He combines his military background with 15 years busi- ness experience to provide leadership and direction in developing the GGSG’s business model, processes and solutions. He represents Cisco at the executive-levels of government, alliances, standards bodies, associations and industry events. He is working with the NCOIC leadership team on the Consortium’s business model, processes and solutions to insure the NCOIC is a trusted partner and delivers on its goal of industry and govern- ment collaboration to accelerate the adoption of network centric capability. Previously, he spent 24 years in the U.S. Marine Corps. He is a graduate of the U. S. Army War College, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and NATO Staff Officer’s course.

Prof. Adam Ogilvie-Smith spent 13 years working in intelligence at the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the Cabinet Office, during which time he participated in the US International Visitor Program, studying “US-European Security Issues”. Adam has since worked for KPMG, Racal and now Thales. In 2009, he became the first secondee from industry in the Office for Security & Counter-Terrorism, part of the Home Office, where his role is to foster greater collaboration between Government and industry in the fields of security and counter-terrorism. Adam is a member of the Euro- pean Security Research & Innovation Forum (ESRIF), and the European Commission’s FP7 Security Advisory Group. He also has 18 years’ experience as a special constable (volunteer police officer) in the Gloucestershire Constabulary. Adam has a BSc in Mathematics & Statistics from Edinburgh University, an MBA from the Open University, and a Diploma in Company Direction from the Institute of Directors. He is an honorary pro- fessor at the Aberdeen Business School, part of Robert Gordon University.

John Osterholz is Vice President, Cyber Warfare and Cybersecurity, BAE Systems, Inc. John is responsible for integrating the application of cyber warfare and cyberse- curity capabilities across BAE Systems, Inc to success- fully address the U.S. and allied cyberspace market. Prior to assuming his current responsibilities, he was the Vice President/General Manager for C4ISR Systems, BAE Systems Inc. John was the Department of Defense senior executive responsible for development of the Global Information Grid architecture and its key programs, before joining BAE Systems in 2004. Prior to that, he held other executive leadership positions including director, Military Satellite Office; director, C4ISR Integration Support Activity; deputy director, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA); and assistant director, White House Military Of- fice. Preceding his Washington assignments, John served in special operations and intelligence as a U.S. Army officer. John holds a bachelor’s degree in Physics from Rutgers University and a master’s degree in Information Systems from The George Washington University.

Nathaniel Palmer is a Principal and Chief BPM Strategist with SRA International, Inc. as well as Editor-in-Chief of BPM.com and Executive Director of the Workflow Management Coalition. Previously he was Director, Business Consulting for Perot Systems Corp, working under business process guru Jim Champy, and prior to that spent over a decade with Delphi Group as Vice President and Chief Analyst. In 1998 Mr. Palmer was the first individual to be awarded the distinction of Laureate in Workflow. He is co-author of “The X-Economy: Profiting from Instant Commerce” (Texere, 2001) as well as contributing author to “The BPM and Workflow Handbook,” “Mastering the Unpredictable” (Meghan-Kiffer Press, 2010) “BPM in Practice,” and “The Encyclopedia of Database Systems” (Springer, 2009.) He has been featured in publications ranging from Fortune to The New York Times, and has had over 100 by-lined articles in IT publications such as CIO and InformationWeek. He has also been featured as a guest expert on National Public Radio and World Business Review.

L. Russell Records is a Senior Partner with CSC Business Solutions and Services, and is now serving as the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) for CSC’s global Chemical, Energy, and Natural Resources Group. In this role, he is responsible for the architecture and construction of CSC’s Oil and Gas and Utilities solutions, including field business intelligence, cybersecurity for utilities, smart grid, and operations optimization. Prior to this assignment, he served as Regional Technology Director for the CSC Consulting’s Southwest Region since 1991. He has served several clients in the role of CTO, including most recently, the United Launch Alliance which manages the Atlas and Delta rocket launch programs for NASA and the Air Force. Mr. Records is a 1971 graduate of the Air Force Academy and received a Masters Degree from MIT in Instrumentation and Control Engineering. He is a long-term member of the Society of Petroleum Engineers and has served as a Drilling/Well Control Engineer in a number of US and overseas assignments, working for a leading petroleum engineering firm.

Riley Repko is the Senior Advisor for Cyber Operations & Transformation at the Department of the Air Force. In this position he overseas existing cyber programs and policies and developing new transformational strategies paramount to supporting the Air Force’s directed priorities in air, space and cyber operations. He serves as a functional expert collaborating with the Depart- ment of Defense, federal government organizations and the private-sector on how to effectively integrate cyber capabilities with current operational forces. He establishes and maintains essential relationships, specific lines of communication and critical processes that ensure continued success across the Air Force operational enterprise. Mr. Repko earned bachelor of science degrees in physics and electrical engineering from St Bonaventure University and the Air Force Institute of Technology respectively and a masters in business administration from St Mary’s University (Texas). He is also a graduate of the Air Force’s Air War College.

Christine Robinson heads the business and technology advisory firm, Christine Robinson & Associates, LLC, drawing upon her career-long background of performing senior leadership roles for outstanding technology firms. From small initiatives to some of the world’s largest, her business and technology solutions for U.S. government agencies and other organizations emphasize security. She co-authored the widely publicized paper “Transforming Security through Enterprise Architecture” to publish in the “2010 BPM & Workflow Handbook” in June, the recently published book “Future Cities, Designing Better, Smarter, More Sustainable and Secure Cities,” and has also written for numerous other publications. Her thought leadership and creativity have led her to win awards for innovation and excellence, inspire government procurements, and even help pass congressional legislation and funding. Christine cur- rently serves on the Arlington County IT Advisory Commission. Christine graduated with her BBA from the University of Texas at San Antonio and graduated with her MBA from George Washington University.

Major General Gabriele Salvestroni is currently the Italian Defense and Defense Cooperation Attache at the Embassy of Italy in Washington DC. M.G. Salvestroni graduated from the Italian Airforce Academy in 1979 and after basic jet and fighter training in the U.S. at Vance (OK) and Holloman (NM), he has served as a pilot in the air defense role flying F104s. After test pilot school in UK he was assigned to the flight test wing which he commanded in 1999. After flying duty he was assigned to the AirStaff where he was involved in research, development and acquisition for all major cooperation programs. Promoted to Brigadier General in 2005 he was chief of logistic department in the Airstaff.

James Schwartz is the Chief of the Arlington County Fire Department in Arlington, Virginia. Chief Schwartz has been with Arlington Fire for 26 years and was appointed Chief in June 2004. Prior to his appointment he served in a variety of fire department positions including Assistant Chief for Operations, responsible for all response-related activities, including fire, EMS, hazardous materials and technical rescue response, incident management and operational training. In April, 2003 he was assigned to the Office of the County Manager where he served as the Director of Emergency Management until his appointment to Fire Chief. Chief Schwartz chairs the International Association of Fire Chiefs’ Committee on Terrorism and Homeland Security. He is a member of the Interagency Board on Equipment Standardization and he serves on the Advisor Council for the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordinating Group at the National Counter Terrorism Center.

Rafi Sela is President of AR Challenges, LTd. (Israel) & AR Challenges (USA), Inc. Mr. Sela is a former Co-Chairman of the US Airport Security Task force at HSIA – Homeland Security Industries Association (USA) & founder & former President of the ILHSIA – Israeli Homeland Security Industries Association. He currently manages teaming projects between Israeli Homeland Security companies and their counterparts in North America, India and SE Asia, and has extensive Defense and Security business development experience in North America and Europe for over 30 years. Mr. Sela served in the IDF for 20 years as a senior Ordnance Officer specializing in product development for the Special operations. (Including the design and manufacturing of the equipment for the Entebbe raid). He is married with three children and four grandchildren.

Peter Sharfman is Director of Policy Analysis for the MITRE Corporation. MITRE is a not-for-profit company specializing in information technology that operates Federally Funded Re- search and Development Centers (FFRDCs) for the Defense Department and the Intelligence Community; the Federal Avia- tion Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, the Veterans’ Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security. At MITRE, Dr. Sharfman works issues where national security policy and information technology intersect. Before joining MITRE in 1989, he worked at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment; OSD Net Assessment; the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Cornell University. He received a B.A. from Harvard and an M.A. and Ph.D. (in political science) from the University of Chicago.

David Shepherdis a program manager at the Chemical-Biolog- ical Division within DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate. He manages the Threat Vectors Analysis program, a program focused on biosecurity which includes the Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC) project as well as projects intended to provide criti- cal information to decision-makers and DHS senior staff. Hisareas of interest and expertise involve biological threat awareness and analysis, emergency preparedness and response, and knowledge and information management. He has been working at DHS S&T for five years, after working as a support contractor at DARPA. He has a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and master’s degrees in telecommunications and history.

Steve Swain is the CEO of the Security Innovation and Technology Consortium (SITC), a role he started in June 2008. Prior to this he was a consultant with Control Risks, an international risk consultancy. He joined them in September 2006 after retiring as a Chief Superintendent in the MPS. His last post was the Head of the Police International Counter Terror- ist Unit (PICTU), a national police and MI5 unit, with responsibility for designing counter terrorist policing options for the UK. He worked with MI5, Special Branch and the Anti-Terrorist Branch to produce as- sessments of the national intelligence picture. Steve is a leading authority on suicide terrorism and the architect of the UK tactics to counter the threat from international and domestic terror groups. He was part of the U.K. team working with the Greek Authorities on the security of the Athens Olympics. He spent time in Beijing performing a similar function for the 2008 Olympics. During his police career he worked at Heathrow Airport where he had responsibility for the airport counter-terrorist policing.

Dan Turissini co-founded Operational Research Consultants, Inc. in 1991. An innovator in systems engineering and integration he has focused ORC in the field of Information Assurance and Identity Management, providing integration & testing, operation & maintenance, and R&D for all aspects of Information Security. He has achieved Certificate Authority certifications across the Federal government, providing trusted eGovernment authentication capability and successful deployments of Federal Personal Identity Verification credentials for various Federal agencies. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Marine Engineering and Nautical Science from the US Merchant Marine Academy and a Masters in Engineering Administration from George Washington University.

Peter Varnish, O.B.E; FREng; FIET; is an independent electronics and weapons engineer specialising in defence and security technologies advising corporates and Governments [Australia; Singapore; UAE; Morocco; Senegal; Bulgaria] in the threat, resilience, offset; technology transfer, mergers and acquisitions. He recently advised the UK Foreign Office on business continuity. His particular interests include cyber warfare; data mining; border control especially Counter-IED, and passive tracking. He began his career with the Royal Navy Scientific Service in 1968 and after 33 years in HM Government Service retired from the board of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, [now QinetiQ] to join Definition International Limited as Chairman. He is also director of Geopolitical Solutions Ltd a technology audit company; and Closed Solutions Ltd who provide advice to Middle and Far East Governments and a nonexecutive director of a number of Homeland security SME’s, and BlueStar Capital.

Samuel Sanders Visneris Vice President for Strategy and Business Development at CSC, where he also leads CSC’s cyber strategy. Mr. Visner served previously as Senior Vice President for Strategy and Business Development at SAIC. Mr. Visner was Chief of Signals Intelligence Programs at the National Security Agency where he led several transformational programs. Mr. Visner also teaches as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University where he conducts a course on the effects on international security of information technology. Mr. Visner currently serves as a member of the Intelligence Task Force of the Defense Science Board and as part of the Global Reserve Program of the National Intelligence Council, which he supports on the issues of cybersecurity and cybercrime. Mr. Visner holds a Bachelor’s degree in International Politics from Georgetown University and a Master’s degree in Telecommunications from George Washington University.

Jan Wibergis Director of the Security Product Portfolio at Saab. He is former Chairman (Chair Emeritus) of NCOIC Technical Council leading the technical work of the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium. He started off by serving in surveillance in the Swedish Airforce, He holds a Master of Science degree in Industrial Electronics and Computer Science. Jan has close to 30 years of progressive and diverse experience in the Military Defense industry focusing on computer and information technology in the area of C4ISR. His experience today includes both civil security and government homeland security in EU countries, as well as military ship programs for Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, Finland, Denmark, UAE and Pakistan. He has held progressively more responsible management positions in a number of companies, including Ericsson, Bofors and the Swedish National Police Board. Dennis Wisnosky is the Chief Architect and Chief Technical Officer of the Business Mission Area within the Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer, U.S. Department of Defense. Mr. Wisnosky is responsible for providing expert guidance and oversight in the design, development, and modification of the federated architectures supporting the Department’s Business Mission Area. This role incorporates oversight of the DoD Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) - the corporate level systems, processes, and data standards that are common across the DOD, in addition to the business architectures of the services and de- fense agencies. Mr. Wisnosky also serves as an advisor on the development of requirements and extension of DoD net-centric enterprise services in collaboration with the office of the DOD Chief Information Officer.

Christine E. Wormuth is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs. As Principal Deputy, she advises the Assistant Secretary of Defense on the homeland defense activities of the Department and regional security matters for the countries of the Western Hemisphere. In addition, she is responsible for management of the Department’s participation in interagency activities concerning homeland security and relations with the Department of Homeland Security. In 2007, she served as the staff director for the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, also known as “The Jones Commission.” Ms. Wormuth began her public service career in the Policy Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1996 through 2002. She entered government as a Presidential Management Intern and received a Masters of Public Policy from the University of Maryland. She holds a Bachelor of Arts in political science and fine art from Williams College and is a member of Women in International Security.

Retrieved from:
http://gwumc.gwu.edu/hspi/policy/CHDSA2006.pdf


Page 43 of PDF:

Christine Wormuth is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies. She was a contributing author for the Center’s “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II” study. In this chapter, she makes recommendations for instilling in the homeland security context the core achievements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, including “establishment of strong, unified leadership at the federal level, empowerment of operational leaders in the field, strengthening of the strategy development and planning process, and the creation of a more joint cadre of homeland security professionals...”

Daniel Prieto is Vice President for Homeland Security and Intelligence at IBM. He suggests that more than another reorganization is needed to promote the jointness that the Goldwater-Nichols Act encouraged. In his paper, Prieto advocates, among other things, a network-centric approach to finesse our homeland security coordination and management efforts. Such an approach “recognizes the limits of hierarchical command-and-control structures, and seeks to improve decision-making by leveraging improved information and communications among participants distributed throughout a network.”

Jointness. Regionalization. Strengthened leadership and investing in our people through continued and expanded education and training opportunities. A network-centric approach. Adequate funding. These are just a few core ideas that merit serious consideration as we move forward and grapple with the challenge of how best to achieve homeland security.
My own views on this issue, expressed at our symposium and in other
homeland security community would bring together all of the now largely disparate components of our disaster preparedness, response and management efforts. Regional homeland security offices would maximize the various components of homeland security in cooperation, integrating all levels of government and all relevant agencies at each level, as well as building relationships with private sector and non-governmental entities that could and should be involved in preparedness, response, and information sharing. At the same time, we need to foster a culture of preparedness that is truly all-hazards and risk-based in nature, that encompasses a range of threats and crises from terrorist attack to infectious disease to natural disaster—all while bearing in mind that response must be flexible, capable of integrating ad hoc, entrepreneurial and creative elements when circumstances demand. Learning from those incidents that we have seen will help us better prepare for those over the horizon.
Admittedly, this is a tall order. Thoughtful consideration of these issues by leading figures in the policy world, the military and beyond will take us closer to our goal, however—and it is my hope that this chapter constitutes one small but significant step forward in that direction.



Page 71

Is a Goldwater-Nichols Act Needed for Homeland Security?
Christine E. Wormuth
Senior Fellow, International Security Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
The Goldwater-Nichols legislation that was enacted into law in 1986 is widely viewed as largely responsible for the most significant reform of the Department of Defense (DoD) since the National Security Act of 1946. While not without substantial flaws, the DoD is generally seen as a highly capable cabinet agency; one that is extremely mission-oriented and able to achieve tangible results while other federal departments often lack operational capacity. Five years after the 9/11 attacks, and one year after the disappointing governmental response to Hurricane Katrina, many in the national security community are asking whether a Goldwater-Nichols type reform is needed for the nation’s homeland security system. From the dysfunction of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to the continuing interagency battles about roles, responsibilities and budget share, it is clear that the United States does not yet have a comprehensive, cohesive and competent system to ensure the security of the homeland. When considering whether a Goldwater-Nichols type reform would be useful or appropriate, it is useful to reflect on the major achievements of the original Goldwater-Nichols Act and how it might or might not translate into the homeland security arena.
Goldwater-Nichols: What Did it Achieve and Why Did it Happen?
The legislation introduced in Congress by Senator Barry Goldwater and Congressman Bill Nichols and ultimately enacted into law in 1986 enabled a wide range of defense reforms, but at a minimum the law resulted in four key achievements that have had lasting positive effects for the modern DoD. First, the law revised roles and responsibilities in the Department to strengthen the Secretary of Defense relative to the Service Secretaries, and placed a single person—the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—clearly in charge of providing military advice to the President. The law also transformed the role of the combatant commanders, placing them squarely in charge of mission accomplishment and providing them the authority over forces to carry out that responsibility. The law forced the Department to pay more attention to comprehensive strategy and planning activities with the goal of achieving a more cohesive strategy that would drive DoD planning and programming efforts. Finally, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation mandated changes to the DoD personnel process that ultimately resulted in the development of military leaders that could look beyond their service affiliations and think “jointly,” allowing the Department to leverage the full range of Service institutional capabilities in order to develop more integrated and effective policies, plans and military operations.
In light of the typically static nature of large bureaucracies and the difficulty of enacting changes in these institutions, it is important to understand how the reforms enacted as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation came about. What made such sweeping changes possible? The U.S. military has not always seen the success it had in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan or even in the initial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom that culminated in the topping of the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a notable handful of operational military failures that shook the confidence of the nation’s leaders, in particular Desert One, the disastrous mission to rescue the Iranian hostages in 1980 and the uncoordinated invasion of Grenada in 1983. Both operations revealed multiple instances of military Services unable to communicate and operate effectively together, despite the high quality of military personnel and tremendous financial investment in all of these institutions.
Although initial efforts to make the case for reform in DoD were met with strong opposition from within the Pentagon, ultimately a critical mass of lawmakers, senior retired military officers and subject matter experts were able to prevail and significantly change how the DoD functions. More than twenty years later, the changes enacted as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation are widely viewed as fundamental to the success of the nation’s military and its ability to conduction operations effectively.
Is a Goldwater-Nichols for Homeland Security Needed?
When considering whether reform on the scale of Goldwater-Nichols is needed in the area of homeland security, it is useful to consider whether there have been operational failures comparable to those the military experienced in the Iranian desert or in the rainforest of Grenada. Certainly the governmental response at all levels—local, state and national—to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was not an operational success. Although the response was not a total failure, it was not acceptable in the eyes of almost everyone who watched it unfold. President Bush himself said “the system, at every level of government, was not well-coordinated, and was overwhelmed in the first few days.” Of particular concern is that fact despite considerable warning of the hurricane, the response to Katrina was still dramatically inadequate. To truly ensure the security of the homeland, the nation must be able to manage the consequences of a no-warning event, and the response to Hurricane Katrina lay bare how far the homeland security system has to go before it can meet that standard.
Looking beyond the operational realm, it is also clear that the homeland security system as a whole cannot yet function effectively. Strategy, planning and programming activities are not clearly linked together. Roles and responsibilities, within the interagency and among the federal, state, local, private and non-profit sectors remain somewhat murkily defined. Perhaps most importantly, there is not yet a common corporate culture at DHS, nor are there sufficient numbers of homeland security professionals who have the training and expertise they need to be effective.
Relative to military operations, homeland security in the post-9/11 environment is a relatively new mission area, but nevertheless it is clear the country needs significant reforms in order to achieve an adequately functional homeland security system. A Goldwater-Nichols approach to homeland security may well be part of the solution, but at the same time, the analogy is not perfect.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act greatly reduced the inter-Service infighting inside DoD. While a significant accomplishment, even before Goldwater-Nichols, the military services at least all worked for a single cabinet secretary. A central challenge in the homeland security arena is uniting the efforts of multiple cabinet agencies—each with its own cabinet secretary.
Goldwater-Nichols led to considerably more unity of effort among the various stakeholders inside DoD, but the reforms were only focused on a single level of government—the federal level, and on a single department within that federal government. The homeland security system is characterized by an exponentially larger number of stakeholders located at all levels of government and society—federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, non-profit and individual. Enhancing unity of effort among such a wide and disparate range of actors will be far more difficult than reforming a single cabinet agency at the federal level of government.
While the Goldwater-Nichols experience does not fit the homeland security sphere perfectly, there is a need for a new framework around which to organize the nation’s homeland security activities to better ensure their effectiveness. In thinking about how the Goldwater-Nichols example might apply to the homeland security sphere, it is useful to consider what “jointness” really means. In an article marking the 20th anniversary of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, Mackubin Owens noted that most supporters of the Goldwater-Nichol reforms used the word “jointness” to describe the quest for greater integration, specifically the desire for “improved procedures for combining the unique specialized capabilities of the different services to enhance combat effectiveness.” Framed in this way, greater “jointness” is also needed in the homeland security sphere. There is a real need for a framework and set of institutional relationships that will promote increased integration among the many actors in this area so that the nation will be better able to combine their unique, specialized capabilities into a robust capacity to protect the homeland and manage the consequences when efforts to prevent attacks fail.
What Would a New Framework Look Like?
The reforms enacted by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation are a useful starting point for exploring what a new framework for the homeland security system might look like, but given the significant differences between the defense and homeland security arenas, there will clearly be limits to how completely the Goldwater-Nichols experience can be applied to homeland security.
Stronger, More Unified Leadership at the Federal Level
Reflecting on the major accomplishments of Goldwater-Nichols for the Defense Department, there may be loose analogues to challenges in the current homeland security system. First, the Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to the military Services, and also established lines of authority to unify the advice that DoD provides to the President. In the homeland security context, the parallel challenge is the central question of how to ensure that the organization at the federal level with primary responsibility for homeland security is sufficiently empowered to execute this mission. What is the best way to structure the homeland security system so that there is a clear focal point in the federal government for setting policy, convening all of the essential stakeholders and ensuring that policy is effectively implemented? The DHS was clearly established to serve as the focal point for homeland security activity at the federal level, but there are many other federal agencies that play important roles in various aspects of homeland security. While Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 5 gives DHS the responsibility to serve as the principal Federal official for domestic incident management, DHS cannot direct the rest of the cabinet to behave in particular ways, whether during an event or on a steady-state basis.
The relative equality of all federal agencies complicates not only the federal government’s ability to conduct joint operations inside the United States, but also overseas in the context of complex contingency operations. In its Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 2 Report, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) examined in detail how to bring greater unity of effort to interagency operations in the overseas context. A theme that ran through many of the specific recommendations in the report was the need for the National Security Council (NSC) to play a stronger role in both the policy development process as well as oversight at the strategic level of planning for actual operations. Whether operating overseas or inside the United States, the only actor in the federal government that can ensure Presidential intent is being executed, mitigate disputes among cabinet agencies, and minimize instances of log-rolling is the White House in the form of the National Security and Homeland Security Councils. Only the President, or those that speak for him or her, can serve as the arbiter between cabinet secretaries, and for any complex operation to have the potential to succeed, there has to be a mechanism in the system to resolve major disputes. The lead federal agency model cannot be at the core of the homeland security system because it provides no realistic mechanism to broker bureaucratic disagreements at the strategic level.
Empowered Operational Leadership
A second major accomplishment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that is relevant when considering a new framework for the homeland security sphere was the empowerment of the combatant commanders to conduct operational planning and control the operational resources necessary to conduct successful operations. While there is not today an analogue in the homeland security system for the combatant commanders, to be effective in responding to major domestic catastrophes, the Nation does need to conduct joint, interagency operational planning in advance of actual response operations. The nation also needs a framework, if not a single organization, that brings together pre-existing operational plans, capabilities and the many stakeholders in the homeland security system into a clear, transparent process that can set priorities and then implement them effectively during a catastrophe.
Today, the most similar structure in the homeland security system to a combatant commander is the Joint Field Office (JFO), led by the Principal Federal Official (PFO), a position established in the National Response Plan (NRP). Under the NRP, in the event of a major catastrophe, the federal government would work together with affected states to establish a JFO that would allow key federal officials to be co-located with state emergency managers in order to work together to lead the response to a domestic incident. In the case of multiple, simultaneous events or an event that has significant national impacts, the Secretary of Homeland Security has the authority to designate a “national PFO” that would coordinate the response at the federal, strategic level. In stark contrast to DoD’s combatant commanders, however, PFOs do not have directive control over all of the resources and capabilities that would be employed as part of a response to a catastrophe. Principal Federal Officials have coordinating authority only, at the federal level among the many cabinet agencies, but also with state and local authorities. Although combatant commanders can work with coalition forces and non-military organizations such as non-governmental organizations and the private sector, their operational plans do not rely on capabilities from these organizations to succeed. Combatant command plans are based on only those forces that the commanders actually control or know with considerable certainty will be available. In contrast, PFOs, while not controlling the resources of other stakeholders at the state and local level, or in the private and non-profit sectors, fundamentally rely on capabilities from all of these sectors in order to carry out a response to a domestic incident. These features of the nation’s emergency preparedness system are central differences between the defense and homeland security spheres, and it is not clear whether the empowerment of the combatant commanders that the Goldwater-Nichols Act achieved could be easily replicated in the domestic sphere.
In the absence of a single individual like the combatant commander in charge of an operation, how can the nation—at all levels of government —best create unity of effort? At a minimum, the major stakeholders at all levels have to understand clearly which actors are in charge of which elements of a response effort and have some basic agreement about that division of labor. The current system, based around the NRP and the National Incident Management System (NIMS), is extremely complex for many reasons, but if the existing system is to function more effectively, it is critical that leaders and major “implementers” at all levels need to be much more familiar with the framework envisioned in the NRP and its supporting documents. In order to make such a complex system work, it must be trained and exercised extensively.
Any successful framework for the homeland security system also will need to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate a wide range of potential crisis scenarios. In many catastrophes, the current system, which envisions a response that is led by local, state and federal officials collectively, may be sufficient—particularly if those authorities have exercised and trained the processes outlined in the NRP and the NIMS. At the same time, it is important to consider whether there could be a small number of scenarios that might require a different command and control structure. Could there be instances in which the catastrophe is so dire that a federally-led effort is the only way to respond on the necessary scale and with the necessary speed? How will the nation’s leaders determine when such a dramatic step might be necessary? Would such a response be possible under existing legal authorities? Are there steps the federal government could take, working with state governments, that would make state governors more comfortable with the concept of a federal lead for certain mega-disasters? Or is the key challenge to work with states to develop more robust capabilities to respond to a catastrophe so that a federal lead would not be necessary to ensure effectiveness? These are critical questions to answer before formulating any sort of Goldwater-Nichols Act for homeland security.
Greater emphasis on regional organizations may be part of the new framework that is needed. By definition, in a catastrophe state capabilities will be exceeded. Under the existing framework, states have a mechanism—the Emergency Management Assistance Compact—to share resources, but what specific resources might be shared under what conditions is often not defined until a disaster is already underway. More emphasis on regional organizations that are focused on assisting state efforts to develop plans and policies for catastrophic incident management—nor only among states in a region, but also between states in a region and the federal level—may help fill the gaps that exist today. Regional structures could also be a tool for working with state and local authorities on a steady state basis to implement policy and planning guidance coming from Washington more consistently and effectively. Regional structures offer a means by which to establish stronger relationships with the state, local, tribal and non-governmental sectors, as well as tool by which to begin cataloguing and assessing capabilities within regions.
For regional structures to be effective, whether they are largely state-centric entities with federal liaisons, or federal organizations with state liaisons, they must add real value and not simply function as an additional layer of bureaucracy. For regional organizations to be useful, federal headquarters in Washington DC will need to be willing to delegate real responsibility and authority, and not just see regional structures as a filtering mechanism. Finally, determining how to draw the boundaries of regional organizations is another challenge, and one with an analogue in the defense arena. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) outlines how the world is divided up among the various regional combatant commanders. In more than one instance, countries with intrinsic relationships in the real world are allocated to different combatant commanders—in many cases the politics of conflicts place countries on opposite sides of the UCP boundaries. While commands may avoid making difficult choices between countries with adversarial relations by virtue of these divisions, the dividing lines also can make it harder to view and address these precise conflicts in an organic fashion. In the defense realm these dividing lines are further complicated by the fact that other important U.S. organizations such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State do not divide up the world in the same manner as the military combatant commands. The challenge of establishing regional boundaries in the defense sphere is an important reminder that establishing regional divisions inside the United States will require careful thought, and if such a move is to have real hope of being beneficial, the federal government, states, major urban areas, and major private sector and non-profit organizations need to adopt a reasonably uniform approach to such boundaries.
Comprehensive Strategic Guidance and Planning
Another significant contribution the Goldwater-Nichols Act made to the modern Defense Department was to direct much greater emphasis on developing a comprehensive approach to strategy development and planning. Although the DoD reviewed its strategy and planning process as part of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review institutional roadmaps, it is certainly true that while not perfect, the DoD has the most robust strategy development and planning system in the federal government. In contrast, despite an array of strategy documents, Homeland Security Presidential Directives and departmental strategy plans, it is clear that the full range of stakeholders in the federal homeland security system are not yet entirely on the same page in terms of priorities and overall focus. As one simple example, the federal government has not yet even developed a common terminology for homeland security matters that enables the community to communicate clearly when its disparate elements come together.
Without prejudging the issue entirely, one potential way to bring more unity of effort to the strategy development and planning process for homeland security at the federal level would, again, be to ensure a more robust role for the White House. A first step toward a stronger White House role would be a merger of the National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council. Merging the National Security and Homeland Security Councils into a single, truly National Security Council would greatly facilitate the ability of the federal government to develop strategies, policies and plans that address homeland security challenges in a holistic, integrated fashion and make important linkages between security issues outside and inside U.S. borders. A unified NSC with staff that can address the full suite of security challenges would reduce disconnects that can and have arisen when two, largely separate organizations are responsible for addressing security issues that by definition are inextricably linked.
Even if a future administration chooses to merge the NSC and HSC into a single, true National Security Council, there is still considerable work to be done in developing a more functional policy, planning, budgeting and execution (PPBE) system across the interagency. Although
there are a number of White House-issued strategies related to homeland security, they have been developed separately at different points in time—in some areas they overlap and in other areas there are gaps—and it is not clear how to prioritize among the different documents.
One means to unify these different concepts would be to conduct
at the interagency level a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR) that would enable the entire interagency to work together to determine national objectives, develop a strategy to achieve those objectives, determine what capabilities are needed for that strategy and delineate roles and responsibilities inside the interagency so that federal
departments can successfully implement those parts of the strategy for which they are responsible. Just as the Quadrennial Defense Review serves as the foundation for the Strategic Planning Guidance that DoD develops as an internal document to guide its efforts, a product of the QNSR would be the development of a National Security Planning
Guidance that would provide more detailed direction to federal departments on how to implement their elements of the strategy, to include homeland security planning and activities.
Equally important is determining how and to what degree to integrate state, local and tribal entities, as well as other non-federal actors into the PPBE system undertaken at the federal level. The primary tool the federal government has to shape activity at the state and local level is the DHS Grants and Training program, but it is not clear that the range of grants and training activities are sufficiently connected to strategic priorities or allocated in ways that maximize the degree to which state and local preparedness efforts reflect priorities being articulated at the federal level. Progress has been made in recent years on allocating a larger share of grants and training funding based on risk assessments, but considerable work remains. It is also clear from the DHS Nationwide Plan Review that more must be done to work with states on deliberate planning for catastrophes as well as developing a process by which to assess the readiness of national emergency preparedness capabilities at all levels.
Developing a “Joint” Homeland Security Career Path
The last major accomplishment of Goldwater-Nichols that clearly has applicability to the homeland security sphere is the critical decision Congress made twenty years ago to link service for military officers in joint duty assignments to promotion to general officer ranks. It is widely acknowledged that this step, while vigorously resisted at the time by the Services and only grudgingly supported in the wake of the Act’s passage, resulted in a much higher quality Joint Staff and stronger corps of joint officers.
There is recognition in Washington that there is a need for a much larger cadre of homeland security professionals who have the multi-disciplinary expertise necessary to be successful managing the challenges inherent in protecting the homeland and managing the consequences of major domestic incidents. As part of building such a cadre, there is also recognition that there needs to be a professional development and educational system that explicitly focuses on the myriad, complex and in some cases unique features of the homeland security system. In this sense, there is a real need in the homeland security sphere to create a system similar to the joint officer management program that was directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
In its Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 2 Report, CSIS recommended that Congress and the interagency should work together to establish a national security career path that would require career civilians to serve in interagency rotations in order to be considered for promotion to Senior Executive Service (SES).10 CSIS is not the first non-governmental institution to recommend such an approach; the Hart-Rudman Commission called for the development of a National Security Service Corps in its final report published in 2001. A career path of this kind would include traditional national security professionals and homeland security professionals.
In addition to requiring interagency rotations to be considered for promotion to SES, the CSIS Phase 2 study also called for building an education and training program that would be a central element of the professional development system for national security career personnel. The DHS is currently considering how best to develop such an education and training program. One option would be to expand the mandate of the National Defense University to address the full panoply of national security issues (of which homeland security is a part) and change the name of the institution to the National Security University. Critics of this option argue that such a change would likely be more cosmetic than substantive and might not ultimately provide sufficient focus on the non-defense aspects of the curriculum. Another option would be to establish a new institution focused on interagency operations, both domestic and international, or an institution that is focused exclusively on homeland security issues. At a minimum, it is clear that there is a need to provide senior homeland security professionals with a focused developmental experience at an accredited educational institution that has a curriculum targeted toward the full range of homeland security challenges.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act: An Imperfect Roadmap for Homeland Security
Although there are many differences between the well-established and very mature national defense system and the much newer homeland security system, it is clear that the major reforms achieved as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 can serve as both goals for which to strive toward and a rudimentary roadmap for how to move the homeland security system toward greater unity of effort and ultimately greater effectiveness. The homeland security environment is even more complex, both organizationally and politically, than the overseas environments in which the military combatant commanders operate. Tempting as it is, it is not possible to simply “cut and paste” the Goldwater-Nichols reforms into the homeland security sphere. The homeland security community will have to consider carefully how to translate the achievements of Goldwater-Nichols effectively into the homeland security environment. Ultimately it may not be possible to achieve the same degree of clarity in certain areas that was achieved in the defense realm as a result of the legislation. The short operational chain of command between the combatant commanders and the President of the United States that was enshrined in the Act may be a bridge too far on the domestic side in light of the complex array of actors at the federal level, the governors at the state level, the diverse models of authority and responsibility at the local level, as well as the presence of critical actors in the private and non-governmental sectors.
At the same time, the core achievements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act—establishment of strong, unified leadership at the federal level, empowerment of operational leaders in the field, strengthening the strategy development and planning process, and the creation of a more joint cadre of security professionals—are clearly much-needed elements of a stronger homeland security system and are reforms the wider homeland security community should seek thoughtfully but aggressively in the next few years.

Integrating USAID and DOS:
The Future of Development and Diplomacy

Project on National Security Reform
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
June 2009
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAC016.pdf


Charles R. Cutshall
Dustin C. Emery
Daniel J. Fitzpatrick
Sarah J. Hammer
Leslie J. Kelley
Kirill Meleshevich


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In order to undertake any reform of a governmental agency, particularly one as large as the Department of State (DOS), it is imperative that previous attempts at reform be studied in depth to determine which factors are most likely to drive such initiatives to succeed or fail. To identify lessons useful to the creation of a Next Generation Department of State (Next-Gen DOS), major reform efforts in the last fifty years were reviewed, from the creation of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 through the 2006 Transformational Diplomacy efforts under Secretary Rice.

Each of these eight efforts represents a governmental response to changing circumstances in the world, domestic political structure, or political rhetoric regarding the place of development in national strategic policies. While a distinct global and national political climate may have influenced each initiative, certain general lessons can be learned from their undertaking. Our findings suggest that reforming the provision of foreign assistance by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and DOS depends upon the following:

1. Early engagement of a broad range of stakeholders
2. Presidential support and White House involvement
3. Active and early participation of Congress
4. Timing
5. Scale of reform
6. Clear roadmaps and well-detailed polices
7. Consistent message
8. Bureaucratic loyalties

At least in the foreign policy arena, the Obama administration is on the precipice of the change sought during their campaign. Coming into office while the previous administration’s foreign assistance framework is still in its developing stages gives the Obama administration the opportunity to make whatever changes they deem necessary to move foreign assistance in any direction they choose. While specifics about President Obama’s foreign policy are still unclear, they have the opportunity to initiate debate and participate rigorously in a major transformation in the provision of foreign assistance. With the growing belief that no longer will patchwork efforts at reform be sufficient, the FAA’s problems cannot be fixed in piecemeal fashion. President Obama is on time to bring together the current reform efforts in Congress with nongovernmental organizations, academics, and the private sector and engage these key players in a vigorous debate over the details of this much needed reform.

Foreign aid is arguably the most effective tool at the disposal of the US government to encourage social, economic and governmental development abroad. As a part of foreign policy, development is inherently linked to diplomacy. The relationship between the two, however, has not been a stagnant one. The current strategic environment regarding the relationship between development and diplomacy was defined in major ways by the two terms of the Bush administration. To understand how that relationship is changing now, it is necessary to analyze the baseline for that change.

The 2002 National Security Strategy, and its official elevation of development to an equal pillar of national security, alongside diplomacy and defense resulted in the gradual militarization of aid. Although the total resources allocated for development increased significantly as a result of the new policy, a large part of this aid was delivered by the Department of Defense (DOD), rather than civilian agencies. The militarization of aid is not optimal, insomuch as it greatly expands the responsibility of the military, decreases the civilian face of aid, puts aid workers in harm’s way, and sacrifices some efficacy of aid delivery. The 2006 Rice Reform affected the relationship of development and diplomacy by creating the Director of Foreign Assistance, a position intended to better align to operations of USAID and DOS. Due to the fact that the reforms have not been fully implemented yet, their affects are still to be realized. An electronic information sharing system, the categorization of countries based on necessity for aid, and deployment of Foreign Service Officers to critical countries all attempt to bring greater cohesion to the US foreign assistance programs. These reforms, however, lacked fiscal support and made no attempt to demilitarize aid.

The Obama Administration will, of course, influence the relationship between development and diplomacy. The administration came into office at a time when the US is involved in two military engagements abroad, a failing economy, and unease regarding other domestic and foreign issues. To date, the administration has not taken a public stance on development and diplomacy. Despite the lack of an official statement from the White House, testimony, budget requests, and speeches by Cabinet-level officials provide a foundation for a better understanding of the new administration’s intentions.

Thus far, it appears that this direction will most likely strengthen “soft power,” demilitarize foreign aid, expand the number of Foreign Service Officers and civilian development personnel, integrate the foreign assistance structure of the government, and create a closer cooperation with Congress. Ultimately, this shift will be one towards “smart power” – the use of a variety of diplomatic tools to encourage US interests abroad. The changing relationship between development and diplomacy will have major implication for the shape and scope of the Next-Gen DOS.

Through the effective use of its authorities, Congress may play a significant role in making foreign policy. The main legislative vehicle for foreign assistance for the last five decades has been the FAA. Due, however, to acts of the legislature, the executive, and the nature of the political environment, the system through which foreign assistance programs are authorized and funded has become fractured, dysfunctional, and outdated. Originally designed in the shadow of World War II, with the threat of communism looming large, the FAA was the cornerstone of what President Kennedy referred to as the ‘Decade of Development.’ The “careful planning” which the Kennedy administration and the 87 th Congress intended to exist with regard to foreign assistance and development has been effectively laid to waste by, among other things, the effects of a revised budget process on authorization and appropriation committees, congressional earmarks, directives, sanctions, and inadequate or weak oversight of foreign aid programs.

In terms of further integration of USAID and DOS, Executive/Legislative tensions and the continuation of ineffective congressional oversight procedures serve as impediments to future reform. Whether it is a lack of understanding of each other’s roles, fears of ceding too much power to another body, or both, Congress and the Executive have promoted an uncoordinated and ineffective strategy for foreign assistance. Legislative restrictions and procedural requirements are used as tools by Congress to limit Executive flexibility. Similarly, the Executive works to develop new initiatives and other methods to gain more control over aid distribution. The lack of coordination between these two powers stands as a major barrier to the development of a comprehensive national strategy for foreign aid. Without a partnership between Congress and the Executive, it will be difficult to develop the support needed to integrate USAID and DOS. Legislative oversight has changed over the years and now lacks an overall strategic vision and attempts to retain control over aid providers through managing the appropriations process in excessive detail. The focus on appropriations, while neglecting the enactment of comprehensive authorizing legislation, has led to a disjointed approach to foreign aid policy and a dependence on earmarks and directives to limit the actions of the Executive. Furthermore, little legislative action by Congress has centered on the creation of new initiatives, while failing to reevaluate existing programs. This has led to the existence of agencies with overlapping mandates and an overall system that promotes an inconsistent and uncoordinated approach to foreign aid. In order for the effective consolidation of USAID and DOS, Congressional oversight must change to promote a broad strategic vision for foreign aid and remove funding restrictions that limit agency flexibility.

As a widely discussed alternative to USAID/DOS integration, the idea of moving development to a Cabinet-level post has received support from aid reform researchers and members of Congress. While this proposal aims to solve aid agency fragmentation and provide an increased role to development, removing USAID from DOS would require substantial coordination between the executive branch, Congress, USAID leadership, the Secretary of State and various other parties. The level of coordination required to implement such a reform limits the likelihood of success. This is due to an inherent connection between the missions of USAID and DOS, a lack of coordination between Congress and the Executive to develop the necessary legislation to pass such a proposal, entrenched interests by foreign aid agencies and uncertain reform outcomes.

The integration of USAID into DOS will require the involvement of the White House, Congress, relevant governmental entities, and other key stakeholders. It will, in the long-term, necessitate a comprehensive rewrite of existing legislation on the provision of foreign assistance. The full report, Integrating USAID and DOS: The Future of Development and Diplomacy, includes a comprehensive roadmap outlining the key measures that should be considered when moving forward with this process. The report includes actions that must be taken by both the President and Congress, recommends ways to encourage ownership of the process by the personnel of affected organizations, highlights key funding measures needed to ensure meaningful change, suggests the creation of a new Under Secretary of Development, provides methods for better integration, and lays out an organizational structure that will better align the mission and vision of foreign assistance.

THE NATIONAL GUARD:
RECOMMENDATIONS TO
DEVELOP THE JOINT
FUTURE FORCE
BY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEVEN R. HILSDON
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA519877



She worked with Nidal Hasan
Patsy of the Fort Hood Massacre to usher in Soldier Cybernetics!


http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=190940.0

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22590675/Homeland-Security-Report-Transition-Team-with-Nidal-Hasan-as-a-Participant

http://www.veteranstoday.com/2009/11/09/terrorist-hasan-was-bush-homeland-security-advisor/

And she is a member of the CFR: http://soldierforliberty.wordpress.com/2009/10/27/council-of-foreign-relations-members-m-z/


Chapter Three
Creating a State and Local Preparedness Revolution



Page 129:

Reserve Component Transformation:
Opportunity for Real Change
Christine E. Wormuth
Senior Fellow, International Security Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Despite a number of studies and recommendations conducted in the last several years on potential changes to the size, shape, and focus of the National Guard and federal Reserves, the Department of Defense (DoD) has generally made only gradual changes to the Reserve Component. While the transformation of the Guard and Reserves has been particularly gradual in the area of homeland defense and civil support, DoD and Congress now have the opportunity and the responsibility to make real changes that will ensure the future health of the National Guard and Reserves.
Since the September 11th attacks, the spotlight has been shining brightly on the National Guard and Reserves. In the aftermath of the attacks, the nation relied heavily on the Guard and the Reserves to help protect the homeland. National Guard troops provided airport security and critical infrastructure protection in the weeks following the attacks until they could be replaced with civilian security. The Air National Guard flew extensive combat air patrols in the months following September 11th and has continued to play a key role in the air sovereignty mission for the past five years.
The DoD has also mobilized Reserve Component units extensively to serve in overseas operations as part of the war against Islamic extremism. Reserve units were quickly mobilized and deployed to Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, and since 2003 nearly every combat brigade of the National Guard has been deployed as well.1
Since the beginning of combat operations in Iraq, thousands of soldiers from the Army and Marine Corps Reserves have also deployed. Currently, Navy and Air Force Reserve personnel are performing what many call “boots-on-the-ground” missions to relieve some of the pressure on Army and Marine soldiers that make up the bulk of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. In October 2006 the U.S. Marine Corps announced that it was planning to deploy certain reserve combat battalions for a second tour in Iraq to enable DoD to maintain sufficient numbers of troops in the Middle East.
Reserve Component forces also play a critical role at home in the United States. In September 2005, the National Guard sent 50,000 soldiers to the Gulf Coast to assist in the response to Hurricane Katrina. Although federal Reserve forces could not be mobilized involuntarily by law at the time of Hurricane Katrina, many reserve soldiers volunteered to help with response and recovery operations in Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama.
The prominent role of the National Guard and federal reserves both at home and overseas during the last several years has generated a great deal of media attention. The broader defense community also has focused more closely on Reserve Component issues, recognizing that Guard and Reserve forces have become an important part of the military’s operational force. As part of this enhanced focus on the Reserve Component, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a comprehensive study analyzing how the National Guard and Reserves can best be organized, trained, equipped and employed in the future.2 Congress also has called for more attention on Guard and Reserve issues. The FY05 National Defense Authorization Act chartered an independent Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) that presented recommendations on recent legislation relating to the Reserve Component to Congress in March 2007 and is expected to release a final report in July 2008.
Making real changes to the Reserve Component requires not only serious study to generate thoughtful recommendations about how to best reshape the Guard and Reserves, but also the political will to implement good ideas. The potential for real change may be greater in the next few years than it has been for some time. While Robert Gates will likely spend most of his time focused on the situation in Iraq, as the new Secretary of Defense he may also bring a new perspective to the challenges facing the nation’s ground forces, both active and reserve. The 2006 election returned control of both houses of Congress to the Democratic Party, which may also create new opportunities to examine important issues relating to the health of the Guard and Reserves. Finally, the presidential election in 2008 will bring a new occupant to the White House, and regardless of which party wins the presidency, a new President may have new ideas about how to use the Reserve Component.
Fix the Army First
While the National Guard and Reserves could play an even greater role in homeland defense and consequence management, before the Reserve Component can do more in those areas, fundamental changes must be made to ensure the overall health of Reserve Component forces. In particular, the Army—both active and reserve—is overstretched and must be fixed, or the health of the all-volunteer force could be at risk.
It is clear that even if the United States begins to reduce its military footprint in Iraq in the next few years, the demand for military forces in the future will remain relatively high. The demands of ongoing operations coupled with the need to respond to unforeseen events —such as a potential coup in Pakistan or aggression on the Korean peninsula—means there will be a continuing need to ensure sufficient numbers of combat-ready troops are available at all times. The Army today is too small to be able to do all that it is asked to do as part of the nation’s national security strategy. Recent reports that the Pentagon is Reserve units in order to increase access to these soldiers is further confirmation that the Army cannot sustain its current pace at its current size. Remobilizing Reserve Component forces would not be a small shift in policy. Under existing policy, Guard and reserve soldiers can be involuntarily mobilized for no more than 24 cumulative months. In essence this means that most mobilized Guard and Reserve troops serve one time overseas in places like Iraq or Afghanistan. If the Pentagon revisits this deployment policy, Guard and Reserve troops could be mobilized involuntarily more than once per partial mobilization order, as long as each specific deployment is less than 24 months at a time. While this re-mobilization would be permissible under law, it would represent a dramatic change in practice from how the Pentagon has historically mobilized members of the Reserve Component, which has been one involuntary deployment per Presidential Executive Order. If the active Army were sufficiently sized for its mission, the Pentagon would not be forced to contemplate mobilization policies that clearly go beyond what can reasonably be expected of volunteer, citizen-soldiers who have full-time lives as civilians. This proposed policy change could have significant negative consequences for recruitment and retention during a time in which it is already challenging to sustain Reserve Component end-strength.
Current troop rotation cycles are a further indication of the strain on the Total Army. A sustainable active Army spends two years at home for every one away so that its soldiers can rest, train and get ready for future deployments. Similarly, the Defense Department has determined that Guard and Reserve forces need to spend four to five years at home for every one year deployed. Currently, most active-duty Army soldiers are spending only about one year at home before going back overseas, and Guard and Reserve troops are spending only three years at home in between deployments. The Army cannot maintain this operational pace and expect to recruit and retain the high quality troops on which the all-volunteer force depends. If the Army is going to meet its goal of keeping active soldiers home for two years between deployments and Reserve Component soldiers home for four to five years between deployments, the Defense Department needs to expand the active Army by about an additional four to five combat brigades and associated support forces. This relatively modest expansion would ease the strain on the current force and allow the Army to maintain an adequate balance between the amount of time soldiers spend at home and overseas.
Not only is the current Total Army too small for its mission, it also is facing very significant equipment shortfalls. This problem is particularly acute for the Army Guard and Reserves as they transition from being a strategic reserve to part of the operational force that is employed on a regular basis. Battle damaged and worn-out equipment from extensive use, coupled with the legacy of equipping National Guard and Reserve units as a strategic reserve rather than part of the operational force, have left the Guard and Reserves ill-equipped for current and future missions. In October 2005, the Government Accountability Office reported that Army National Guard units left behind more than 64,000 individual pieces of equipment, worth $1.4 billion, in the Iraq theater in order to ensure incoming units from the United States would have sufficient equipment when they arrived in theater.3 Army Reserve units also have left behind and transferred large numbers of equipment in order to equip deploying units adequately for their missions overseas. While understanding the need to have adequately equipped troops overseas, governors and legislators have expressed considerable concern about whether National Guard units returning home from operations in Iraq have sufficient equipment left to respond to domestic emergencies as a result of the leave-behind policy. If the United States plans to continue using the National Guard and Reserves as part of the operational force, the Pentagon needs to develop a new equipment strategy to ensure the Reserve Component can execute this role effectively.
Equipping the Reserve Component to serve as part of the operation force will not come cheaply. In its study on the future of the National Guard and Reserves, the CSIS report recommended that DoD spend at least an additional $13 billion over the next five years, on top of the $21 billion already included in the current five-year budget, to adequately equip the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.4 Although its shortfalls are not as dramatic as those the Army faces, the Marine Corps Reserve also needs substantial funding to reset equipment in need of repair and replacement. Without this additional funding, Reserve Component ground forces will be unable to function as part of the operational force over time.

The Reserve Component in Homeland Defense and Civil Support

When it comes to homeland defense and civil support, the National Guard and Reserves are a tremendous resource. The National Guard of the several States, as the state militia envisioned in the Constitution, [INSERT: that's a total lie, the NG was formed by the "Dick Act of 1903", not the US Constitution] exist in all 54 states and territories and work routinely with members of local communities. National Guard soldiers are a part of their local population, they have extensive experience working with municipal authorities, and they have considerable flexibility in terms of the missions they can conduct if they are employed in state active duty or Title 32 status. Reserve soldiers are also forward deployed throughout the country, and Congress recently gave the President broader authority to mobilize these soldiers involuntarily in the event of a catastrophe. With this new authority, it will be easier for DoD to leverage the capabilities resident in the federal Reserves that could make a real difference in managing the consequences of a natural or man-made disaster.
Not only do the National Guard and Reserves offer substantial operational capabilities relevant to homeland defense and civil support missions, they also have the potential to form part of a more regional approach to homeland security. In recent years there has been a growing realization that more needs to be done at the regional level to properly prepare for future disasters. Recently, the government has taken steps toward strengthening the regionalization of homeland security policy, particularly in the White House Katrina after-action report, which called for greater regional cooperation, exercising, and training. The FY07 Homeland Security Appropriations Act also contained a provision aimed at strengthening regional structures inside the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).5
Establish Regional Civil Support Forces
The National Guard in particular offers a substantial capability that if used to maximum effect could both improve the nation’s ability to respond rapidly and effectively to major catastrophes and build a more regional approach to homeland defense and civil support. Although in recent years the National Guard has taken a number of steps to focus more intensely on these mission areas, more can and should be done to ensure the nation is truly prepared to address the domestic security challenges it faces in the post-September 11 environment.
To ensure that governors have the resources they need to respond effectively to major catastrophes, the National Guard could be organized to form the backbone of Civil Support Forces (CSF) in each of the ten Federal Emergency Managment Agency (FEMA) regions. These CSFs would be drawn from existing National Guard units and would have two primary functions. Each CSF would serve as a coordinator and facilitator for developing regional response plans for catastrophes. The regional CSFs also would serve as one of the initial military responders in the wake of a disaster or attack. They would have the ability to deploy rapidly in order to bridge the gap between when the local first responders arrive on scene and the arrival of federal assets more than 72 hours later.
A major focus of the CSF would be helping to facilitate better working relationships between the wide range of stakeholders in each FEMA region, including state and local governments; Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Army North (ARNORTH); DHS/FEMA offices; Coast Guard elements in the region; and even key players in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector who might play a part in a regional response. All of these organizations have important roles in responding to a terrorist attack or disaster. The best disaster response would be one in which all the organizations work together, using their different areas of expertise to provide the most effective response, but all too often today the representatives of these diverse organizations are meeting each other for the first time in the middle of the crisis. The headquarters element of the CSF could play a major role in establishing working relationships among these stakeholders on a steady-state basis so that if and when a disaster occurs, key players already know how they will interact during a response.
Establishing CSFs in the National Guard would not require building new force structure. The DoD and National Guard could build on the new state Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ), selecting one state in each region to serve as the CSF headquarters and designating it as a focal point for civil support planning, exercising, and training. That JFHQ-state would then work with other states in the region to identify the response capabilities needed for that particular region and determine which National Guard unit elements from each state could be drawn on virtually to serve as the CSF for the region.
Each CSF would be primarily comprised of combat support and combat service support units (e.g. security, engineer, transportation, CBRNE and medical assets) consistent with the capabilities that are most likely to be needed to respond to a disaster. The National Guard, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Steven Blum, has already established ten Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High Yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP) that bring together these types of forces for use in consequence management. The CSF proposed in the CSIS report would be comprised of very similar types of forces, but unlike the CERFPs, they would be drawn from units throughout an entire region vice a single state, and they would be fenced from overseas deployment so that state governors would be guaranteed a ready and equipped response capability 365 days a year.
Using the National Guard more intensively for civil support is frequently presented as an either-or option: the Guard can be deployed overseas for warfighting or it can be used a home to respond to disasters. In fact, the DoD’s new rotational model for the Army presents an opportunity to better use the National Guard for civil support without jeopardizing the critical role it now plays as part of the operational force. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model envisions deploying Guard units overseas once every six years. When not deployed overseas, Guard units will spend five years gradually ramping up their training and exercising to prepare for the next deployment. During the early years of the rotational cycle, Guard units will be largely focused on individual training and will not yet be engaged in the higher end field exercises that are necessary to be fully combat ready to go overseas. Guard units in the third year of the ARFORGEN cycle will have sufficient equipment and personnel to function effectively as CSFs but would still be early enough in the cycle so that service as part of a CSF would not significantly disrupt preparation for more intense overseas missions. Fencing certain support units (both personnel and equipment) in the National Guard from overseas deployment during the third year of the ARFORGEN cycle to serve as regional CSFs would give the nation a dedicated and capable response capacity without undermining the ability of the National Guard to serve as part of the operational force.
Units serving as part of the regional CSFs during any given year would focus their annual training exercises on civil support missions, build relationships with the full range of other organizations that would be part of a regional response operation, and be on alert to respond to an actual disaster for the year in which they are “in the box” as part of the CSF. Units making up the CSF would report to their respective governors on a steady-state basis, but could be chopped to the command of the headquarters state adjutant general through Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs) for annual exercises.
Command and control arrangements for the CSFs reflect the inherent flexibility the National Guard offers in the area of homeland defense and civil support. In the event of an actual catastrophe, governors throughout the region could decide whether they would be willing to release control of component units to the governor of the state most in need of aid. Troops released to the command of another state governor could serve in either state active duty or Title 32 status. If the circumstances of an attack resulted in a presidential decision to federally mobilize Guard troops, the CSF would fall under the command of NORTHCOM and the Secretary of Defense. To ensure that CSFs are able to function effectively under the full range of command and control scenarios, CSFs would conduct two exercises each year; one in which the CSF reports to a state governor, the other in which they report to NORTHCOM.
In order for the CSFs to respond rapidly to a disaster and bridge the gap between local first responders and the arrival of federal response assets, the CSFs would need reliable access to prompt airlift. The CSIS study on the National Guard and Reserves recommended that the Air Force recognize the requirement for civil support-related airlift and put air crews and planes on soft alert to ensure that CSFs could be deployed quickly and efficiently.6 One way to do this would be to associate the ten FEMA regions with the ten different Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). This would allow the alert requirement to be rotated, so that at any given time, active, Guard and Reserve airlift assets from only two AEFs would be on alert. Although this would constitute a new requirement for the Air Force, and is one that the Air Force to date has argued is not necessary, if the nation is truly facing a real threat to the homeland, the time has come to develop a consequence management capability that is reliable and can actually respond fast enough to make a real difference.
Regional CSFs would focus National Guard units more intensely on homeland missions, and provide a set of dedicated, trained and practiced response forces to assist in managing the consequences of a major catastrophe. These forces would advance regional planning efforts and build working relationships among states and a wide range of federal agencies. By drawing on units in the third year of the ARFORGEN cycle to man the CSFs, DoD could provide a more robust civil support capability than it currently offers without undermining the important role the National Guard plays in overseas missions.

The Guard Role at NORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau
There are several important areas where transformation is needed to strengthen the homeland defense and security capabilities of the Reserve Component. Although NORTHCOM is working hard to build bridges to the states, relations between the command and state governors continue to be strained. Given that the Guard is likely to play a major role in any response to a catastrophic event, it makes sense to appoint a National Guard general officer as the Deputy Commander of NORTHCOM, at least for immediate future. Placing a National Guard general officer in the actual chain of command would demonstrate NORTHCOM’s recognition of the Guard’s key role in homeland security, would help to build bridges to the states, and would bring the upper echelons of NORTHCOM an accurate understanding of the Guard’s strengths and limitations. If NORTHCOM and the Guard are to work effectively with one another, they must understand each other’s capabilities.
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the Bureau itself also need a greater voice in homeland defense and civil support issues. In the specific area of the role of the National Guard in homeland defense and civil support, the Chief of the NGB should be empowered to directly advise the Secretary of Defense. When the National Guard is called to serve in state active duty status or under Title 32 for domestic missions, it is fulfilling its role as the nation’s militia rather than serving as part of the federal Army and Air Force. For such missions, it is wholly appropriate for the Chief of the NGB to advise the Secretary of Defense directly, just as the Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army would advise the Secretary on matters concerning the Army, for example. Any revision of Title 10 would need to be crafted carefully to make clear the roles and responsibilities of the Chief of the NGB in this area relative to the roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. Unlike the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, the Chief of the NGB would not have the responsibility to represent the DoD as a whole on homeland matters, including military assistance to civil authorities. Representing the Department on homeland defense and civil support matters to the Executive Office of the President, DHS and other federal departments and agencies, as well as State and local authorities should continue to be the role of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. The Chief of the NGB would have a more limited role focused on advising the Secretary of Defense on how the National Guard can contribute to homeland defense and civil support, and would execute this role in close coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Similarly, Congress should consider revising the statute outlining the functions of the NGB so that the Bureau could play a more direct role in advising the Combatant Commands and working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to develop plans, policies, and programs with respect to the Guard’s role in civil support missions. While the Army and Air Force should remain responsible for developing doctrine and training requirements for its personnel, if the NGB’s charter were revised to include this new function, the NGB would be able to advise the Army and Air Force on development of doctrine and training requirements for National Guard forces participating in defense support to civilian authorities operations. As part of this new responsibility, the NGB would be the primary adviser to OSD and the combatant commands for developing joint requirements for civil support missions that would draw on Guard forces and for advising OSD and the combatant commanders as they translate those requirements and the associated military capabilities resident in the National Guard into operational plans for these missions.
Finally, while the Guard gets most of the attention when it comes to responding in a crisis, there are many capabilities in the federal Reserves that also could be put to good use in consequence management. Particularly now that members of the Reserves can be involuntarily mobilized by the President during a catastrophic disaster, NORTHCOM and the Reserve commands should work with Joint Forces Command to ensure that NORTHCOM has real visibility into the kinds of Reserve Component capabilities that are available in the homeland and where these assets are at any given time. Such visibility would make it easier for NORTHCOM to plan for civil support missions using the full range of active and reserve capabilities.
Conclusion
The U.S. Reserve Component has numerous capabilities that will be needed to respond effectively to future catastrophes, whether a natural disaster or a terrorist attack. While Guard and Reserve forces have already played key roles in responding to disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, they are not being used to their maximum potential. If organized more systematically to focus on homeland defense and civil support missions, National Guard troops in particular could be part of a major step forward in improving the nation’s emergency preparedness.
The Hart-Rudman Commission argued years ago that civil support should be a primary mission of the National Guard. Although their recommendations in this area were not embraced by the DoD, they were right then and they are right today. Organizing National Guard elements into virtual, regional Civil Support Forces during the third year of the Army’s new rotational cycle and focusing those forces on planning, exercising and training at the regional level can be done without jeopardizing the critical role of the National Guard as part of the operational military used overseas. Such forces would provide governors with a rapidly deployable, trained and guaranteed disaster response capability—something the nation does not have today.
No matter how the nation, the governors and the DoD ultimately choose to organize the National Guard and Reserves for homeland defense and civil support missions, the Reserve Component must be given the funding and equipment it needs to execute its full range of responsibilities. In order to perform missions at home and abroad effectively in the future, the Reserve Component will need the funding required to serve as part of the operational force and DoD will need to take steps to mobilize Guard and Reserve forces in a manner that is consistent with their new role and the constraints they face as citizen-soldiers.



Death By Design: Science, Technology, and Engineering in Nazi Germany

http://www.pearson.ch/HigherEducation/History/Germany/1471/9780321276346/Death-By-Design-Science-Technology.aspx
Eric Katz

Description
Through a selection of primary and secondary sources, Death by Design examines the uses of technology during the Holocaust and the specific ways in which scientists, architects, medical professionals, businessmen, and engineers participated in the planning and operation of the concentration and extermination camps that were the foundation of the “final solution.” The book discusses the overriding intellectual, ethical, and philosophical implications of the Nazi's use of science and technology in their killing operations.

Features
Primary sources. Individuals who witnessed the Holocaust first-hand-such as the engineers (Ch. 3). architects (Ch. 7), and doctors (Ch. 10) who participated in the building and running of the concentration camps, as well as individuals who survived internment in these same camps (Ch. 1)-give their accounts of the Nazi killing operations. These primary sources allow students to “hear” the voices of perpetrators and victims, alike, and build their skills as critical readers and historians. Secondary sources. Essays on the involvement of the SS (Ch. 11), IBM (Ch. 12), and Ford (Ch. 14) in the Nazi operations help students understand the role of business in the Holocaust. Additional secondary sources-such as a critical look at the ethics of Nazi architect Albert Speer (Ch. 8 ) and essays considering the political and ethical values associated with technology (Chs. 5, 6, and 15)-prompt students to question the connections between Nazi science and technology and the current uses of science.

A brief historical background introduction. This essay provides students with a concise history of the Nazi regime.

Chapter introductions. Each chapter introduction provides context for the following reading. The author of the selection is identified, as is the time and place in which he/she was writing and any other historical background information that might facilitate a deeper understanding of the material.

Discussion questions. Appearing at the end of each chapter, discussion questions provide the basis for in-class discussions or essay assignments, by encouraging students to bring a more critical eye to the readings.


Section I: Details of the Killing Operations

1. The Killing Process at Auschwitz-Birkenau - Miklos Nyiszli.
From Auschwitz: A Doctor's Eyewitness Account. Nyiszli, a Hungarian Jewish doctor employed by the infamous Nazi doctor of Auschwitz, Joseph Menegle, describes the step-by-step killing procedure of the gas chambers and crematoria at the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp.

2. Design and Development of the Gas Chambers and Crematoria in Auschwitz - Franciszek Piper. “Gas Chambers and Crematoria”. Piper presents a detailed history of the five gas chamber and crematoria complexes, and the provisional temporary gas chambers, that were built and operated at Auschwitz-Birkenau from 1941 through the end of 1944.

3. Engineering Mass Murder at Auschwitz - Jean-Claude Pressac with Robert-Jan Van Pelt. From “The Machinery of Mass Murder at Auschwitz”. Using the latest source material recently acquired after the fall of the Soviet Union, Pressac and van Pelt provide a history of the engineering firms that were involved with the SS in the design and construction of the gas chambers and crematoria at Auschwitz-Birkenau.



Section II: Technology, Management Policy, and Politics: General Issues

4. Technology and Politics in Totalitarian Regimes: Nazi Germany - Paul Josephson.
From Totalitarian Science and Technology. Josephson presents an overview of the relationship between technology and political power in Nazi Germany, showing how the Nazis used technology to advance the political ideology of the Third Reich, while banning technologies that seemed “Jewish” or ideologically suspect.

5. Nazi Ideology, Management, and Engineering Technology in the SS - Michael Thad Allen. From The Business of Genocide: The SS, Slave Labor, and the Concentration Camps. Allen examines the ways in which Nazi ideology influenced management and engineering decisions in the industrial operations of the SS. By examining several SS managers and engineers, including Chief of Engineering Hans Kammler, he discusses the reasons why technological professionals aligned themselves with the evil aims of Nazism.



Section III: The Role of Architectural Design in Nazi Germany

6. Architectural Aesthetics and Political Ideology in Nazi Germany - Paul Jaskot.
“Architecture and the Destruction of the European Jews”. Art historian Jaskot focuses on the aesthetics of architecture as an example of the connection between political ideology and the development of technology in Nazi Germany.

7. Architecture and Technology in Nazi Germany: Memoirs - Albert Speer. From Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs. In these excerpts from his memoirs, Speer, one of the highest ranking officials in Nazi Germany during the war, discusses his role as Hitler's architect, the role of technical professionals and engineers in the operations of the Third Reich, and the connection between his training as an architect and his service to the goals of Nazism.

8. Albert Speer: Ethics, Architecture, and Technology - Jack Sammons, Jr. “Rebellious Ethics and Albert Speer”. Sammons considers the case of Albert Speer as an example of ethics in the technological professions, and he argues that Speer betrayed the highest ideals of his craft--architecture--in his work to further the aims of the Nazi regime.



Section IV: Medicine and Biology in Nazi Germany

9. Genetic and Racial Theories in the Nazi War on Cancer - Robert N. Proctor.
From The Nazi War on Cancer. Proctor discusses how Nazi ideas of biological and racial determinism influenced research and industrial policy regarding the causes and cures for cancer.

10. Medicalized Killing in the Nazi Death Camps - Robert J. Lifton. From The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide. In several selections from his book on the Nazi medical establishment, Lifton shows how the medical metaphor of the Jews as a disease in the German nation became the guiding principle for killing all undesirables in the Third Reich. Medical professionals oversaw all the killing operations at Auschwitz, and used Jews (and other prisoners) as subjects in grotesque medical experiments.



Section V: Engineering, Technology, and Business

11. IBM in Nazi Germany - Edwin Black.
From IBM and the Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance Between Nazi Germany and America's Most Powerful Corporation. In an excerpt from his controversial book, Black discusses the history of IBM's cooperation with the Third Reich and how IBM provided sophisticated information-managing technologies that the Nazis used in the labor camps, population censuses, and the armaments industry.

12. The Crime of I.G. Farben: Slave Labor and Mass Murder in Nazi Germany - Joseph Borkin. From The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben: The Unholy Alliance Between Hitler and the Great Chemical Combine. Borkin examines the history of the giant petrochemical corporation I.G. Farben and its alliance with the SS in the building of a slave-labor factory on the grounds of Auschwitz and in the manufacture of the Zyklon B gas that was used in the gas chambers.



Section VI: Concluding Ethical Considerations

13. Technological Evil: Cultural Values in the Holocaust-Eric Katz.
“On the Neutrality of Technology: The Holocaust Death Camps as a Counter-example”. This chapter provides a philosophical overview of many of the case histories in earlier chapters, arguing that the development of the Nazi concentration camps is a clear example that technology is endowed with the values of the culture that produced it.


PDF Page 35:

"State and Local Governments" ... [are our enemy]

The past several years have strained homeland security relationships between the federal government
and state and local governments. According to the 2007 National Governors Association
Annual Survey, “States continue to report unsatisfactory progress in their relationship with the
federal government, specifically with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).”53 As noted
above, many emergency managers at the state and local levels felt that DHS’s emphasis on terrorism
was misplaced and came at the expense of preparedness for the natural disasters that state and
local governments were far more likely to experience.
The very public dispute between President
Bush and Governor Kathleen Blanco of Louisiana over control of the National Guard during the
response to Hurricane Katrina, together with the President’s seeming enthusiasm for a greater
role for the military in future disasters, unsettled many at the state and local levels.
Some state
emergency managers, such as Craig Fugate of Florida, emphasized that “it is important that the response from the federal level is one of a supporting role for state and local emergency management,
it cannot supplant these efforts.”54
Alarm at the state and local levels about the intentions of the federal government during future
catastrophes grew in 2007 with the enactment of a law allowing the President to federalize the
National Guard without consent from state governors in order to
restore public order and enforce the laws of the United States when, as a result of a natural
disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or
other condition in any State or possession of the United States, the President determines that
domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the constituted authorities of the State
or possession are incapable of maintaining public order.55
The National Governors Association and the National Guard community vigorously opposed
this provision, and they successfully lobbied Congress to repeal this expansion of presidential
powers a year later. As a result of these developments and others since the formation of the Department
of Homeland Security, relations between the federal
government and state and local governments are at a low
point.

Underlying these specific grievances and concerns is a
broader and largely unspoken concern by some government
officials and emergency managers outside Washington, D.C.,
that the federal government is attempting to significantly
change how the United States is organized to respond to
domestic emergencies. Historically, responding to domestic
emergencies has largely been the job of local and state
governments, in recognition of the fact that they are best
positioned to assess local needs and take quick action. Only
when local and state governments cannot meet all their needs
do they turn to the federal government for assistance. Essentially,
states pull down federal assistance through formal
requests, and the federal government pushes that assistance
out to states once those requests are received and approved.
The September 11 attacks and the growing realization that
further acts of catastrophic terrorism in the United States are a real possibility cast serious doubt
on that traditional pull-push system. The deeply flawed response to Hurricane Katrina added
further fuel to the debate. For those inclined to support the idea of “federal takeovers” of future
catastrophes, the performances of the city of New Orleans and the Louisiana state government
were confirmation of the need to find a new approach. For those who argue that a federal takeover
violates the U.S. approach to governance and is unlikely to lead to better disaster management, the
performance of FEMA and the tangled federal command and control structure were proof of the
folly of “putting the feds in charge.” Although the argument about whether the federal government should take over in a crisis
engenders strong feelings on both sides, in reality the nation’s traditional system of relying on local
and state governments to manage domestic incidents, with help if needed from the federal government,
seems to work well for 98 percent of the disasters that occur in this country.
As the White
House’s lessons learned report on Hurricane Katrina noted, “The State’s role has been compared to
retail sales in terms of organization, delivery, and management. Under this description, the Federal
government’s role is comparable to wholesale. This generally works well and should continue
in the majority of instances.”57 That this model is equally well suited for catastrophes is less clear;
in fact, as the White House report observes on the very next page:
When the affected State’s incident response capability is incapacitated and the situation has
reached catastrophic proportions, the Federal government alone has the resources and capabilities
to respond, restore order, and begin the process of recovery. This is a responsibility that
must be more explicitly acknowledged and planned for in the NRP [emphasis added], and we
must resource, train, and equip to meet this obligation when such a contingency arises.58
The federal government has formally issued 15 disaster scenarios to be used in planning and
exercising at the federal, state, and local levels, and at least 12 of them would clearly be considered
catastrophes by the PKEMRA’s definition.59 What would the traditional “pull-push” disaster
management system look like in the event of a 10-kiloton nuclear detonation, or a major chemical
attack in an urban area,
to take two of the National
Planning Scenarios? [INSERT: The only "terrorists" capable of those kind of scenarios are the traitors at CSIS staging a false flag]
The National Response
Framework provides the basic
blueprint for how these
events would be managed.
A local on-scene commander
would be present
at the ground level, but for
such major events the state
governor would be making
the big decisions. On
the federal side, DHS’s first
step would be to establish
a Joint Field Office (JFO)
that would be closely tied
to the state emergency operations center. Under the current system, the lead federal official would likely be the Principal
Federal Official, reporting to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Because a nuclear event and a
major chemical attack are both obvious catastrophes, the federal government would be able to take
accelerated action, using procedures outlined in the Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) to the
National Response Framework. Under that annex, the federal government can immediately begin
deploying federal assets to the vicinity of the crisis without having to wait for formal requests from
the affected state governments. Yet even when such predeployment is allowed, as a matter of policy
federal resources arriving at federal mobilization centers or staging areas near the incident are to
“remain there until requested by State/local incident command authorities, when they are integrated
into the incident response effort.”60
According to the traditional model, the state government would then put together a formal
request for assistance and submit it through the JFO to FEMA, which would farm out the requests
to the different parts of the federal government that are predesignated to provide specific forms
of help. But if a nuclear device detonated, or if thousands of Americans were dead from exposure
to chemical gas and thousands of others were spontaneously evacuating because they feared
exposure, is it realistic to assume that the state government would have the capacity to formulate
a formal request to the federal government and marshal state resources into an effective response
effort? Would the state government have sufficient situational awareness to assess its needs? Would
the state government and local jurisdictions have the physical capacity to retain law and order?
Would enough of the state leadership be functioning and able to make informed decisions? States
that have extremely well developed emergency management systems and extensive response capabilities,
such as New York, Florida, and California, may be able to function relatively effectively
even during an event as grave as a nuclear detonation, and thus may be able to use the traditional
Stafford Act system of federal assistance. But for many other states, it is not clear that the current
system would be sufficient to ensure a robust response.
Recommendation 6: The next Administration should work closely with state governments
to initiate a robust dialogue on the subject of how to balance the need to enable the federal
government to directly employ federal resources within a state or states during the most extreme
circumstances with the constitutional right of states to self-governance.
The idea of expanding the role of the federal government during a domestic catastrophe is
anathema to many in the homeland security community, but the time has come to take the first
steps toward adapting the traditional emergency management model to the post–September 11
environment.
The Stafford Act already grants the federal government substantial authority during
a major disaster In any major disaster, the President may provide accelerated Federal assistance and Federal
support where necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate severe damage,
which may be provided in the absence of a specific request [from the Governor of the affected
State] and in which case the President (A) shall, to the fullest extent practicable, promptly
notify and coordinate with officials in a State in which such assistance or support is provided;
and (B) shall not, in notifying and coordinating with a State under subparagraph (A), delay or
impede the rapid deployment, use, and distribution of critical resources to victims of a major
disaster.62
Current policy governing the provision of federal assistance during a catastrophe as outlined
in the Catastrophic Incident Annex—expedited deployment of federal resources to federal mobilization
centers or staging areas near the incident — does not appear to fully exploit the authority
granted to the federal government under this section of the Stafford Act.
A President will surely be willing to take whatever steps are necessary to work with a governor
and his or her governing team during a major catastrophe,63 but it is not impossible to imagine
scenarios in which state leadership is severely weakened in its ability to orchestrate an effective
response effort,64 or leaders are in place but the state’s physical capacity to execute their decisions
is severely degraded. In such cases, it may be appropriate for the federal government to exercise
more of the authority granted to it under the Stafford Act than today’s plans envision.
The goal of adapting the current system is not to enable the federal government to manage
a catastrophe over the objections of a state governor, but rather to develop in advance an understanding
with state governors so that all agree on the extreme conditions under which the federal
government might need to directly employ federal resources within a state or states in order to
execute its responsibility to save lives and protect property.
The barriers to making such adaptations to the current domestic emergency management system
are largely cultural and psychological rather than legal. Despite the substantial legal authority
to act during a catastrophe already given to the federal government by both the Stafford Act
and the Insurrection Act, the notion of its taking a more prominent role is extremely politically
sensitive, and understandably so. The Bush Administration reportedly approached state governors
through the National Governors Association early in its first term to discuss new federal-state approaches
to disasters, but this initiative did not bear fruit. The principle that crises are best managed at the lowest level of government possible should
remain a fundamental feature of the American approach to domestic emergency management. At
the same time, in light of the threats the nation faces in the post–September 11 environment, it is
only prudent to ensure that the country’s preparedness system includes the ability of the federal
government to exercise its full authority under the law to save lives and protect property during
a major disaster should a state government be incapacitated or its available resources inadequate.
The next Secretary of Homeland Security, with strong backing by the President, should work
closely with state governors to begin exploring how the current system could be adapted to make
such federal help possible in ways that are mutually acceptable. Given the political sensitivity of
this issue, the initiative would need to be handled discreetly at the most senior levels of DHS. A
first step might be a face-to-face discussion between the Secretary of Homeland Security and as
many state governors as possible, with the Secretary making very clear that the federal government
has no intention of developing a process to seize control over the objections of governors.
A logical follow-up would be a series of “principals only” tabletop exercises focused on a scenario
that envisioned the incapacitation of a state government (or multiple state governments). These
would enable senior federal officials and state governors to begin exploring key questions:
Under what circumstances would it be appropriate for the federal government to employ federal
resources directly within a state or states?

■ How would the federal government execute this authority? Would the procedures look substantially
different than those outlined in the NRF?

■ Under what, if any, circumstances could state leadership be judged to be fundamentally incapacitated? [INSERT: After CSIS/CFR scum destroy them using the Delta Force, see as Operation Last Dance]

■ How could state leadership be restored, if it has been incapacitated at the outset of an event?

■ What circumstances, if any, might lead a President to go beyond exercising the full authority of the federal government under the Stafford Act to issue a declaration of martial law? Such an exercise, or series of exercises, would at least prompt the stakeholders to seriously discuss whether the current emergency management system needs to be adapted for the most extreme circumstances. In the absence of this kind of high-level process, the political taboos around this issue will deter the broader DHS bureaucracy from raising these questions. Unless this concerted effort is undertaken at senior levels, in any future catastrophe that destroys a state government’s ability to function the federal government’s efforts to play a more prominent role in providing assistance and support will be entirely ad hoc, and thus unlikely to be very effective.



The number one enemy of the globalists is state and local governments. We need to get patriots/constitutionalists elected at the local, county, and state government levels to resist the federal, global, and corporate takeover! Your city council, your State legislature, and neighborhood groups is where all political action needs to take place. The "tenth amendment" movement is the garlic to these vampires, while "anarchy", "communism", "fascism" and "democracy" are wet soggy bread slices for these fungi at the CSIS.

The CSIS does not want state, county, local governments or charities responding to disasters; CSIS wants disasters to be used as an excuse to declare "martial law" as totally admitted to in this treasonous document.



In This Photo: Tom Ridge, James Locher III, Frances Townsend, Christine Wormuth
James Locher III (C), executive director of the Project on National Security Reform, testifies before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee along with (L-R) former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge (L), Frances Townsend, former homeland security advisor to President George W. Bush; and Christine Wormuth, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies' International Security Program, on Capitol Hill February 12, 2009 in Washington, DC. The witnesses offered differing points of view on whether the president's Homeland Security Council and National Security Council should be folded into one bureaucratic body. (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images) *** Local Caption *** Tom Ridge;Frances Townsend;Christine Wormuth;James Locher III
(February 12, 2009 - Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images North America)



In This Photo: Tom Ridge, James Locher III, Frances Townsend, Christine Wormuth
Former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge (L) testifies before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee along with (L-R) Frances Townsend, former homeland security advisor to President George W. Bush; Christine Wormuth, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies' International Security Program; and James Locher III, executive director of the Project on National Security Reform; on Capitol Hill February 12, 2009 in Washington, DC. The witnesses offered differing points of view on whether the president's Homeland Security Council and National Security Council should be folded into one bureaucratic body. (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images) *** Local Caption *** Tom Ridge;Frances Townsend;Christine Wormuth;James Locher III
(February 12, 2009 - Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images North America)


In This Photo: Joe Lieberman, Tom Ridge, Susan Collins, James Locher III, Frances Townsend, Christine Wormuth
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Joe Liberman (I-CT) (2nd R) and ranking member Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME) (L) pose for photographs with witnesses (L-R) Christine Wormuth, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies' International Security Program; James Locher III, executive director of the Project on National Security Reform; Frances Townsend, former homeland security advisor to President George W. Bush; and former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge before a hearing on Capitol Hill February 12, 2009 in Washington, DC. The witnesses offered differing points of view on whether the president's Homeland Security Council and National Security Council should be folded into one bureaucratic body. (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images) *** Local Caption *** Tom Ridge;Frances Townsend;Christine Wormuth;James Locher III;Susan Collins;Joe Liberman
(February 12, 2009 - Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images North America)

SOURCE: http://www.zimbio.com/photos/James+Locher+III/Christine+Wormuth

Wormuth donated money to Barry Soetoro, Reed, and Van Hollen:

http://www.campaignmoney.com/political/contributions/christine-wormuth.asp?cycle=08


Wormuth, Christine E
ARLINGTON, VA
22205 Csis/Defense/Homeland Security Expe $250 09/30/2008 P OBAMA VICTORY FUND - Democrat
Wormuth, Christine E
ARLINGTON, VA
22205 Csis/Defense Analyst $250 07/05/2008 P OBAMA FOR AMERICA - Democrat
Wormuth, Christine
ARLINGTON, VA
22205 Csis/Military Expert $250 01/25/2008 P OBAMA FOR AMERICA - Democrat



WORMUTH, CHRISTINE E
ARLINGTON, VA
22205 CTR FOR STRATEGIC INTL STUDIES/POLI $1,000 06/30/2006 P REED COMMITTEE - Democrat


Wormuth, Christine E.
ARLINGTON, VA
22205 DFI International/Defense Analyst $500 09/30/2002 G VAN HOLLEN FOR CONGRESS - Democrat
Wormuth, Christine E.
ARLINGTON, VA
22205 DFI International/Defense Analyst $250 08/21/2002 P VAN HOLLEN FOR CONGRESS - Democrat

LMAO, the concertina wire background for this White Paper...

http://www.janes.com/events/conferences/eurosatory2008/EurosatoryConf2008.pdf

Homeland Security in urban areas
18 June 2008, Villepinte, Paris, France
The Official Eurosatory 2008
International Conference

An authoritative panel will address the official
Eurosatory 2008 conference at this year’s most
important security and defence exhibition on
the European mainland.

Key speakers include
Mr Francis Delon
Secretary General of National Defence Ministry, France
Mr Peter Verga
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense
and Americas’ Security Affairs
Mr Gilles de Kerckhove
EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator
Dr Richard A Falkenrath
Deputy Commissioner Counter-terrorism, New York Police Department, USA
Assistant Commissioner Tarique Ghaffur
Head of Central Operations, the Metropolitan Police Service, London
Mr Phillipe Coq
Vice-President, EADS
Brigadier General David Fraser
Former Regional Commander South in Afghanistan, Canada
Ms Christine Wormuth
Senior Research Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington DC

Strategic Planning for U.S.
National Security:
A Project Solarium for the 21st Century
Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley

http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/interagencyQNSR.pdf



Council on Foreign Relations

Following a Catastrophe: Ensuring the Continuity of Government

(Audio)


http://www.cfr.org/publication/14966/following_a_catastrophe.html

Speakers:

Jamie S. Gorelick, Member, Continuity of Government Commission; Partner, WilmerHale

Fred C. Iklé, Distinguished Scholar, Center for Strategic & International Studies

Norman J. Ornstein, Senior Counselor, Continuity of Government Commission; Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute

Presider:

Thomas E. Donilon, Partner, O'Melveny & Meyers LLP

November 7, 2007



THOMAS E. DONILON: Why don't we get started? We can maximize the time for our discussion.

My name is Tom Donilon. I've been asked to moderate today's discussion. The topic is entitled "Following a Catastrophe: Ensuring the Continuity of Government." I'll talk about that in just a minute. Let me do just a very quick set of introductions and reminders along the council -- of the council way. Most of -- all of you, I think, know those: cellphones off; BlackBerries, other wireless devices. Today we're on the record. That's the ground rules.

For our discussion today, we're joined by three people who really don't need any introduction. That's a cliche. It happens to be absolutely true in this case. And I'll do it very quickly, again, so we can maximize discussion time.

Down at my far left, Jamie Gorelick is one of America's leading lawyers; has vast experience, as I think everybody in this room knows, in law, government service and in corporate America. She was deputy attorney general during the Clinton administration. Prior to being deputy attorney general, she was general counsel at one of the world's largest law firms, the Department of Defense legal department. She's been president of the D.C. Bar, was counselor to the secretary of Energy, has served on a number of -- does serve on a number of corporate boards and a number of advisory committee and commissions to the United States government, most notably the 9/11 commission.

Fred Ikle is a long and distinguished expert in the area of national security affairs and also has a long and distinguished history of government service. Fred is currently a distinguished scholar at CSIS, engaged principally now, I think, in studies about the impact of technology on national security. As I said, Fred's service to the United States goes back to the -- at least the Nixon and Ford administrations, I think, Fred, as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; was the coordinator of foreign affairs advisers during the Reagan campaign, which was the immediate cause of me losing my first job in 1980 and put out on the streets -- (laughs) -- right -- and of course was during the Reagan administration undersecretary for Policy at the Defense Department.

Norm Ornstein is one of America's best-known political scientists. He's currently and has been for a long time resident scholar the American Enterprise Institute for public research. Norm is also a political scientist -- in addition to being well-known, is a political scientist with impact, who cares deeply about American political institutions as anybody I have known. He is a senior counselor to the Continuity of Government Commission and has been one of the driving forces behind addressing the issues we're going to discuss today. Norm was one of the driving forces behind campaign finance reform and one of the principal craftspeople of the McCain-Feingold legislation. He has over the last 30 years been a force behind reform in Congress and again is a political scientist with -- who cares and has high impact.

I principally remember Norman as my first professor in the first hour of my first day of college, where he was my political science professor in Political Science 101. Somehow the lines crossed on who looks older than whom -- (laughter) -- over the years, right? (Chuckling.) I'll try to pinpoint that. But nonetheless, Norman is -- has been one of the most important influences in my life, and it's great to see him here today.

As I --

NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN: An A student. (Laughter.)

DONILON: Yeah. (Laughs.)

As I -- yeah, you know, after the laughter, you can -- after the, you know, kind of brown-nosing evidence you're seeing today -- (laughter) -- (laughs) -- I only honed those skills over the years, right, you know.

Today, as I said, the topic is entitled "Following a Catastrophe: Ensuring Continuity of Government." And simply put, I think our discussion today focuses on the following task, and that is to attempt to get an assessment of how the United States government would react to, be able to function after a catastrophic attack that put in peril its fundamental institutions: the presidency, the Congress, the judiciary and its election system.

For those of us in the room who work in corporate America, you wouldn't have a global corporation that didn't have a disaster recovery program that wasn't constantly reviewed, updated and tested. Your auditors at a major public American company, that had global reach and that had data that it relied on and data centers and the core decision-making processes -- your auditors would insist on looking at that regularly, and you'd want to make sure you had a best-in-class system.

The question presented for this discussion is, do we have a best-in-class system? Do we have a system that can survive the kind of catastrophic attack that the United States might suffer? And we certainly have seen the possibilities of that around 9/11.

I'd like to start with Norman to do an assessment, and I thought we could try to do three things today. Get an assessment of the problem, talk about steps that could be taken of a practical nature, and then maybe explore a little bit, in our half-hour discussion here before we open it up, why some of the obvious steps haven't been taken to strengthen the kind of response that America could have to a catastrophic attack.

Norm is, as I said, was kind of the inspiration behind the Continuity of Government Commission, wrote in the pages of Roll Call shortly after the 9/11 attack about the problem of Congress operating in an effective way in the wake of such an attack. So I thought I -- just to signal everybody, we'll start with Norman. I think we'll go to Jamie to talk about some of the practical things that could be done, and Fred to comment on their presentations.

Norm.

ORNSTEIN: Thanks, Tom, and the answer to your question is, we do not have anywhere near sufficient plans in place for any of the institutions. And it's unsettling frankly that six years after a warning signal with neon lights that continue to flash, we've done next to nothing in a fundamental way. And the problems are there really on four fronts.

They're there for ensuring that there is a Congress up an running as swiftly as possible after a devastating attack that could knock it out of business, keeping in mind that the Constitution says flatly that it requires a quorum of half the members to do any official business and that in this case, the House of representatives has the biggest problem in terms of getting up and running, that the Constitution says that all House members shall be elected. And if there are vacancies, they're filled by special elections, that in good times, when we're doing one or two, take, on average, four months. And you can't do an election overnight is the practical reality.

And for the Senate of the United States, the problem which we saw highlighted itself after 9/11, where the 17th Amendment to the Constitution allows states to have their executives appoint interim senators to fill vacancies, something of course that we've seen many times. That's if there are vacancies. When we had the anthrax scare, it brought another problem right in front of us. Which is, if that had been a serious, pointed, organized attack using high-grade, weapons-grade anthrax, gotten into the ventilation system of the Senate, we could have had 60 or 70 senators with serious problems, hospitalized for months or longer, no quorum.

And of course, those Senate terms last for six years. We've had instances: Karl Mundt of South Dakota and then more recently for almost a year, Tim Johnson being out. For Mundt, it was about four or five years where he was effectively comatose. So that's a major set of problems.

Presidential succession, which is done via statute. The last time we amended the presidential succession process was 1947 when vice president -- then-President Truman went to Potsdam the year before with his secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, and saw some serious peril there and thought, you know, we really don't have an adequate process in place. And so we revamped the presidential succession, but it is woefully inadequate to what we face today. It also is a deeply flawed act in other ways that we might get into a little bit.

There's the Supreme Court. On 9/11, just by eerie coincidence that morning the Judicial Conference of the United States was meeting at the Supreme Court. All nine justices, the chief judges of the appeals courts, the major figures from the district courts -- virtually the entire leadership of the federal judiciary about 150 yards from the Capitol Dome. It turned out with an interesting twist that several people who were there told me afterwards. During the course of that meeting, three or four times, with Chief Justice Rehnquist presiding, people were coming up onto the dais and whispering in his ear and then they'd leave and then they'd come back, and eventually he just got up and left, didn't say anything, as they hustled him off to an undisclosed location, leaving the rest of the judiciary to fend for themselves not having any idea what was going on.

Now, you might think, well, the court is not as significant; it deals with matters only in a more passive fashion and much later on. But if you think about the potential nightmare scenarios -- and unfortunately, there are many nightmare scenarios; the most nightmarish being something happening at an inaugural, where everybody who is in charge in the government is generally present and where you have the brief moment at noon on January 20th when everything is supposed to change, but incoming Cabinet members who are there in the line of succession are not yet sworn in, and outgoing Cabinet members are supposed to have submitted letters of resignation as of that day.

And the leaders of Congress, the speaker, the president pro tempore of the Senate are up on the stage with the incoming and outgoing presidents and vice presidents. If you ended up with a fog of war there -- there are many other circumstances where there might be some disputes about who is actually supposed to take over -- you don't want to have a dozen courts of appeals out there offering different suggestions as to who actually should be in charge, and there we have nothing much in place except a statutory requirement, six of the nine justices to make a quorum.

The fourth area -- which we're only starting to think about in the last few years; we didn't really think much about with 9/11 -- is elections. The -- of course, on 9/11 in New York the mayoral primary had been scheduled. Some people had already gone out to vote. The governor stepped in using his executive authority -- actually, it's not at all clear he had that executive authority, but no one disputed it -- and postponed that election.

But imagine if you had a disruption in one state, one city, a couple of places and you had to cancel, say, voting in Cleveland, something -- a decision that would be made by a partisan secretary of State, or in one or two key states, what are we going to do? Who's going to make those decisions? Are you going to hold a presidential election, where, in effect, a sizeable group of people who could determine the outcome of the election can't vote because of a threat or an attack? Are we going to let them going to let them vote later when the outcome otherwise would be known? These are issues that have not been adequately discussed, and there is no plan in place and no official in charge since elections are local matters to deal with something that could have the most enormous impact.

So most of these things we did not even think about in a serious way before 9/11. We haven't thought about the prospect of an attack that could come without any notice and be devastating. All the plans we had in place for succession with the Cold War that -- many of which have been scrapped in years since, obviously inadequate or gone, and all of them in serious need of a scrubbing to bring them up to a point where auditors -- good auditors would say we're set.

DONILON: Thanks, Norm. Just before we go to Jamie, then you would -- you believe, I take it, that that requires a range of steps, including constitutional amendments?

ORNSTEIN: To deal with the problem in Congress, and I, for one -- and this is something that occurred to me with unfortunate clarity on the afternoon of September 11th. I'd been at Dulles Airport that morning, got called off the jetway when my plane was about to take off when the second plane hit the World Trade Center, went home and watched, and when it became clear to me that United 93 -- after it crashed in Pennsylvania -- had been headed, I thought, certainly to the Capitol. And I knew what happens on a day like that at the Capitol -- beautiful day, morning business, lots of people around -- just envisioning what could occur. I thought, you know, we could be without a House for months and months, and that would mean martial law. And it didn't much matter to me at that point who the attorney general was, but I don't want martial law, benign or not, for a period of months.

If you look at what Congress did in the weeks that followed, an enormous range of things, including authorizing the use of force, emergency appropriations to deal with that would -- there are some who believe that you can find ways around it without a constitutional amendment. I believe we need an amendment that very simply would allow for temporary appointments until elections could be held that are real elections, where you can have a campaign and choices made, and for both Houses, for incapacitated members, until the incapacitated individuals can stand up and say, "I'm ready to come back." For the presidential succession, for the court and for elections, this can all be done by statute.

DONILON: Jamie, so we've got a bad audit. I think also you make -- I think the 9/11 commission found that in fact Flight 93 very much -- very likely could have been aimed at the Capitol as one of its targets. We have a bad audit. How should management think about it?

JAMIE S. GORELICK: Well, you know, you think that with the kind of compelling case that Norm has made for action, that there would have been some. So I thought I would look at, you know, why not? Why haven't we done anything? And what steps could one take? I totally agree, and I'll come back to it, with Norm's assessment of where you would need a constitutional amendment and where not.

But one of the first reactions to the commission's recommendation was we shouldn't talk about it because it will alert the bad guys to our vulnerabilities. Well, you know -- no, that's an argument that has been made, and it is an argument that has been made against discussing the need for cybersecurity, almost every vulnerability that we've tried to address as a country. And I just think that we need to dispatch that. If the Madrid bombings told us anything, it is that people who want to do harm are actually thoughtful about ways in which they might do it and are perfectly capable of taking advantage of timing. So I think we need to be alert to that, but we need to dispatch it.

Second, you have to think about each of the stakeholders and why they might feel that their ox might be gored here or that they would be giving up something substantial. And the first point there is that there's a reason we have very few constitutional amendments. People are very leery of making substantial changes in our system of governance. And the menu of horribles that Norm has laid out actually would require changing many things, or possibly changing many things, simultaneously. And that has -- that puts people on edge, and therefore they literally have done nothing.

So my view is you really have to parse this and lay responsibility on each of the constituencies for their part of the puzzle.

So the first is presidential succession. You know, for 60 years, we have put members of Congress -- the leadership of Congress in the line of congressional -- presidential succession. And one might well ask whether that makes sense given our political setup right now. You know, imagine Newt Gingrich taking over for Bill Clinton or Nancy Pelosi for George Bush. I mean, it just -- it would make more sense, I think, to the current political environment to keep it within the party and within the chain of command, if you will, of the Cabinet. The contrary argument, of course, is, you know, who elected Condi Rice? Why would you put a Cabinet member, who has not stood for election, in the line of succession? I think that's a debate that you can have, that's a choice that you can have, and it's a statute that you can revisit, and you know, I think it ought to be revisited.

The second is this romantic notion that people in the House have that they are the House of the people, and therefore you cannot sit in the House unless you've been elected. It's somewhat disparaging of the process that exists for the Senate. And I don't think it's because democracy is more important to the House than the Senate. I think it is probably so because people assumed that you're going to have an election pretty soon anyway, you could have a special election, and how hard could this be?

I agree with Norm that you have to have something equivalent to the appointment processes for the House that you now have for the Senate. That, I think, would have to be done by constitutional amendment, but I think it needs to be put squarely on the House to debate this and discuss this.

The states are -- and localities are responsible for elections. And this is, I think, among the hardest issues to deal with, because each state has concerns about finality, concerns about cost. It has its own short-term political concerns that people might not be able to get around. And I think that this is a national problem that needs to be dealt with nationally. And there should be a template for -- agreed upon by some conference of state officials similar to the commission that we had to look at our electoral process. This is a national problem, and we need a national solution.

And let's not forget the political parties, because in any number of Norm's scenarios, you have an issue for the political parties. What if there is an assassination of the person who has been elected but not confirmed by the Electoral College in that space of time? Who -- what happens then? We've just not discussed this. And that is a distinct possibility. The time around elections and around transition is our time of greatest peril. And the political parties thus have to be brought into this discussion.

Of course, it is easier to act by statute than via constitutional amendment. I mean, just the process of a constitutional amendment is extremely difficult, and as I said at the outset, there are great antipathies toward changing the Constitution. There are a number of things that could be done legislatively, but I think each of those parties needs to be brought to the table.

Perhaps the simplest problem to address is the problem of the Supreme Court, and that's so for several reasons. Although the Judicial Conference did gather together the leadership of the circuits and the district courts with the Supreme Court and they were in a place of maximum vulnerability on the day of 9/11, in general the courts are physically dispersed. They have the power to issue writs generally, so that a court in California could actually issue a writ that would be applicable elsewhere; they are courts of general jurisdiction.

However, the mechanism for replacing members of the Supreme Court so that you would have a quorum is not ideal for -- it's not ideal in any circumstances, because these are lifetime appointments, and to move in a hurried fashion to do something so important and of long-standing effect is probably not wise.

A solution to this has been proposed by my partner, Randy Moss, who was the head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Clinton administration, or one of them. And he has proposed a fairly simple solution, which is that there be established an emergency intermediate court that could resolve disputes among the circuits, which is the most important -- among the most important of the responsibilities of the Supreme Court, for the period of time in which there is not a quorum in the Supreme Court. That could be done by statute, and it would have limited impact. It could be cabined so that people would be less anxious than they might be about some of these other -- some of these other changes.

The final point I would make on implementation is this. The focus on the election process also should have us focus on the transition process. We know from intelligence that we've gathered that there has been a focus on our transition, and we know, those of us who've done transitions, that they're ugly; that you walk into the White House with essentially nothing available to you. And thoughtful people have made very concrete suggestions about how to handle a transition that could be of great benefit to the country as we think about this constellation of issues. And I would urge the people who've been interested enough to show up here at 8 in the morning to get involved in that discussion as well.

DONILON: Thanks, Amy.

Fred, your reaction to some of the ideas that have been put on the table, additional practical responses to the assessment that Norm and Jamie have laid out?

FRED IKLE: Right. Well, Norm has told us about what ought we do, and Jamie, how difficult it is to do it. And why is that so? It in part has to do with the -- well, the focus of the body politic and government people. And what you have here is that we do a lot of our planning by looking in the rear view mirror. We haven't experienced something like this. We've experienced 9/11, so we focus on a 9/11-type attack.

Also, people in this area don't -- you know, we do a lot for the bird flu. How likely is the bird flu? We don't know. We do a lot for terrorism against airplanes. How likely is that? We don't know. We don't know how likely is this kind of an attack.

What is not sufficiently recognized is that if there's a motivation to attack, and you just touched on it towards the end of your remarks -- to eliminate our government, our constitutional government, thereby weaken our response to a larger attack that might follow the strike against our constitutional government -- it could be quite strong and from a clever enemy, and if the country -- our country is in a situation where we're already divided, like we are today a bit about what to do about crazy Ahmadinejad with his ICBMs, which he doesn't have yet, and what to do in Iraq and so on, in contrast to the united -- rather united population we had after Pearl Harbor. And then, of course, Roosevelt was greatly helped by Hitler's great mistake of declaring war, but he couldn't have made it without -- without declaring war, without the declaration of war by Hitler, also probably (could ?) have moved ahead because the government was united.

So I think we ought to think about the importance also -- we discussed should this be public or not, and this is on the record -- the importance of indicating that we are prepared to cope with it even though it may be not fully developed in legal terms.

What we have had, actually, in 9/11 is an attack to inflict harm, destroy some of the icons, and what you have had in future attacks is probably attacks against the government, but in part it's been just to inflict casualties and harm. And a lot of the focus about the threat of a nuclear weapon, terrorist attack is how many casualties. There's less focus on depriving us of our government -- what I called in a book last year, annihilation from within -- that an enemy really wants to take our constitutional government so that we -- whatever's left of the organizations in this country malfunction and strongly dispute it as being illegal, illicit; the successor to the elected president, the secretary of Agriculture or whatever, is taking on powers which was never granted to him, and so you have a very divided country that's going to respond to this attack. And that could make it attractive to certain types of enemies.

The -- I think if we realize that the probability of this event is unpredictable like all the other probabilities -- we do spend money on the other probabilities; we spend time on it -- this is not a question of a lot of money. (Inaudible) -- spend billions as we do in other terrorist defenses. It's an organizational question, and we should be able to put our minds together to do it in a way that hopefully minimizes the need for constitutional amendments and is bipartisan -- that's very important.

And it so happens -- and I think I got this idea from Norm -- that the period now we're entering is the ideal period. A president is not up for re-election; he's not campaigning for himself. We'll have a change in government, but it's not clear which way it will go, and we could fix it in a bipartisan way without favoring one side or the other. That may be a way of doing it, and if we can press the people -- and so many are here -- either in executive branch or working in Congress that we should grab this period the next few months to make these changes, we might get there.

DONILON: I think that's a very important point about the timing of the discussion. It would be a very good gift from this government to the next, I think, to address some of these issues. I also think that the point you made about not only having a system in place that is effective in terms of governing, but legitimate is a very critical point on this.

Questions from the floor, comments? I think we have microphones. It would be great if people would wait for those microphones, and just state your name and affiliation and your comment and question and we'll -- and to whom you wish to direct it, and we'll move on here.

Thanks.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. Russ Demming (sp), teaching at SAIS. Thank you for -- you've all made a very compelling case that something needs to be done. What is the best vehicle for this? Is a commission -- a special commission to undertake this? I know that Jamie is a member of continuity of government commission. What is that? Does it do anything?

GORELICK: Norm created it so. (Laughter.)

DONILON: Yeah, why don't we have Norm -- why don't we have Norm comment on it. Norm's going to answer the question. What is that? (Light laughter.)

ORNSTEIN: Yeah. The -- as Tom mentioned, the first piece I wrote on this was just a couple of weeks after 9/11 in a column I write in Roll Call, and at that point I said let's get this conversation started right away. And what I hoped would happen is that the congressional leaders would have picked some individuals inside and outside just to talk about the problems and what might be done. Nothing happened there for many months, and after a significant amount of public attention given, trying in part just to embarrass them into doing something, Speaker Hastert quite reluctantly put together a task force that was headed up by then-Representatives Chris Cox and Martin Frost. And they actually did a pretty good job, but they were told, you know, don't consider anything other than minor tinkering.

After a few months, Lloyd Cutler, the late, great, Lloyd Cutler called me up and said, "We've got to do something more on this." And from that, we created a continuity of government commission, co-chaired by Lloyd and Alan Simpson with a group of very distinguished Americans like Jamie Gorelick.

And we held public hearings, did serious deliberation, tried to jump-start the process, issued a report on Congress -- another one forthcoming on presidential succession -- you know, as much as anything to go through in a systematic way what the problems were, what potential solutions were, and then you also want to look at what the unintended consequences would be of anything that you wanted to do and put something out there on the table so we could jump-start a deliberative process.

I think the report -- we still have a website up, marvelous stuff, but there's only so much a commission can do if you do not have the will or momentum from the major actors in the institutions who accept their own fiduciary responsibility to protect and extend themselves. That continues to be a deficit.

DONILON: Fred, do you have a comment on the mechanism?

IKLE: Yeah. My concern is the net outcome of commissions very often is to create another commission. And I would think of something slightly more mischievous to get this going.

The military have good procedures for succession, by and large, and if your public and people in Congress learn about work being done somewhere in the Pentagon, maybe, or some military installation, about martial law -- which is an ill-defined thing, by the way, it's not a clear legal arrangement -- martial law for this continuity -- for this discontinuity of government as a temporary fix until the executive branch and Congress have fixed it in a proper way, and start building it up and let the public know it's coming, it's being done, ask your congressman to get going on the right legal solution but we need something as a substitute -- this may drive it forward.

DONILON: Yeah?

QUESTIONER: Heather Kiriakou. One thing I was wondering is the ripple effect also to some of the other government agencies should such a catastrophic event occur. Some things that CIA deals with is the presidential daily brief. You know, a select number of individuals receive our most sensitive intelligence every day.

Should there be such a catastrophic event, it's unclear then who should receive this information. And also, on something that would be a statutory requirement, who is responsible for doing covert action? Has any of these issues been discussed and what do you think about them?

DONILON: Jamie, why don't you take that.

GORELICK: Yeah. Well, as a legal matter, each one of those would follow literally as a ripple effect from the decision on succession. So it's my assumption that the flow of intelligence, and the authority for approving such things as covert actions, would flow from whoever is in the line of succession to be president. So I don't think you'd want to jerry rig some other procedures. I mean, you have to decide the main question, which is who is running the executive branch in a period of turmoil such as the one that we've discussed.

ORNSTEIN: Well, I do think that -- I could be wrong about this, but the covert findings issues require congressional consultation as well.

GORELICK: They require notification, so you'd have to -- you'd have to determine, you know, there are notifications that go to Congress of covert actions. And depending on the nature of them, there are protocols for who gets notified. So certainly that piece of it you'd have to -- you'd have to decide as well. Again, you know, presumably that would flow from your congressional succession planning.

DONILON: In the middle here.

Q I'm Mark Reisch (sp), Encino Global Strategy Project.

I was wondering: What lessons can you draw from history -- perhaps our own history, maybe the Civil War or ancient at the time of the Roman Republic -- the concept of the dictator in Cincinnatus -- as just examples that we can draw upon.

DONILON: Norm, you all looked at a lot of history on this.

ORNSTEIN: Well, there are a couple of points to make here. The first is this lack of attention. In effect, the inability to execute a will is unfortunately something -- is an example of history repeating itself.

We've had other periods in American history where we actually operated -- or let me use a different analogy. Like driving a racecar without any insurance where we operated in a very precarious situation -- long periods of time, for example, when we had no vice presidential succession in place, as we have now done with a constitutional amendment -- a president died or was assassinated, the vice president took over, nobody behind him in presidential succession, leaving the president pro tempore of the Senate and the speaker of the House as the only ones there. And Congress out of session for lengthy periods of time, so no safety net whatsoever.

That was changed only after we had a couple of instances where we barely dodged the bullet. After President Garfield was assassinated, that finally brought a change in presidential succession to create a little bit more of a safety net. You could look at Lincoln's assassination and right before that, the plans that many terrorists had, basically, to try and decapitate the government by getting rid of everybody who was in the line of succession. This has happened before.

Now, at the same time, you can look at what occurs when you do get something that's the equivalent of martial law or you have a vacuum and somebody steps in and takes over power. And it's not a pretty picture, frankly. So what history tells us is that -- what history told us as we started the commission -- was this was not going to be an easy process. Obvious as it seems that we ought to be doing something, that it wasn't going to happen very easily and that the consequences of not acting were very, very dire -- given how humans behave in times of crisis.

DONILON: Fred, any comment on historical --

IKLE: Yes -- a quick one. I worked on -- I was participating in a Defense (design support ?) in the mid-'90s about terrorism -- transnational terrorism -- and as I was going through the sort of preparatory papers that we had, and analyses, I saw a sudden change. Suddenly, this thing became serious. What happened? It was the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, that used very advanced poison gas trying to eliminate the Japanese government, which was the purpose of it. Of course, it was so badly handled nothing came through. But again, the rearview mirror gave you the impetus to do something. And that was really -- we have to try to hang onto something where we can point to an event that came close to happening or that happened in some other countries. Things happening in Europe that we might point to and might stimulate -- help stimulate reaction on our side.

DONILON: How about -- we'll go right here in the corner here. Thank you.

Q Thank you. I'm Tom Wilkerson from the Naval Institute.

Two of you served in government. All of you are scholars of our democratic process. You've made -- I'm not a lawyer, but you've made -- at least to my inexperienced ears -- a very compelling case that there's something we should do and 9/11 has given us an example of what could be done to us. So why isn't anyone listening? I mean, you all have served in government, so when you talk to who were your succession, who now lead the government in those three branches, and make this compelling case, why do we get the -- as we say in the military -- the maintenance officer's salute?

GORELICK: Well, I tried to speak to that some. I think that there is inertia. There is -- it's too hard. There is the worry about the short-term political, you know, assumptions that is looking at what these changes might affect if you contemplate an event happening today. And then there is what I mentioned earlier: We have not tinkered with our system much, because people don't know what the consequences would be and they're afraid of it. And this would require tinkering with everything. And I think it's scary to people.

But what we're trying to do is force the issue. I'm not so sure I love Fred's idea of forcing the issue by creating the perception that we're going to have military law, but it is inventive and mischievous. But my view is you need to put this back to each element that has fiduciary responsibility.

ORNSTEIN: Let me just add that -- you know, I can understand why rank and file members of Congress or even many people in the executive wouldn't act. And it really is the same as so many very smart and capable people I know who do not write a will. You've got children. You travel. You've got, you know, questions that could leave them in wrenching situations over custody. You know, things that make a compelling case and yet people find a million reasons not to write a will. They're superstitious that maybe it will hasten their own demise. It raises all kinds of questions: Will it be your sister or my brother who will get custody of our kids -- so people don't want to do it.

The frustration for me flows from the top. I understand that, but if you are the speaker of the House or the majority leader of the Senate or the president of the United States, or the vice president of the United States, you have a different fiduciary responsibility. You've got to rise above that, overcome the inertia and protect the basic character of your own institutions.

And I had great frustration getting Speaker Hastert to care about this. When he finally did care about it, it was because some of his own party members decided to dig in their heels against doing anything significant, because they didn't want to challenge the elective capacity of the United States House of Representatives. I got nothing but indifference from Senate Majority Leader Frist. And I haven't found that much difference now under Senator Reid or Speaker Pelosi, although they're at least paying a little more lip service, but nothing more than lip service.

ORNSTEIN: Let me make, if I could, one follow-on.

Before you dismiss Mr. Eclay's (sp) comment about the military too quickly, you might want to revisit what really went down in Katrina because you don't have to eliminate the government for it to be paralyzed.

QUESTIONER: Mm-hmm.

ORNSTEIN: And what we saw down there is when it came down to things, that which remained was -- as an institution which was the only one that could impose order and provide support services turned out to be the United States military. In the absence of anything else, I doubt very seriously that any foreign interloper could eliminate enough of that military that it couldn't again do that if there were someone who would ask for it in extremis.

DONILON: In the back.

QUESTIONER: Good morning. I'm Kevin O'Frey (sp) from the Palisades Group.

Following up on a conversation about martial law, the first time Norm Ornstein mentioned it, I sort of had followed you all the way and then got very uncomfortable, and every time it's come up, I've gotten uncomfortable. Having looked at this, I would urge that we talk about the use of military force in the domestic environment and not about martial law because it's a red herring. It's very hard to imagine any scenario where the executive branch would be decapitated completely -- there'd be no line of succession and a military ruler would take over or somebody would take, you know, constitutional authority wearing the uniform.

So I guess -- with respect to the commission, I'm urging that you delineate between the notion of martial law -- which I think is a boogeyman -- and really issues of separation of powers and the use of military force -- which in Katrina, we didn't use force. We used to military to restore order, and I don't think it was even under the Restoration Act. There was -- you know, supporting a -- I don't think we had the attorney general involved in that, but I urge a little bit more caution until we talk to that

GORELICK: Let me speak to that.

I mean, there are well-worn methodologies for utilizing the military in a wide variety of circumstances and they are rehearsed and they are understood. I, however, don't think that it is crazy to assume for the purposes of planning a level of disarray in which the chain of command is not at all clear and in which our military leaders say, "We have the capacities to restore order. We don't know who we're responding to, and therefore we're going to go ahead and do it."

And the reason I say it's not crazy to think about that level of disarray is that there wasn't that decapitation of the executive branch on 9/11 and there was disarray. The chain of command was completely obliterated. Nothing happened as it should have happened because the president was gone. The secretary of Defense said that himself, and so you had literally the vice president speaking directly to the -- or thinking he was speaking, anyway -- directly to the commander of NORAD to take action. That's not the way it's supposed to work, and that's with nothing hitting anybody.

So I actually think that it is prudent to think about disarray if some element of our government or more than one element of our government is actually attacked, because if I'm a senior military leader and I know I'm the only grown-up left, I might say, "I don't know who to respond to, but I can't let X continue." So I think that it is -- we need to continue to contemplate that. I don't think it's a complete boogeyman.

ORNSTEIN: Let me both second that, but also indicate that when I first mentioned martial law, that's not what I had in mind. What I had in mind was a president acting as a unitary executive without any check or balance. In the weeks after 9/11, Congress passed a resolution authorizing military force and at least at the end of it had the War Powers Act remains intact. There was at least a fig leaf of a check and balance there. I -- the Patriot Act that was implemented, whether you like it or don't like it, was a far more significant check than if the attorney general on his own had basically said, "Here's what we're going to do." And of course, the Patriot Act had a sunset provision into it, building in the notion that whatever we do here or whatever excesses occur, that we'll end at a certain point and we'll at least revisit it. That would not have happened had there been no Congress.

So there are two things here. There's martial law where one branch of government takes over and basically assumes the functions of other branches of government. There is a kind of martial law where you have the military stepping in because all the other elected or constitutional branches are in disarray or decapitated. And they're two separate issues, both compelling.

DONILON: Why don't we try next to Ross (ph) here and then one down, and then Bill and --

QUESTIONER: Charlie Vichardis (ph), CB Grayson Company (ph).

First of all, I want to commend Norm and Jamie for working on this thing. I worked on this program here in -- when the Reagan administration resurrected this whole COD program in the early 1990s, and Fred was very much a part of that. And at that time, you couldn't even talk. There was an existing program here underway. We addressed many of the same issues then in succession. None of us who worked on the program ever thought it ever going to work because we all had to deploy to mobile sites around the country and kiss your wife goodbye, and hope she would survive the nuclear attack. And if she didn't, you'd left her some forwarding address she'd write a postcard to to match up to at some later date. So you knew it wasn't going to work at that particular point in time.

I'd just come off a commission that I think is just one of the few commissions that really works in government, and that is the Base Realignment Commission. And that is one of the commissions that has the force of law, and its recommendations to go the Congress, and unless the Congress votes it down, it becomes law. And I would suggest that's probably what we really need in something like this case here or else it's -- 20 years from now, we'll be up here having breakfast again and be talking about the same subject.

I don't have a question. (Laughter.)

QUESTIONER: Hi, I'm Bob Murray, CNA.

I think this has been a tremendous conversation this morning, and also congratulate you for putting this effort there. It seemed to me that there was a -- that there is a great strength in the point that Norm Ornstein made about temporary appointments by the states. And that states have the advantage if they're controlling elections and being dispersed and relatively -- (audio break) -- and also sources of legitimacy. So I wondered whether you were getting any reaction or had approached any of the governors, for instance. Are they talking about this at all? Because they would actually have to implement some of your ideas and that in some ways, it might be the easiest thing to fix if we could work out -- the House and maybe the Senate if we could work out this system of temporary appointments. Still messy, but perhaps able to be worked out so that you could have a functioning legislature at least, even if the secretary of Agriculture is still the president.

QUESTIONER: That was one of your recommendations --

ORNSTEIN: Yeah.

QUESTIONER: any reaction from the governors?

ORNSTEIN: Yeah, and actually -- you know, a number of governors were very happy to consider this and to do it. I got reactions from a number of state legislators. There have been states -- Delaware was a very interesting example -- that had put their succession plans in place during the Cold War, and Delaware had a process in place where the members of the legislature would designate a group of three to six people as potential successors. And then if something happened, the governor would choose from among that list. So you at least get some political check in place.

The reaction that I got from many members of Congress was an interesting one because instead of looking at this in the broadest sense, they looked at it from their own narrow parochial perspective and it was, "I'll be damned if I'm going to let this son of a bitch pick my successor!" -- pointing to his own governor at that particular point in time. And I said, "One, you'll be dead, so, you know, not to worry; and two, can't you think of this in the larger context? And do you really think that governors that we have under a situation of utter catastrophe in the country would say, What a great opportunity to take advantage for political leverage? It's just not going to happen. But it's another part of human nature.

DONILON: (Off mike.)

QUESTIONER: Thank you. Jill Sugar (ph).

I'm clearly very struck by the comments that everyone has made and Jamie's points about the total disarray which clearly, given your work, you're very familiar with in terms of 9/11. But I was also thinking back to something on a more simple level of even the day that Alexander Haig came to the White House Press Room and -- sort of the "I'm in charge." And therefore thinking that so much of it has to do with the credibility and what this means to the American public, and the faith that government is going to have a continuity. And what I'm wondering is -- this probably is something that has been contemplated, but if not, it seems to me that one of the difficulties -- as Norm has pointed out -- is having people who are still in office trying to make these decisions about themselves.

This also seems to me to be an issue that needs a very high level of focus and respect. And what I'm wondering is, has there been any thought given to people such as former President Bush, Clinton, Sandra Day O'Connor, Tom Daschle, George Mitchell, Bob Dole -- having them discuss this and come up -- particularly as we enter this election period -- something that is ready or at least being contemplated for the next administration, but dealt with at that level of attention with people like you -- you, Norm, Jamie and Fred and others, Tom, being engaged?

DONILON: I'm tempted to put all the Haig questions to Fred. (Laughter.)

But is there are any comment on the idea of a sort of --

IKLE: Well, Richard Owen (sp), I think, has written on that -- he's written notes on it. And it wasn't quite as serious as it looked. It was really more -- a bit flamboyant -- you know, in a tense meeting. It didn't create a crisis. The vice president was on his way to come into Washington.

GORELICK: Yeah, but I -- I think -- you know, it's interesting to see how statesman-like people become -- immediately after leaving office and can see the bigger picture in a way that Jill suggests. It's -- I think that it's actually a very good idea to get people who understand the stakes and who can -- and who've taken a step back to be involved. Now getting that kind of collection of people around a table is extremely difficult, but you can imagine doing it for Congress separately, for example and calling upon people who have recently served and have, you know, reverence for the institution and continuing concern about our security.

MS. : (Off mike.)

ORNSTEIN: Yeah.

You know, I -- just one comment on the Haig business. As I've traveled around the country in the -- over the last six years and have talked about this issue, it is amazing how that continues to resonate with people. When you mention it, everybody just sort of -- the eyes light up. Poor Al Haig will be remembered first for that because that really stuck with people and it's the most effective way of dramatizing this issue, actually, in some respects.

I've talked to Tom Daschle, who's a statesman, and Bob Dole, who also is a statesman and continues to be deeply involved, although Bob is now 84 and threw himself into the Dole-Shalala Commission, which was a -- actually a shining example of how a commission can work well. And I think he can get involved as well. Getting -- when we first created the Continuity of Government Commission, Presidents Ford and Carter were honorary co-chairs as they did on so many things, but didn't play any active role and that was part of the deal that they would be honorary co-chairs. Getting Presidents Clinton and Bush involved is a particularly interesting idea and I think very much worth pursuing.

DONILON: Dan?

QUESTIONER: Dan Tarullo from Georgetown Law School. Thanks, Tom.

I have a brief comment and then a question. The comment kind of amplifies on Jamie's observations of why this doesn't happen. I mean, constitutionalizing has throughout our history been an incremental exercise. You know, even the creation of the Constitution was moving from where we were under the Articles of Confederation to some things that people wanted to change, and each amendment has been people saying, "Well, do we like this, and if we don't, how do we change it?" Whereas what you folks on the panel are contemplating is a potentially radical discontinuity where everything is sort of up for grabs. And I think that means that basic questions become implicated again and everybody's fighting about basic questions.

Are you worried most about -- as Norm seems to be -- about somebody kind of seizing control or are you worried most about paralysis, where you have too many checks and balances -- people are unable to function? And I guess in response to your question, Thomas, about what can be done, I'm struck by how little writing and discussion there is of this set of issues outside of Washington and the people sitting at the front of the table. I mean, I unfortunately have to look at writing by law professors who want to -- or people want to go into law faculties every year haven't seen anything on this. You know, everybody's writing on Article II powers, everybody's writing on civil liberties in a time of anti-terrorist activities. Nobody's writing on this. So it's got to kind of get outside the beltway, I think, to have any shot at picking up. That's number one.

The question is, I was a bit surprised at the degree to which this was a constitutional law professor's dream discussion. What about the rest of the government? Because I -- that's -- you know, using Tom's analogy, we have a very headquarters-heavy operation here with the exception of the judiciary, which Jamie pointed out. And I add the Federal Reserve, which is -- has high-ranking people throughout the country and the military, to some degree. Most of the rest of our government has all its nerve centers within seven miles of where we're sitting right now. And I'm not talking about the secretary of Transportation. I'm talking about all the assistant secretaries and the deputy assistant secretaries of Transportation and Energy and the like. It -- how much contingency planning has been done for those important but non-symbolic functions of government after a genuine catastrophe in Washington?

DONILON: Fred?

IKLE: Well, quite a lot has been done in the military, really. You know, we have NORTHCOM now. We didn't have to sing for it for this republic here and changes happened as a result of Katrina, when all of the military was accepted by the Defense Department then and or disasters. But to look at this more broadly, a continued two-pronged approach certainly move us forward. And I like the recommendation of the Base Realignment Commission -- (off mike) -- as a commission that it can give us that power then to get something done.

Second -- parallel to that -- one could -- and this could be done internally in the Defense Department or the military establishment -- encourage them toward -- do further work. And a lot of work has been done about the passe comitatus act, which often is interpreted as an excuse to do nothing to scratch the back of all these legislative pieces we have lying around to integrate these into preparing a legalized response by the military to such a crisis. You move forward and there's two -- and there's two roads, you may more likely get something when there's at least two approaches -- may compete with each other and drive each other forward.

DONILON: That'll have to be the last word, in keeping with the council commitment to end on time for its events.

Thank you all very much. It was terrific. (Applause.)

There's the Supreme Court. On 9/11, just by eerie coincidence that morning the Judicial Conference of the United States was meeting at the Supreme Court. All nine justices, the chief judges of the appeals courts, the major figures from the district courts -- virtually the entire leadership of the federal judiciary about 150 yards from the Capitol Dome. It turned out with an interesting twist that several people who were there told me afterwards. During the course of that meeting, three or four times, with Chief Justice Rehnquist presiding, people were coming up onto the dais and whispering in his ear and then they'd leave and then they'd come back, and eventually he just got up and left, didn't say anything, as they hustled him off to an undisclosed location, leaving the rest of the judiciary to fend for themselves not having any idea what was going on.


W T F ?

Anyone else ever hear about one of our branches of government having a coincidental "all hands on deck" meeting right at the time of the "caught off guard" terror attacks?

Meh I would be careful about this book. Its basicly built on myths. Like a book telling you how man made global warming is real. With all the data and graphs and little detail and experts and so on. But honestly.... a book about the holocaust or WW2 that isnt banned in Germany also isnt worth reading.

Try this book, maybe it will help you see the Science, Engineering, and Planning of the Nazi Depopulation and enslavement systems:




Red Prometheus

Engineering and Dictatorship in East Germany, 1945–1990


Dolores L. Augustine


This is an excerpt of the most relevant part of the introduction

The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England



Introduction

What is the relationship between dictatorship and science? How effectively can scientific and engineering communities resist the totalitarian impulse of a dictatorial ruling party? Was the Communist system able to produce good science and technology? What does this tell us about the degree to which an autonomous society continued to exist under Communist rule? These questions stand at the center of this study, which focuses on one of the most technically advanced East bloc countries, East Germany. There, the German tradition of science-based technology was wedded to a socialist system that accorded technological progress a central place in modernization strategies. German engineering and Communism held in common a profound belief in the transformative power of technology, but differed on how to unleash it. Their alliance was complex and fraught with contradictions.

German engineering, which played a central role in the creation of the Nazi killing machine, enjoyed twin rebirths after the Second World War in East and West Germany. Scientists and engineers tried to revive a culture of technological excellence and a tradition of science-based industry. They brought with them attitudes and expectations that stemmed from the military-dominated Nazi research establishment and from patriarchal traditions of engineering going back to the nineteenth century and before. German intellectual tradition viewed technology as a manifestation of culture.

The great men of science and technology—whether university-educated specialists or engineers trained on the job—were thought capable of forging unique cultural products that solved major technological puzzles. Scientists and engineers in East Germany counted on the Communist state to give due recognition to their unique creative powers and mastery of complex technologies through experience and education.

Communism did not only accept technological modernity, but viewed technology as an essential part of socialist progress. Radically rejecting the Nazi utopias of racial purity and absolute violence, after the war East German Communism embraced equality and technological modernity—the wonders of science harnessed to the needs of the people. Marx believed technology to be essential to the triumph of socialism.1 Lenin made industrialization, rather than equality or the pursuit of world revolution, the centerpiece of efforts to win and keep the support of the masses, thus establishing priorities that would guide the Soviet bloc until the fall of Communism.2

Technology provided the basis of modern industrial production and became an important part of East German socialist identity. This expressed itself in propaganda, high culture, and popular culture. In East Germany, technology was central to the way Communists saw their system and citizens saw their state. Technology was a crucial weapon in the Cold War struggle between East and West, and was seen as essential to the creation of a better socialist future. To a much greater extent than any other Communist state, East Germany legitimized and under-girded its existence with technology.3

In the post-Stalin era, the universality of science, whether in East or West Germany, was affirmed, and the earlier doctrine of the superiority of “socialist science” was jettisoned.4 Technology was conceived as a derivation of science. Unsullied by the system under which it was developed, technology could travel without difficulty from the capitalist world to the socialist world, believed supporters of the Communist system. It was the use to which technology was put that differed drastically between capitalism and socialism. While capitalists used technologies to promote exploitation and war, socialists deployed technology to the benefit of their people and all mankind. According to this view, the work of engineers and scientists was not intrinsically good or bad.

This “technical intelligentsia” could serve the bourgeoisie, and do its evil bidding, or it could become the partner of the working class, and help build a better, socialist society. It was hoped that the “old intelligentsia,” educated and socialized in the pre-socialist era (i.e., the Imperial, Weimar, and Nazi eras), could be won over to the socialist project. The trust-worthiness of these holdovers from the capitalist period was questioned by some, however. Above question, at least in theory, were the loyalties of the “new technical intelligentsia”—engineers, scientists, and technicians recruited, educated, and socialized under socialism. The creation and expansion of the ranks of “socialist engineers” became a major goal of the SED (the Socialist Unity Party, as the Communist Party of East Germany was known).

During the 1960s, socialist ideology came to be infused more and more with a belief in technology. The GDR (German Democratic Republic) aspired to overtake the West through “technical-scientific revolution.” With this ambition came a profound shift in the relationship between technical professionals on the one hand and state and party bureaucrats on the other. When the SED leadership started allowing itself to believe it could win the competitive race with the West, it came to believe it could become the central driving force behind technological innovation.

A process of centralization, bureaucratization, and ideologization of decision-making took place. The SED and the secret police also attempted to co-opt and penetrate the “technical intelligentsia,” replacing any alternate ideology or loyalty to professionalism with loyalty to the socialist system. Now infused with a belief in technology, Communist ideology was seen as capable of becoming not only the guiding force behind “scientific-technological progress,” but the ultimate source of technical innovation. This major shift in power relations and ideological claims made by the SED had a major impact on the innovative process. In recent years, scholars have sought to overcome the “black-and-white picture... [of] the oppressive state versus the victimized scientific community” under dictatorial rule.5

Research on the Nazi era has come to emphasize the complicity of engineers and scientists with the Nazi régime.6 In his work on Stalinist science, Nikolai Krementsov explores the maneuverings of scientists intent on promoting their own interests, careers, disciplines, and research institutes under Communism. They worked within the context of a system in which the state not only held a monopoly over the funding of science, but also had at its disposal a considerable repertoire of methods of coercion. Who won or lost in the competition for state sponsorship was not, however, determined by ideology, but rather by the resources and abilities of groups of scientists, organized in often competing networks. To win out over its competitors, a discipline, subdiscipline, or institute needed spokesmen able to formulate a particular scientific approach in ideological terms, connections in the upper echelons of the party hierarchy, and the prospect of military applications of its scientific work.

According to Krementsov, the party pursued its own political and ideological aims, and “service to the party’s goals was the main criterion in defining the objects and subjects, and even the pace, of scientific studies . . .” Nonetheless, the outcomes were often unexpected, reflecting the needs and desires of segments of the scientific community as much as those of the party hierarchy, which itself was profoundly fragmented.7

Asif Siddiqi has shown that the Soviet space program was the brainchild of engineer Sergei Korolev and other missile experts, who induced the political leadership to embark on a project that they did not see as of central importance.8 The development of nuclear missiles was the main concern of political leaders, who were focused on the conflict with the United States. Resources and personnel were shifted from the missile program into the space program on the initiative of missile scientists and engineers. The Soviet leadership had extraordinary confidence in them because of their role in the build-up of Soviet defenses, and was therefore willing to accord them a good deal of autonomy. The propaganda value of the space program was an unforeseen by-product. Siddiqi sees this case as evidence of the dynamic quality of the relationship between scientists and political elite in the USSR. Policy was not always dictated from above, he argues.

Slava Gerovitch has studied the way Soviet scientists used the ideas and language of cybernetics to reform society and to create a new sort of relationship between themselves and the rulers of the Soviet Union. Under Stalin, “newspeak” dominated, a form of speech that placed ideology and philosophy above science. Western ways of talking about the use of computers and cybernetics were thoroughly rejected as intrinsically capitalist.

Based on ideas developed by American mathematician Norbert Wiener,
the central concept of cybernetics
was that much of reality could be reduced
to logical relationships within systems
that could be controlled with the help of computers.


With the Khrushchev-era liberalization and the acceptance of computers as essential to growth and progress, it became possible to completely overturn the ideologically motivated rejection of cybernetics, to make it into a kind of master science in the Soviet Union, and to replace “newspeak” with an entirely new form of speech, “cyberspeak.”

Scientists were now able to successfully impose their language and the supremacy of scientific rationality on philosophers. Some even hoped that cybernetics would remake the power structures and economic system.

In the end, however,
cybernetics became a new orthodoxy,
a tool of the Communist elite.

Gerovitch shows that scientists in the Soviet Union had considerable resources at their disposal in their negotiations with the state, though he is more pessimistic than some historians about their ultimate ability to retain control over those resources.9

This emphasis on the agency of scientists in the Soviet Union has parallels in the broader literature on the nature of dictatorship. Historians such as Robert Gellately have found much evidence of the complicity of the population in Nazi terror.10 Historian Sheila Fitzpatrick has argued that even in the darkest days of Stalinism, the masses played an active role in social and political life in the Soviet Union. Social and cultural historians have made a similar argument with regard to East Germany. They assert that although the East German leadership aspired to totalitarian rule, it did not fully achieve it, failing in important ways to control and direct society. The resulting tensions within Communist societies often went right to the top, leading to competition between opposing factions within the elite.11

Others have sharply rejected such a view. For them, the GDR was a totalitarian dictatorship terrorized to the end by the secret police. An important group of historians who subscribe to this interpretation rely heavily on the files of the Ministry for State Security (or MfS), which ran the East German secret police, known as the Stasi. They believe that these files reveal the true mechanisms at work in East German society. A totalitarian state-within-a-state, the Stasi maintained labyrinthine networks of informers who not only kept the MfS informed of possible deviation from absolute loyalty to the Communist system, but also took action to root out the (supposedly) disloyal. Security procedures increasingly took precedence over all other criteria (such as professional competence), with the result that only highly conformist individuals were given positions of responsibility and power.12

There are alternatives to the “totalitarianism” interpretation. Sigrid Meuschel has given us a sociologist’s definition of the SED dictatorship, which she calls a “party state” (perhaps best rendered in English as a “one-party-state”). According to her analysis, the SED effectively destroyed the autonomy of different sectors of society, insinuating the “logic” of Communism into all aspects of life. This destroyed the functional differentiation of society, which Talcott Parsons and others have asserted is a central characteristic of modern societies.13 Alternate interpretations of the East German system include Jürgen Kocka’s concept of the “modern dictatorship” and Konrad Jarausch’s “welfare dictatorship,” which emphasize the linkage between coercion and consensus-building in Communist rule in the GDR.14

This study addresses this debate, making use of the kinds of sources used by the two major schools—secret police reports as well as all sorts of sources that provide the perspective of the common citizen.

This book explores the creation of technology in East German industry as a process of constantly renegotiated power relations. But this is not the story of struggles between two homogeneous camps. Both the bureaucracy of party and state and the technical professionals were torn by rivalry and competition. The dynamics of their interactions were also profoundly influenced by two actors that cannot be left out of the equation. The first is the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the thinking behind Soviet policymaking is often obscured by the lack of access to Soviet archives (though pioneering research has begun).

Nonetheless, a Soviet agenda can often be inferred from a multitude of decisions and interactions with East German industry. The Soviet leadership was torn between two goals. On the one hand, the Soviet leadership sought to gain whatever advantage it could from the advances of East German industrial research. On the other hand, the Soviets viewed the East Germans as potential rivals whose advances, particularly in the atomic and high tech sectors, posed a potential threat to the Soviet Union.

The fourth actor in the process of creating technology is society. To create an alternative to Western-style professionalism, society had to be mobilized. The model of autonomous, self-regulating professions was to be replaced by a new loyalty to the SED. Serious attempts were made to sever the historical links between the professions and the bourgeoisie, as well as to forge new ones between the professions and the proletariat—above all by recruiting university students from the working class. Women were also to gain new professional opportunities. It was thought that this “new intelligentsia” would promote “social progress.”15 The participation of society was not only essential to the creation of the “socialist engineer,” but also to the mobilization of the creative talents of the proletariat in the factory. Art, literature, public representations, and educational efforts attempted to reach the masses with the message that they should help build socialism by promoting technological progress.

How successful was socialist science and technology? During the Cold War, it was often argued that in the Soviet Union, ideology had impeded the search for scientific truth. The classic case of this is Trofim Lysenko, a poorly educated agronomist and a “clever and cruel political maneuverer” whose teachings began to supplant genetics in the 1930s and ruled supreme until 1965.16 The purges of the 1930s killed off or silenced the best scientists and engineers. Initiative and critical thinking were suppressed. It has also been argued that theoretical work in the sciences suffered from an overemphasis of practical applications. In numerous works, Loren Graham has argued that the oppressive role of the state slowly, over the decades, eroded the scientific and technical prowess of the Soviet Union.

The central problem lay in the creation of a top-down, overly centralized system, particularly in its Stalinist incarnation. As in the days of the tsars, engineers and scientists put pleasing the rulers first, and as a result oscillated between frenetic activity and passivity. However, Graham has also argued that political interference was not great enough to prevent valuable scientific work from being done. Soviet scientists often performed well because they were given tremendous social prestige and financial resources for research. Marxist ideology not only did not stand in the way of scientific progress, but in some cases sparked new insights and profitable new paths. Graham’s overall evaluation of Soviet science is nuanced: “The Russian experience points to a strong distinction between those conditions that are necessary for the survival, even prospering, of science, and those that are necessary for its most creative achievements.”17

Graham also points out the human costs, particularly of Soviet engineering. Universities and engineering colleges churned out engineers with very narrow technical specializations and lacking a sense of the “broader social concerns” that earlier generations of Russian engineers had possessed. Huge technical projects were carried out without giving thought to the human costs, environmental impact, or social utility, resulting in unnecessary human suffering and social problems, and thus contributing to the ultimate downfall of the Soviet Union.18

A younger generation of scholars has been more categorical than Graham in its rejection of the idea that democracy fosters better science. In a book defiantly entitled Stalin’s Great Science, Alexei Kojevnikov argues that many of the factors that Western scholars have cited as causes of the failures of Soviet science and technology could just as easily be used to explain the triumphs of Soviet science. Indeed, centralized control very much facilitated the emergence of Big Science, notably in the case of the Soviet atomic program. Despite tremendous hardships and the political persecution around them, many scientists worked with great dedication, and were rewarded with great success. They were motivated by careerism, but also by profound patriotism, fueled by their bitter experiences in the Second World War and fear of the United States.

Their attitudes toward socialism varied. Many of the scientists educated in the early Soviet period were rebels whose socialist beliefs led them to embrace revolutionary scientific concepts and to reject the conservatism of the academic establishment. The era of “High Stalinism,” which was also the era of the purges, brought sober careerists to the fore. Although they publicly toed the party line, their primary concern was the preservation of the scientific community and its institutions, as well as the promotion of their own careers, institutes, schools, and disciplines. Kojevnikov considers the triumph of Lysenkoism to be a very exceptional case.

He also argues that ideological opposition to quantum physics and Einstein’s theory of relativity hardly had a serious chance of success, due to nuclear physicists’ “skills—and some luck—in playing the rhetorical, ideological, and political games of that culture.” According to Kojevnikov, atomic scientists possessed enough freedom to pursue the ideas they found promising, and the state provided them with tremendous resources to do so. Moreover, competition within the scientific community promoted scientific excellence. Gradually abandoning attempts to develop a uniquely “socialist science,” the Soviet Union nonetheless developed its own brand of modern science. Kojevnikov attributes what he sees as great successes to the “extraordinary cultural value and importance” accorded to science in the Soviet Union.19

Though the detonation of the first H-bomb in 1955 and the launching of Sputnik in 1957 unleashed a wave of intense anxiety about the technological and scientific capabilities of the Soviet Union, on the whole, the West underestimated the scientific capabilities and technological might of the Soviet Union. In the West, it was argued that conformism and the inefficiencies of the planned economy stood in the way of good scientific and technical research. With the end of the Cold War and the opening of Soviet archives, the debate over Soviet science and technology has become more complex and less colored by ideology. The history of science and technology in Eastern Europe must be explored in a similar spirit.

East Germany makes for an interesting and unique case study on technology under Communism. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was a relative backwater at the time of the Russian Revolution, Germany was one of the top scientific and technological powers in the world at the end of the war. Its research and teaching infrastructure largely intact, East Germany inherited an academic tradition of excellence in science and a strong base for high-tech research in industry. Along with this went certain cultural attitudes, notably a consensus that science and technology should be left to the experts. Anxious to make use of German capabilities, the Soviet Union signaled a willingness to largely leave institutions and personnel alone after the war.

In time, de-Nazification, state control of industry, the introduction of the planned economy, and secret police surveillance had a considerable impact on the universities and industry. Nonetheless, there were clear lines of continuity at the universities and in industry in the conception and organization of scientific and technical research and teaching. A major reason for this is the deep respect the Communist leadership felt toward the German university tradition and German science.

German professionalism was also uninterrupted. Although bureaucracy clearly triumphed over scientific and technical professionalism in the Soviet Union, this was much less the case in East Germany. In part, this is due to the more pervasive impact of professionalization in German society. In Germany, the professional ideal was intimately bound up with aspirations to join the bourgeoisie, as well as with the reconfiguration of masculine identity in the nineteenth century. A period of de-professionalization in the Weimar Republic was followed by what was widely perceived as re-professionalization of engineering and industrial science in the Nazi era. Professional autonomy in these fields was sharply curtailed during the Communist era.

Nonetheless, a professional ethos persisted, thanks to traditions of university training, the persistence of the scientific ideal, the vitality of professional organizations, and continuities in research culture, particularly in large enterprises with a long history.
A third major difference between East Germany and the Soviet Union is the problematic transition from Nazism to Communism. With some exceptions, one could say that the Germans chose National Socialism, whereas Communism was imposed on East Germany from the outside.

Some felt nostalgia for what they had perceived in the Nazi era as increased autonomy, greater opportunities for professional advancement, and the sheer joy of technical work, untroubled by political or ethical considerations (particularly in the militarized sector of the economy). However, the Nazi era also set the stage for the Communist period. Engineers and scientists working in the high-tech sector became accustomed to working in high-security facilities, cut off from society, unconcerned with consumers, enjoying job security and generous support for industrial research, responsible only to the state, but completely dependent upon that state. These were the conditions many encountered in East German industrial research after the war. Ideologically, acceptance of the new political system was eased by a fourth German peculiarity, namely the cultural model of the apolitical scientist or engineer.

This ideology was based partly on the defense mechanisms developed by technical professionals working for the Nazis to justify themselves after the war. It was, however, also rooted in professional ideology, as propagated by the Verein Deutscher Ingenieure (Association of German Engineers) since the nineteenth century. This organization’s outlook combined a supposedly apolitical loyalty to Kaiser and nation with an ostensibly ideology-free dedication to technology.

Fifth, the existence of West Germany had a significant impact on the situation and mindset of the higher technical professions in East Germany. Particularly in the era before the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, West Germany provided a frame of reference that affected the way professionals saw their personal career trajectories, issues involving professional autonomy, and the economic and technical accomplishments of East German industry. The greater earnings, status, and mobility of their Western counterparts, the public role played by West German engineering organization, and the successes of West German industry engendered discontent in the GDR. Some of these disillusioned professionals fled across the border into West Germany. The SED and secret police tried to combat this brain drain, as well as real or imagined acts of sabotage and espionage.

The identification of these five East German characteristics is useful in understanding the process of negotiation involved in the creation of new technologies and, in particular, why this process occurred so differently in the GDR than in the USSR. Methods of analysis are drawn from disparate fields: social history, cultural history, the history of professions, the history of elites, the STS (“Science, Technology and Society”) school of the history of technology, analysis of the power structures of party and state (including the secret police), and biographical approaches. I have chosen to focus on high-tech industry rather than consumption and production of consumer goods, although very important debates have developed concerning that sector.

The economic choices made in the GDR, choices that had a profound impact on the availability of consumer goods and that contributed to the downfall of the GDR, cannot be understood without a full appreciation of the cultural values that ascribed a central role in industrial development to high-tech industries. I set out to study the East German obsession with high-tech industries as a cultural, political, social, ideological, and gendered phenomenon, a subject that, despite the extensive literature on these industries, has not really been explored in any great depth. (This literature has concerned itself mainly with a chronicling of technological progress within the histories of individual enterprises.) In addition, high-tech industries lend themselves well to the science-under-dictatorship theme because science and industrial scientists play a prominent role in these industries, because they had leverage and influence as highly favored industries, and because they were swept up in power conflicts to a greater extent than other industries.

This book is not about the ways in which innovation was blocked by the economic inefficiencies of the planned economy or false incentives created by the socialist system—a fine literature already exists on this subject.20 Instead, I attempt here to look at the way engineers and industrial scientists—who were motivated by a complex mixture of professionalism, individualistic careerism, socialist ideology, a belief in science, company traditions, and personal goals and ties—interacted with the dictatorial system. This will tell us something about the innovative process in the GDR, but also about many other things: the ways in which the SED mobilized society, the interaction of cultural forces coming from above but also from below, and the ways in which individuals conformed or did not conform to socialist norms in everyday situations.

My strategy is to delve deeply into individual examples, using biography as a vehicle. This methodology has been tried too little in research on East German technology. The analysis of biographies, autobiographies, and interviews illuminates vital aspects of the relationship between culture and technology, providing insights that institutional histories cannot. They make it possible to examine motivations, ideology, and career strategies.

A re-creation in detail of the interactions of individual and system in the factory, university, and research facility becomes possible. What biographical and autobiographical approaches to these microcosms show is that the actors were seldom driven by simple opportunism or by blindly ideological thinking. Rather, their lives were, like all lives, messy and driven by complex and contradictory forces. To understand the nature of life under dictatorship and its impact on science and technology, we must understand these complexities. This approach brings up problems with regard to sources, problems that are, however, surmountable.

Vast archives have opened up since the fall of Communism. Official reports— the reports of party and government agencies, industrial reports, and other papers from enterprises, socialist “combines,” and other organizations—give a fairly good picture of the engineering profession and the development of technologies. However, they do not make it possible to re-create in detail the process of negotiation among technical professionals, state, Soviet authorities, and society. Almost entirely missing is the realm of public debate that existed in the West. Biographical and autobiographical materials offer an alternative, yet they are extremely sparse for the GDR (unlike for the Soviet Union 21).

(Continued in source PDF: http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/chapters/0262012367intro1.pdf )

Secret Bush Administration Plan to Suspend US Constitution
"Continuity of Government" (COG) Provisions activated in 2001

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=10473
by Tom Burghardt Global Research, October 6, 2008


Several months before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved an updated version of the U.S. Army's secret operational Continuity of Government (COG) plans.

A draft document published by the whistleblowing website Wikileaks entitled, "Army Regulation 500-3, Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources. Army Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program," dated 19 January 2001, spells out changes in Army doctrine.

Issued by Headquarters, Department of the Army and signed off by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the Secretary of the Army, the document is affixed with a warning: "Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document." The restricted document as published by Wikileaks states:

History. This regulation is a revision of the original regulation that was effective on 10 July 1989. Since that time, no changes have been published to amend the original.

Summary. This regulation on the Army Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program has been revised to update Army COOP policy and extend the requirement for all-hazards COOP planning to all Army organizations. Classified information contained in the 1989 version of this AR has been removed and placed in a classified HQDA Operations Plan (OPLAN).

Applicability. This regulation applies to the Active Army, the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), and when federalized to the Army National Guard (ARNG). In the event of conflict between this regulation and approved OSD or JCS publications, the provisions of the latter will apply. ("Army Regulation 500-3, Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources. Army Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program," 19 January 2001, p. 3) [emphasis added]

"All-hazards COOP planning" is described as the means by which "the Army remains capable of continuing mission-essential operations during any situation, including military attack, terrorist activities, and natural or man-made disasters." While the Army stresses the updates described in AR 500-3 relate to chemical, biological, nuclear attacks, "natural disasters" and "technical or man-made disasters or accidents," current Army doctrine is also heavily weighted towards contingency planning for "civil disturbances."

Two national "civil disturbance" plans, Garden Plot and Cable Splicer have been operational since the 1960s. Researcher Frank Morales has detailed how,

Under the heading of "civil disturbance planning," the U.S. military is training troops and police to suppress democratic opposition in America. The master plan, Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2, is code-named, "Operation Garden Plot". Originated in 1968, the "operational plan" has been updated over the last three decades, most recently in 1991, and was activated during the Los Angeles "riots" of 1992, and more than likely during the recent anti-WTO "Battle in Seattle." ...

Equipped with flexible "military operations in urban terrain" and "operations other than war" doctrine, lethal and "less-than-lethal" high-tech weaponry, US "armed forces" and "elite" militarized police units are being trained to eradicate "disorder", "disturbance" and "civil disobedience" in America. Further, it may very well be that police/military "civil disturbance" planning is the animating force and the overarching logic behind the incredible nationwide growth of police paramilitary units, a growth which coincidentally mirrors rising levels of police violence directed at the American people, particularly "non-white" poor and working people. (Frank Morales, "U.S. Military Civil Disturbance Planning: The War at Home," in Police State America, ed. Tom Burghardt, Toronto/Montreal: Arm The Spirit/Solidarity, 2002, P. 59)

AR 500-3 should be viewed in this context. Plans for Continuity of Government have been in place since the 1950s. Originally conceived during the Cold War when fears of a nuclear strike envisaged by atomic war-gamers at the RAND Corporation, believed that an immobilization of government functions and a breakdown of civilian rule would follow a nuclear attack. But from their inception, COG planning has been shrouded in secrecy.

In addition to constructing nuclear-proof underground facilities where the civilian leadership could escape a decapitation strike, other COG provisions included a series of executive orders designating which officials would assume Cabinet-level posts and other Executive Branch positions. Officials so designated would constitute a "shadow government" should office holders be killed in an attack "or otherwise incapacitated."

However, when these and other Pentagon "civil disturbance" plans surfaced in the 1980s during the Iran-Contra hearings, they were roundly criticized by members of Congress, civil liberties groups and the media before disappearing once again, down Orwell's "memory hole." The inherent dangers implicit in such plans are that unelected Executive Branch officers could assume the Presidency and other appointed offices subject neither to congressional scrutiny nor judicial oversight.

Exercising sweeping emergency powers buried within Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs), unelected officials could suspend the Constitution, declare martial law and create an Executive Branch dictatorship that rests solely on the power of the U.S. military.

Most troubling, Executive Branch officials under secret rules of a COG regime could suppress and usurp the lawful powers of Congress and the Judicial Branch (by force of arms if deemed necessary) as a means of ensuring "cooperation" under a "unitary executive."

As we have seen, the "unitary executive" theory has been a salient feature of Bushist rule since the December 2000 judicial coup d'etat, when the Supreme Court's Bush v. Gore decision handed a contested election to George W. Bush by stopping the vote count in Florida.

Since assuming office, the administration has ruthlessly wielded executive power in order to achieve their antidemocratic agenda: from the looting of the economy through "deregulation," massive deficit spending and tax cuts for their corporate "clients," to waging a preemptive war of conquest in Iraq, the "unitary executive" has systematically shredded America's constitutional system of checks and balances.

The Bush administration put COG plans into operation for the first time in U.S. history in the hours directly following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. They have never been rescinded.

Their implementation involves a rotating staff of 75-150 senior government officials and others from every Cabinet department in two "secure, undisclosed locations" on the East Coast. However, key congressional representatives have been kept out of the loop and House and Senate leaders have said they were not informed the "shadow government" had "gone live."

So secretive are Bush administration plans that Peter DeFazio (D-OR), a member of the House Committee on Homeland Security, was denied access in 2007 to the classified version of the COG plans contained in top secret Presidential Decision Directive annexes. This too, is unprecedented.

While the Bush administration admitted that COG was activated in 2001, their disclosure came only after The Washington Post broke the story based on confidential administration sources troubled by the scope of the program and its secretive implementation.

Since the late 1980s, Rumsfeld was a habitu of COG exercises along with Vice President Dick Cheney. Indeed early COG drills had been organized by the right-wing Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). As investigative journalist Andrew Cockburn revealed in his definitive political biography of the former Defense Secretary:

This highly secret program was known as Project 908, and among the individuals earmarked to take power when disaster struck was Donald Rumsfeld. ... There, for several days, he would be immured in artificial caverns, staring at electronic displays streaming data of disaster and confusion, sleeping on cots and subsisting on the most austere rations. ...

Insofar as the COG games gave the illusion of reality, they taught Rumsfeld and his fellow players some dangerous lessons, particularly when the fall of the Soviet Union induced some changes in the usual scenarios. Although the exercises continued, still budgeted at over $200 million in the Clinton era, the vanished Soviets were now customarily replaced by terrorists. The terrorism envisaged however, was almost always state-sponsored. ...

There were other changes, too. In earlier times the specialists selected to run the "shadow government" had been drawn from across the political spectrum, Democrats and Republicans alike. But now, down in the bunkers, Rumsfeld found himself in politically congenial company, the players' roster being filled almost exclusively with Republican hawks. (Andrew Cockburn, Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy, New York: Scribner, 2007, pp. 85-86, 88)

As researcher Peter Dale Scott revealed, in early 2006 the Department of Homeland Security awarded a $385 million contract to a Halliburton subsidiary, KBR, to provide "temporary detention and processing facilities." Scott wrote,

The contract--announced Jan. 24 by the engineering and construction firm KBR--calls for preparing for "an emergency influx of immigrants, or to support the rapid development of new programs" in the event of other emergencies, such as "a natural disaster." The release offered no details about where Halliburton was to build these facilities, or when. ...

After 9/11, new martial law plans began to surface similar to those of FEMA in the 1980s. In January 2002 the Pentagon submitted a proposal for deploying troops on American streets. One month later John Brinkerhoff, the author of the 1982 FEMA memo, published an article arguing for the legality of using U.S. troops for purposes of domestic security. (Peter Dale Scott, "Homeland Security Contracts for Vast New Detention Camps," Pacific News Service, February 8, 2006)



The DHS contract to KBR had been preceded by the April 2002 creation of the Pentagon's Northern Command (NORTHCOM), specifically empowered by the Bush administration for domestic U.S. military operations in direct violation of Posse Comitatus prohibitions forbidding the use of the military for domestic law enforcement. At the time, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld called NORTHCOM's launch "the most sweeping set of changes since the unified command system was set up in 1946."

Sweeping indeed! Last month Army Times reported that the Army's "3rd Infantry Division's 1st Brigade Combat Team [BCT] has spent 35 of the last 60 months in Iraq patrolling in full battle rattle, helping restore essential services and escorting supply convoys. Now they're training for the same mission--with a twist--at home." According to Army Times,

Beginning Oct. 1 for 12 months, the 1st BCT will be under the day-to-day control of U.S. Army North, the Army service component of Northern Command, as an on-call federal response force for natural or manmade emergencies and disasters, including terrorist attacks. ...

But this new mission marks the first time an active unit has been given a dedicated assignment to NorthCom, a joint command established in 2002 to provide command and control for federal homeland defense efforts and coordinate defense support of civil authorities. ...

They may be called upon to help with civil unrest and crowd control or to deal with potentially horrific scenarios such as massive poisoning and chaos in response to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive, or CBRNE, attack. ...

The 1st BCT's soldiers also will learn how to use "the first ever nonlethal package that the Army has fielded," 1st BCT commander Col. Roger Cloutier said, referring to crowd and traffic control equipment and nonlethal weapons designed to subdue unruly or dangerous individuals without killing them.

"It's a new modular package of nonlethal capabilities that they're fielding. They've been using pieces of it in Iraq, but this is the first time that these modules were consolidated and this package fielded, and because of this mission we're undertaking we were the first to get it."

The package includes equipment to stand up a hasty road block; spike strips for slowing, stopping or controlling traffic; shields and batons; and, beanbag bullets. (Gina Cavallaro, "Brigade Homeland Tours Start Oct. 1," Army Times, September 8, 2008)

While senior Pentagon brass have downplayed the significance of deploying a BCT that has taken part in aggressive occupation duties to suppress the Iraqi people's resistance, Col. Lou Vogler, NORTHCOM's chief of future operations said in an interview that the military "will integrate with law enforcement to understand the situation and make sure we're aware of any threats." An article published by the Army News Service disclosed,

During the exercise, commanders and staff of the force will train, rehearse and exercise--from academic classes to making decisions and executing orders--all to help prepare them for the mission they will assume on Oct. 1, said Vogler.

"It's an opportunity for network building in an unprecedented assignment of forces," said [Marine Corps Lt. Col.] Shores. "DOD always had allocated contingency sourced forces--but this is precedent-setting network building with the forces that we ultimately will go out and execute with. It's an opportunity to get to know our forces, to see them in execution, to mission-orient them and be that much better--to be that much more responsive."

One goal of the exercise is to exercise with partners from the civilian agencies they would support. To that end, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other interagency representatives are participating to ensure integration with civilian consequence managers who would lead a response, said Vogler.

"The overall federal response builds on the local and state response in accordance with the incident command system and existing plans and processes that are out there," said Vogler. "The response force would supplement local efforts." ("Consequence Management Response Force to join Army Northern Command," Army News Service, September 15, 2008)

Vogler and Shores were discussing an exercise code-named Vibrant Response, that took place September 8-19 at Fort Stewart in Georgia. Three brigades form the core of NORTHCOM's Consequence Management Response Force: the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Army Division; the 1st Medical Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas, and the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. All three units participated in Vibrant Response.

As researcher and analyst Michel Chossudovsky comments:

The BCT is an army combat unit designed to confront an enemy within a war theater.

With US forces overstretched in Iraq, why would the Pentagon decide to undertake this redeployment within the USA, barely one month before the presidential elections?

The new mission of the 1st Brigade on US soil is to participate in "defense" efforts as well as provide "support to civilian authorities".

What is significant in this redeployment of a US infantry unit is the presumption that North America could, in the case of a national emergency, constitute a "war theater" thereby justifying the deployment of combat units.

The new skills to be imparted consist in training 1st BCT in repressing civil unrest, a task normally assumed by civilian law enforcement.

What we are dealing with is a militarization of civilian police activities in derogation of the Posse Comitatus Act. ("Pre-election Militarization of the North American Homeland. US Combat Troops in Iraq repatriated to 'help with civil unrest'," Global Research, September 26, 2008)

One scenario envisaged by Chossudovsky is that "civil unrest resulting from from the financial meltdown is a distinct possibility, given the broad impacts of financial collapse on lifelong savings, pension funds, homeownership, etc."

One might reasonably inquire, what "precedent-setting network" does the Army have in mind that would "ensure integration" with "civilian agencies" such as FEMA (a branch of Homeland Security)? As the World Socialist Web Site reports:

It is noteworthy that the deployment of US combat troops "as an on-call federal response force for natural or manmade emergencies and disasters"--in the words of the Army Times--coincides with the eruption of the greatest economic emergency and financial disaster since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Justified as a response to terrorist threats, the real source of the growing preparations for the use of US military force within America's borders lies not in the events of September 11, 2001 or the danger that they will be repeated. Rather, the domestic mobilization of the armed forces is a response by the US ruling establishment to the growing threat to political stability. (Bill Van Auken, "Army deploys combat unit in U.S. for possible civil unrest," World Socialist Web Site, 25 September 2008)

As the 2001 COOP planning document describes, a host of on-going Army plans and exercises have been revised by the Bush administration. In addition to Vibrant Response discussed above, they include: Plan EXCALIBUR, a COG Army training exercise; ADOBE, described by investigative journalist William M. Arkin as a "FEMA continuity of government special access program designation." Arkin describes special access programs or SAPs as,

Classified research and development, acquisition program, operation, intelligence activity, or plan that is so sensitive or critical that the value of the information warrants enhanced protection beyond that normally provided for access to Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret information. (William M. Arkin, Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World, Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005, p. 598)

The impetus for revising Army COOP was, according to AR 500-3 primarily because,

The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the former Soviet Union significantly reduced the probability of a major nuclear attack on CONUS but the probability of other threats has increased. Army organizations must be prepared for any contingency with a potential for interruption of normal operations. To emphasize that Army continuity of operations planning is now focused on the full all-hazards threat spectrum, the name "ASRRS" has been replaced by the more generic title "Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program." (p. 13)

Towards this end, the Rumsfeld-era document states that the Army's new "mission-critical" functions will be restructured so that, "Army COOP plans must ensure that the Army remains capable of continuing mission-essential operations during any situation, including military attack, terrorist activities, and natural or man-made disasters." (p. 13) The Army, following various contingencies analyzed in the document will "coordinate with mission-essential external organizations and agencies." (p. 14)

So sensitive are the political ramifications of these plans that under the heading, 3-12 Operational Security (OPSEC), the Army avers,

a. The success of COOP planning relies on denying access by unauthorized parties to information on COOP plans, procedures, capabilities and facilities.

b. Overhead imagery, signals intelligence, human sources, and exploitation of open literature during peacetime are threat capabilities used to gain knowledge of Army emergency plans, command and control systems, and facilities.

c. See Appendix B, Security Classification Guide, for guidance on the level of classification of COOP-related information. (COOP, op. cit., p. 20)

Appendix A of AR 500-3 lists relevant references for changes included in the COOP planning document. These include:

Section I
Required Publications
HQDA Operations Plan EXCALIBUR, 30 April 1999 (Being Revised)
HQDA Continuity of Operations Plan (cited in para 1-4.f)

Section II
Related Publications a related publication is merely a source of additional information. The user does not have to read it to understand this publication.

Executive Order 12656
National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP), 18 November 1988
DoD Directive (Dodd) 2000.12
DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program, 13 April 1999

CJCSM 3410.01
Continuity of Operations Plan for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (COOP-CJCS), 1 March 1999

Executive Order 12787
Prescribing the Order of Succession of Officers to Act as Secretary of Defense, 31 December 1991

DoDD 3020.26
Continuity of Operations (COOP) Policy and Planning, 26 May 1995

DoD 3020.26P
Continuity of Operations Plan, 21 June 2000 (Classified SECRET)

DoDD 3020.36
Assignment of National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Responsibilities to DoD Components, 2 November 1988

DoDD 3025.15
Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), 18 February 1997

The Federal Response Plan, April 1999
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 67, (Top Secret) Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG) and Continuity of Government (COG) Operations, Oct 21, 1998
Federal Preparedness Circular 65, Federal Executive Branch Continuity of Operations, (COOP), July 26, 1999

As Peter Dale Scott reported in CounterPunch, apparently members of Congress are considered "unauthorized parties" to be denied access "to information on COOP plans, procedures, capabilities and facilities." Congressman DeFazio had been denied access to the classified annexes of National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 51/HSPD 20) Scott wrote,

NSPD 51 contains "classified Continuity Annexes" which shall "be protected from unauthorized disclosure." Congressman DeFazio twice requested to see these Annexes, the second time in a letter cosigned by House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Bennie Thompson and Oversight Subcommittee Chairman Christopher Carney. It was these requests that the White House denied. ...

DeFazio's inability to get access to the NSPD Annexes is less than reassuring. If members of the Homeland Security Committee cannot enforce their right to read secret plans of the Executive Branch, then the systems of checks and balances established by the U.S. Constitution would seem to be failing.

To put it another way, if the White House is successful in frustrating DeFazio, then Continuity of Government planning has arguably already superseded the Constitution as a higher authority. (Peter Dale Scott, "The Showdown," CounterPunch, March 31, 2008)

With the stunning revelations published by Wikileaks, it is abundantly clear that top Bush administration officials were busily revising Continuity of Government plans, including "civil disturbance" contingencies for suspending the Constitution and imposing martial law, long before the 9/11 attacks.

Since that fatal and tragic day seven long years ago, we have been told repeatedly by the government and their media sycophants that 9/11 was the day "when everything changed."

We now know thanks to Wikileaks, that as with the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the unprecedented and lawless surveillance of Americans, the illegal detention and torture of prisoners of war, that Bush administration assertions are no more than a pack of murderous lies.

One fact is abundantly clear from the mass of conflicting evidence and assertions made by proponents of various theories surrounding the 9/11 events: AR 500-3 demonstrates that from the very first moments after being installed in office, the Bush regime was involved in a "controlled demolition" of the U.S. Constitution.

Tom Burghardt is a researcher and activist based in the San Francisco Bay Area. In addition to publishing in Covert Action Quarterly, Love & Rage and Antifa Forum, he is the editor of Police State America: U.S. Military "Civil Disturbance" Planning, distributed by AK Press.

CSIS, the Oil Crusaders
http://www.voltairenet.org/article30064.html
6 July 2004

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of Washington was created in 1962 by the initiative of the CIA director of Investigations. It became soon the favorite institution of the Cold War analysts who worked for Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. In the 80’s, Ronald Reagan recruited there his main Defense advisers, and in the early 90’s, it was just right there where Bush senior found Dick Cheney, minister of Defense during his term. By reviewing the reports on the coming energy crisis, CSIS developed during the last few years under the leadership of Senator Sam Nunn, and focused on the war against the emergence of nuclear powers, oil strategies and civil war.

In 1962, Ray S. Cline, who had been appointed CIA deputy director and favored by the movements that sanctioned the Bay of Pig’s fiasco, decided to establish a higher institute for strategic strategies to recruit experts and lead the ongoing work.

Ray S. Cline was an OSS agent during the Second World War, an analyst in the war in Korea, liaison agent between the American and British services, and finally CIA chief in Formosa (1958 - 1962). He created the People’s Anticommunist League of Asia and the Officers Academy of the Political Warfare in Taiwan [1].

During his career he did not allow the Agency to mix information gathering with its analysis and the actions that would derive from them. He developed in the CIA an Information division for data processing, identification of uncovered areas, drafting reports and send them to the relevant person. It was precisely under this principle that the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was created.

Ray S. Cline relied both on the retired admiral Arleigh Burke, founder of Polaris program, and the historian David M. Abshire. Together, they founded the Center on September 4, 1962, at the Jesuit University of Georgetown, in Washington, and hired Richard V. Allen as permanent director.

With the support of Relm-Earhart Foundation, CSIS hosted the first conference on economy and national security issues. More than 30 speakers attended, such as the young professor from Harvard, Henry Kissinger, James R. Schlesinger (future CIA director and Secretary of Defense), the economist Murray Weidenbaum (future president of the OECD Council) and Donald Rumsfeld (congressman from Illinois at that time).

In 1966, the Center presented its analysis on China-USSR dispute at the House of Representatives.

In 1968, CSIS made a political commitment. Richard V. Allen was the adviser to Richard Nixon during his campaign as candidate for matters on foreign policy and became later member of the National Security Council. David M. Abshire came to be assistant to the Secretary of State for relations with the Congress. In 1973, it carried out a campaign to increase public opinion’s awareness on energy matters and produced a documentary at Hanna-Barbera studio that was broadcasted to 40 million viewers. As a result, Senator Hubert Humphrey got the votes to build an oil pipeline in Alaska.

In 1974, President Gerald R. Ford, instructed an independent commission to come up with a proposal pertaining to reforms in government institutions for foreign policy. [2]. Among others, the President appointed David M. Abshire to be part of the commission. He worked with Anne L. Armstrong, who in turn became president of CSIS Executive Committee.

At a later date, Gerald Ford appointed Abshire as head of the radio propaganda system for eastern countries. CSIS created a working group under Frank Staton, CBS president and whose proposals were approved to reform public diplomacy. In the interim, Anne Armstrong was nominated Ambassador in London.

Under Carter’s administration, CSIS held hearings at the Congress to reveal the magnitude of the Cambodian genocide. An amazing documentary was also produced on a terrorist attack in Manhattan.

CSIS showed its satisfaction with the election of Ronald Reagan [3]. Richard V. Allen, who was one of his closest advisers during the campaign, became the National Security Adviser and David M. Abshire was appointed Ambassador to NATO. As for Anne Armstrong, she chaired the Intelligence Advisory Committee abroad.

The representative from the State of Wyoming (USA), Richard B. Cheney, joined the Center and headed a group of studies on the Grand Strategy. It was the time when the political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski, the strategist Edward N. Luttwak, and the journalists Arnaud de Borchgrave and Michael Ledeen came in to play their roles. The Center became then the place where everything pertaining to arms control was done under Senator Sam Nunn. As a result, the Nunn-Lugar with USSR agreement was signed, including the drafting of the Goldwater-Nichols of the Defense Department.

During 24 years, the Center recruited university professors, produced analysis and multiplied interventions on means of communication. The funding was through donations from the extreme right-wing banker Richard Mellon Scaife, the Prince Turki bin Abdul Aziz, head of the Saudi secret services and Mobil oil transnational.

However, the strong ideological and very poor academic nature of its works, including the systematic support provided by Reagan administration, affected the image of the University of Georgetown that decided to work on a separate basis. Therefore, in 1986, CSIS became a think tank (center for investigation, propaganda and dissemination of ideas, generally of political nature) independent, but it faced uncertainty for some years. In 1989, George H. Bush senior was elected to hold the post at the White House, and appointed Dick Cheney Secretary of Defense who worked with CSIS experts. The think tank was temporarily beheaded.

From Cold War to Energy Crisis

CSIS resumed its functions when its officials quit their official duties after Bill Clinton was elected. It became immersed on the Free Trade Area of the Americas. In 1995, it launched a campaign against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The alliance with Saudi Arabia that had been in secret during the Cold War and was consolidated with the Gulf War, gradually faded away.

As the energy crisis approached [4] those who advocated for the clash of civilization [5] joined the Center. Bernard Lewis, Samuel P. Huntington and Francis Fukuyama supervised the works. BP Amoco [6], Exxon and Chevron expressed their support and the Japanese millionaire Kasuo Inamori, founder of Kyocera group, and president and general manager of DDI Telecommunication Company, funded the establishment of a Leadership Academy: AILA. Anthony H. Cordesman, Gulf military specialist, took charge of a strategy program.

CSIS worked, above all, to strengthen the relations with Atlantic. It hosted in 1997 a major international conference under the chair of Zbigniew Brzezinski and Jacques Delors for Europe-America unity. After September 11 attacks, CSIS reviewed the rise of the so-called anti-Americanism in Europe. Together with the German Marshall Fund, a common statement was released to renew the transatlantic partnership [7] to enhance the ties between the European Union and NATO, and requested the United States to work with them on a Constitution draft for Europe.

In year 2000, CSIS, with the assistance of Ted Turner, CNN Director, created an international network of Atlantic institutions for strategic studies to carry out investigations pertaining to nuclear proliferation. The program, which is called Nuclear Threat Initiative - NTI, is headed by Sam Nunn and encouraged the recent G8 summits.

Currently, CSIS has a capital of 25 million dollars. Its operational annual budget is 22 million and has 190 investigators. It issues the quarterly magazine Washington Quarterly, including a number of newsletters and books. Apart from its headquarters in Washington, where over 600 conferences are hosted under Richard Fairbanks, there are also two local groups in Texas: one in Houston, headed by Robert Mosbacher (headed before by Kenneth L. Lay, president and general manager of Enron), and the other one in Dallas, which is led by Richard Cheney.

In order to enhance its image, it gathers about 20 millineries twice a year in an International Council chaired by Henry A. Kissingger [8].

On September 9, 2002, the Center for Strategic and International Studies celebrated its 40 years, and about 850 personalities were reunited for a gala dinner in New York [9]. The event was hosted by John Hamre, H.E. Cardinal of Washington Theodore J. McCarrick, Senator Sam Nunn, David Abshire, Anne Armstrong and Henry Kissinger. The US vice-president Dick Cheney, was unable to attend due to security reasons, but participated through a videoconference from his underground bunker. The conservative oil lobby was also present in the event.

[1] Thierry Meyssan: “The World Anticommunist League, international crime”, Voltaire, January 20, 2005

[2] Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, presided by the anti-Gaullist Ambassador Robert D. Murphy

[3] «Ronald Reagan contre l’Empire du Mal» text in French, Voltaire, June 7, 2004

[4] «Le deplacement du pouvoir petrolier», text in French, Voltaire, May 10, 2004

[5] Thierry Meyssan: "The Clash of Civilizations", Voltaire, December 7, 2004

[6] Arthur Lepic: «BP-Amoco, coalition petroliere anglo-saxonne», Voltaire, June 10, 2004

[7] Madeleine K. Albright, Harold Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank C. Carlucci, Warren Christopher, William S. Cohen, Robert Dole, Lawrennce S. Eagleburger, Stuart E. Eizenstat, Alexander M. Haif Jr, Lee H. Hamilton, John J. Hamre, Carla A. Hills, Sam Nunn, Paul H. O’Neil, Charles S. Robb, William V. Roth Jr., James R. Schlesinger: “Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership”, May 14, 2003. A summary of this book is available in our section international free Tribunes

[8] Thierry Meyssan: «Le retour d’Henry Kissinger», text in French, Voltaire, November 28, 2002

[9] CSIS French members are Helene Ahrveiler, Bertrand Collomb and Christine Lagarde.

The CSIS Agenda to Control US Policy and the World
http://us.altermedia.info/zionism/neocon-csis-agenda-for-world-domination_457.html
WRITTEN BY: ANGELA VALKYRIE

For over forty years now, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has been influencing the US government and world leaders about foreign policy issues that not only affect America, but the entire world.

The CSIS is composed of non-elected officials.

The fact that the CSIS is an organization led by un-elected officials who consult our government on US foreign policy and thus influence government decision making without our knowledge is unconstitutional.

The governing system under which we live should be made up solely of elected officials.


The CSIS is a privately funded, nonpartisan tax-exempt organization with its headquartered in Washington, D.C. No one is really sure who pays these guys’ salaries. Many suspect their salaries inadvertently come from America’s tax-payers. Because CSIS is so influential within the confines of the US Department of Defense it is more than likely that they are a beneficiary of taxpayer dollars. Although this has yet to be proven, we definitely need to have someone trace the money.

The US government takes its direction from these CSIS un-elected individuals. There is little if any mention of these people in the media.

Since the post WWII era, many organizations just like the CSIS have been manipulating the US government to their own power hungry advantage and to their own agenda, without our knowledge. It is time we recognize who these people are and their strategic effects on the US government. It is time to put a stop to their control over America, now! To do this, we need to inform the American people of each organization one by one, alerting Americans to the organizations involved in affecting changes in our country that are illegal and unconstitutional.

Although I will illustrate how other various Neoconservative groups are working together with the CSIS to affect our US government, this article will focus first and mostly on the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The CSIS is made up of Neoconservatives.

Neoconservatives are the bad guys.

The CSIS consists mostly of un-elected Neoconservative individuals who affect US government policy.

The CSIS Advisory Board is composed of both public- and private- sector policymakers, including several members of Congress.
The CSIS Washington Roundtable meets three to four times a year with members of Congress, executive branch officials, and other Washington experts to discuss pressing policy issues of the day.
Neoconservative views dominate the media.

CSIS Neoconservatives are mostly former leftists/liberals who converted to conservatism during the ’70′s and 80’s when Ronald Reagan became President.

“Neoconservatives are followers of Leo Strauss and are commonly known as Straussians. Leo Strauss, a Jew from Nazi German arrived in the US in 1938 and taught at the New School for Social Research. Later he taught at the University of Chicago where he managed to gather about a 100 Ph.D. students who later became disciples of Straussian philosophy and took up important posts in various institutions.”

– Paul Webster, “What it is and how it came about…”

In domestic policies Neocons tend to be “liberal” while being extremely militant about foreign affairs. They cross party lines and tend to be either “Compassionate Conservative” Republican

Christian Conservatives & Jewish Neoconservatives: Two sides of the same coin.

Regardless of their domestic “liberal” leanings, their major concern is always foreign policy specifically US relations with Israel in the Middle East. They strongly favor US military global interventions which would lead to America becoming the leader in a “New World Order.”

US Vice-President Dick Cheney, James Woolsey, Henry Kissinger, James Schlesinger are all current CSIS members.

Mark Neuman, a longtime Jewish Republican activist and White House official during the Reagan administration, in reference to his support of George W. Bush, was quoted as saying this about George W. Bush, “He will surprise people with how diverse his administration will actually be.”

Diverse meaning the coalition between Jewish Neoconservative Democrats, Christian Compassionate Conservative Republicans, Jewish Republicans, Black Republicans and Black Neoconservatives. All of these movements divide party lines because they all have the same political agenda, which is, in a nutshell, US global domination with Israel by its side. These guys are always blaming the “evil terrorists” for everything that is wrong in the world and assert America as the “good-guy-super-power-super-hero” of the world.

Now, that all sounds nice and dandy but it’s just not true. We’d all love America to be the “good-guy-super-hero” of the world. But, sadly, it’s not real, it’s not the truth, it’s just a pretty picture painted with propaganda and lies, framed by your television set. What is real? What they do not show us on TV. The blood, the oil, the money, the power, the greed, land grabbing, hatred and Zionism.

“There are no necessary evils in government.” – Andrew Jackson ( July 10, 1832)

Neoconservatives believe that there are necessary evils in the name of “defense” that need undertaking. These “defense” strategies are almost always offensive pre-emptive strikes.

“Happily the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance.” – President George Washington (1790)

The US Government has been giving military and monetary aid to Israel in their persecution of Palestinians and in the occupation of Palestinian land.

Palestinians have the right to return to their homeland. Because they are not being allowed to return to their native land, this angers many Arabs, many who’ve become “terrorists” in retaliation for Israeli occupation. These Arab revolutionaries or “terrorists” know that the United States of America is aiding Israel in the oppression of their people. This makes them very angry at the United States. They want the US to mind its own damn business. Under the US constitution that would be the right thing for us to do.

“Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world.” – President George Washington (September 17, 1796)

Our alliance with Israel is immoral, corrupt and unconstitutional.

CSIS Neocons are notorious for avoiding all explanations for terrorists’ hatred towards America, because that would bring questions about US globalization and imperialism. So they “explain” terrorists as “freedom haters” or “anti-Semitics” (ignoring the obvious fact that Arabs can’t be anti-Semitic since they are Semitic) who are insane suicide bombers that enjoy killing people and themselves just because they oppose freedom and American values. The reason for terrorist activity is vastly more complicated than this Neocon explanation. Alternative media sources are trying to get the real news out but in these paranoid “Patriot Act” times, it can be very difficult.

“In spite of constant reassurances about the term ‘democracy’ one is rarely allowed to criticize the country of Israel without suffering some punishing consequence for it. If you are a Jew you may survive the accusations of anti-Semitism but if you consistently express yourself online in any dissidence about Israel’s current politick, you will probably not be immune to cyber attack.”

- Mary La Rosa, The Chomskybot Code: Conduct in the Time of Terror

In the Middle East, CSIS Neocons support the most extremist elements in Israel such as the Likud Party. The Likud party is made-up of Jewish Zionists.

“The war in Iraq was conceived by 25 Neoconservative intellectuals, most of them Jewish, who are pushing President Bush to change the course of history.”

- Ari Shavit, “White Man’s Burden”

The CSIS supports the illegal occupation of Arab land. These Israeli settlements (a large percentage of the settlers are Jewish-Americans who are shipped from America to Israel via private funding) are illegal occupation and colonization of Palestinian land. Many American Neoconservative leaders in the CSIS and other similar Neoconservative Organizations promote the settlements, openly arguing that they will help to bring about “Armageddon” and the return of Christ.

These Ideological Zionist Neoconservatives are the dominant force over Republican Conservatives and Democrat Neoconservatives in Congress.

Ehud Barak, CSIS ALUMNI:

Well-known militant and Zionist, Ehud Barak was a researcher and adviser at CSIS in 1995.

Ehud Barak, as you probably know, was prime minister of Israel.

One of Israel’s most decorated soldiers, Barak enlisted in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) at the young age of 17, thoroughly brainwashed and fully dedicated to Zionism before reaching adulthood.

In 1982, no longer a teenager, but a “responsible” adult, he was appointed head of the Israeli Defense Force Intelligence branch; in 1986 he was appointed commander of the IDF central command; and in 1987 he was appointed deputy chief-of-staff.

In 1991 he assumed the post of chief of general staff and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general, the highest position in the Israeli military.

John Hamre, CSIS President:

The CSIS President and CEO John J. Hamre was previously the US deputy secretary of defense. Mr. Hamre, now, although he is not an elected official and subject to direct democratic control as elected officials are, is still very much a man of great influence with the Pentagon.

John J. Hamre is a member of the Christian Evangelical church, Washington’s Luther Place (formally called the Memorial Evangelical Lutheran Church).

John J. Hamre is a Christian Zionist.

Hamre was socially, politically and spiritually influenced (when he was younger) by the teachings of this church’s radical right-wing pastor (now retired), the Rev. John Steinbruck, a former Navy chaplain and outspoken political activist.

Mr. John J. Hamre Neoconservative Christian Zionist brings to this country and the world qualities not typically associated with senior defense officials. For example, he once gave a sermon at West Point over a year ago to cadets in the academy’s chapel. The unofficial sermon (Hamre is not a man of the cloth) was about his own personal spiritual and political journey, as he puts it, from “Bibles to bullets,” and the responsibilities that come with it.

Sam Nunn, CSIS Chairman:

The CSIS is under direction by the board of trustees chairman and former senator Sam Nunn. Sam Nunn is the senior partner in the law firm of King & Spalding, where he focuses his practice on international and corporate matters. He served as a U.S. senator from Georgia for 24 years (1972-1996).

He is also a board member of the following publicly held corporations: The Coca-Cola Company; Dell Computer Corporation; General Electric Company; Internet Security Systems, Inc.; Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.; and the Chevron Texaco Oil Corporation. Sam Nunn has big oil interests in US-occupied Iraq.

James Woolsey, CSIS Trustee:

R. James Woolsey joined Booz Allen Hamilton in July, 2002, as a Vice President and officer in the firm’s Global Assurance practice located in McLean, Virginia.

During the twelve years he has served in the U.S. Government Mr. Woolsey has held Presidential appointments in two Democratic and two Republican administrations. Neoconservatives cross party lines because of their divided beliefs that don’t adequately fit into either the Democratic Party or the Republican Party. Neoconservatives are truly a separate party and should therefore create a new party for themselves. But that move would bring their true agenda to light and deceit is the best thing the Neoconservative Party has going for them right now.

Woolsey was Director of Central Intelligence in 1993-95.

Woolsey also served as Ambassador to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Vienna, 1989-1991.

Woolsey was a member of The National Commission on Terrorism, 1999-2000; The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the U.S. (Rumsfeld Commission), 1998; The President’s Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform, 1989; The President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission), 1985-1986; and The President’s Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission), 1983.

Mr. Woolsey is presently a principal in the Homeland Security Fund of Paladin Capital Group and a member of the Board of Directors of four corporations with plans to set up occupation in Iraq.

Mr. Woolsey is currently the Chairman of the Advisory Boards of the Clean Fuels Foundation and the New Uses Council, and a Trustee of the Center for Strategic & International Studies. He also serves on the National Commission on Energy Policy.

James Woolsey is an oil-hungry corporate executive.

“We have regarded the bulk of the oil-producing countries in the Middle East for many years as our filling station.”

- R. James Woolsey

Woolsey also serves as Vice Chairman of the Advisory Board of Global Options LLC.

He is a frequent contributor of articles to major publications, and from time to time gives public speeches and media interviews, on the subjects of foreign affairs, defense, energy, critical infrastructure protection and resilience, and intelligence.

James Woolsey enjoys striking fear into the hearts of Americans and Arabs because it makes it easier to control them.

“We want you to be nervous. We want you to realize now for the fourth time in 100 years, this country is on the march and we are on the side of those whom you most fear, your own people.”

-R. Woolsey, “World War IV”

James Woolsey is a Christian Zionist.

“We are all Jews… I sometimes get asked these days if I’m Jewish — it’s my neoconish views on defense and foreign affairs, I suppose. For a while I would just say, ‘No, Presbyterian,’ but I’ve started saying instead, ‘Well, I anchor the Presbyterian wing of JINSA’ [the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs].”

- R. James Woolsey, “We are all Jews”

James Woolsey is an angry paranoid Zionist who thinks everyone is a Nazi.

“We’ve got to get rid of the Ba’athists the way we got rid of the Nazis.”

– R. Woolsey

I’d personally like to know who he thinks “we” are.

Contact Info:

R. James Woolsey
Vice President
Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc.
8283 Greensboro Drive
McLean, VA 22102-3838
Phone: 703-377-0809
Fax: 703-902-3533
E-mail: woolsey_jim@bah.com

Mr. Woolsey is also a leading member of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). He is on the board of JINSA Advisory Committee. The intermarriage between JINSA and CSIS is strong.

The JINSA mandate: To inform the American defense and foreign affairs community about the important role Israel can and does play in bolstering democratic interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

JINSA

The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) is committed to a strong national military policy for the United States and Israel. JINSA advises the US government on foreign policy security matters for both the United States and the State of Israel and strengthening the strategic relationship between these two nations.

Founded as a result of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, JINSA communicates with, advises and disseminates propaganda to the US government national security establishment and the general public via the media regarding Neoconservative ideologies on the role Israel plays in bolstering corporate American global interests. JINSA’s main focus is the Zionist link between America and Israel and ensuring the US/Israeli domination of the Middle East and perhaps, eventually the entire Globe. This is why the CSIS logo is a globe and the JINSA logo is a Star of David positioned next to the Americana 5 pointed star.

Contact Info:

Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
1779 Massachusetts , NW, Ste 515
Washington, D.C. 20036
202.667-3900 Fax 202.667-0601
jinsa.org

CSIS Arab-Israeli “Peace” Process Advisors:

• Anthony Cordesman
• Richard Fairbanks
• Judith Kipper
• Alexander T. J. Lennon

CSIS Defense Policy Advisors:

• Dallas C. Brown III: National security strategy, national military strategy, the interagency process; peacekeeping operations; armor and mechanized operations

• Richard Burt: Germany; NATO
• Anthony Cordesman: Middle East security issues; national security; defense budgets; defense intelligence
• Ralph Cossa: U.S. national security strategy
• John Hamre: Department of Defense
• Charles Herzfeld: Defense technology and policy; information technology and high performance computing; naval problems; intelligence issues; technology innovation
• Max M. Kampelman: Arms negotiations
• Edward Luttwak: Budget, organization, global strategy
• Peinhardt: U.S. defense and military policy, Army National Guard affairs, military recruiting, personnel information systems
• Jeffery M. Ranney: Defense budget forecasting; strategic planning; defense economics
• Harlan Ullman: Budget, defense policy, unconventional warfare
• John Welch: Defense acquisition; work force; planning, valuing and executing initiatives
• Dov Zakheim: Defense policy, resources strategy, budget

CSIS MILITARY ADVISORS:

The CSIS Military Advisors bring to the CSIS the advice, experience and expertise of senior military personnel from all branches of the U.S. armed forces. The CSIS Military Advisors of 2003-2004 are:
Lt. Col. Michael Coss, Col. Hung Chieh Liao, Capt. Steve Vanderplas, Lt. Col. Scott Gorske, Lt. Commander Lance Lesher, and Lt. Col. John K. Love.

Some of these CSIS Military Advisors are pictured below:
[Photos coming soon.]

Other CSIS Members:

Henry A. Kissinger, Richard Fairbanks, Benjamin W. Heinman, Jr., Murray Weidenbaum, William A. Schreyer, James R. Schlesinger and William S. Cohen.

The US/Israeli Megalomaniacal Neoconservative Conspiracy:

On August 11th, 2003, Howard Dean, the Democrat presidential candidate hopeful, said, “[President Bush is] an engaging person, but I think for some reason he’s been captured by the Neoconservatives around him.” And I, also, believe this to be true.

“Alexander M. Haig, Jr., – former Secretary of State under Ronald Reagan who currently runs Worldwide Associates, Inc., a company that assists ‘corporations around the world in providing strategic advice on global political, economic, commercial and security matters’; James Woolsey – former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for two years under Bill Clinton and one of the earliest of drum beaters for taking out Saddam Hussein; Richard Perle – the neoconservative icon who is one of the chief architects of Bush’s Middle East policy; Charles Krauthammer – a regular columnist with the Washington Post who is a ‘hawk’s hawk’; Michael Ledeen – currently occupying the Freedom Chair at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.; Frank Gaffney – founder and president of the Washington, DC-based Center for Security Policy and columnist with the Rev. Sun Myung Moon’s Washington Times; and Arnaud de Borchgrave – Senior Adviser and Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former editor-in-chief of the Washington Times.

“A recent article in the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz will give you an idea of how incredibly tangled-up these people and issues are. Akiva Eldar’s piece, ‘Perles of wisdom for the Feithful,’ reports that in 1996, Richard Perle (Benador client) and Doug Feith, currently the deputy defense minister and according to Eldar ‘the No. 3 person in the Pentagon’s hierarchy,’ met at the request of Benjamin Netanyahu who was then taking ‘his first steps as prime minister.’ They prepared a report for the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, a think tank with offices in Washington, DC and Jerusalem.

“Perle, Feith and several others ‘could not have known that four years later… the working paper they prepared, including plans for Israel to help restore the Hashemite throne in Iraq, would shed light on the current policies of the only superpower in the world,’ Eldar writes. The paper’s major theme was assuring the security of Israel. One scenario advanced was to encourage ‘investment in Jordan [in order] to shift structurally Jordan’s economy away from dependence on Iraq; and diverting Syria’s attention by using Lebanese opposition elements to destabilize Syrian control of Lebanon.’

“Grand conspiracy? No. Megalomaniacal vision of unleashed U.S. power? You bet.”

- Bill Berkowitz @ WorkingForChange.com

Vice-President Dick Cheney is a member of both JINSA and CSIS. Dick Cheney’s wife Lynne is also member of CSIS and the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI.)

The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) for Public Policy Research, founded in1943 approaching the end of the WWII era, is located in Washington, D.C. It is an organization dedicated to strengthening US national defense, US Jewish cultural and political institutions of and related to Israel. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is fundamentally made up of mostly scholars, corporate executives and politicians with Neoconservative leanings to the right. It is more or less a central “think tank” of Zionism. They oversee and make decisions regarding trade, economics, social welfare, government tax, spending, US policies on foreign affairs and all US defense policies related to Israel and the entire Middle East.

The AEI is considered by the US government to be America’s foreign policy “experts.”

The AEI website link: http://www.ajc.org/

AEI representatives testify repeatedly before congressional committees and provide consultation to all branches of the US government.

The Neoconservative think tank is a conglomeration of various groups including, CSIS, JINSA, AEI, ZOA, AIPAC, The Likud Party, the US Government, etc.

AIPAC:

AIPAC is the Pro-Israel lobbying organization in America helps Neoconservative think tank bills become law.

JINSA, CSIS, AEI, AIPAC – Michael Leeden, Richard Perle and the Cheneys

JINSA, CSIS, AEI and AIPAC are all Neoconservative Zionist think tank organizations working together to control US government policy, change laws and basically transform America to fit their ideals and agenda. These organizations were not formed with the interest of the American people in mind.

“Michael Leeden, a co-founder with [Richard] Perle of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) whose wife Barbara is a major player in the rightwing Republican leadership on Capitol Hill; Jeane Kirkpatrick; and Joshua Muravchik, whose father, Emanuel, was also close to Podhoretz as he moved rightward through the 1970s.

“Though she doesn’t focus much on foreign-policy issues, Lynne Cheney, the vice president’s wife, also hangs her hat at AEI, while the vice president’s daughter Elizabeth is now serving as deputy secretary of state for near east affairs.

“While the Cheneys, unlike the mostly Jewish neo-conservatives who began their political evolution on the left, have always been rock- ribbed, right wing, Rocky Mountain Republicans, it appears that they have joined the larger family or are at least tying their family fortunes together.”

- Jim Lobe of Dawn/InterPress News Service, “Family ties connect US right, Zionists”

These Zionist Neoconservative organizations are mostly made up of un-elected officials. They are unconstitutional and un-American organizations that have an iron clad hold on our country and our lives as American citizens.

This needs to change. It can change with our US citizenship involvement in government lobbying with the Senate and Congress. “We the people” can regain our country and fight for our freedom from corporate tyranny perpetuated by these Neoconservatives. But first we have to know who the “bad guys” involved are and how their evil infrastructure works. Next we have to complain to the Senate and Congress.

Use your power as voters and US citizens. Our founding fathers decreed that WE rule this land and it is our long overdue responsibility to oust these treasonistic traitors of the American way. The future of America and the world depends upon it! If we do nothing, we are as much to blame as these corrupt corporate tyrants controlling our government.

I plead with all of you. Work to take back our country and our government today. Release our people from the tyranny of this Zionist occupied government once and for all!

“When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the Earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such from, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.” – Thomas Jefferson, “Declaration of Independence,” July 4, 1776

“Bush himself laid out the vision that tugs at the hearts of Neocons today: a ‘liberated Iraq’ and a transformed Arab Middle East prepared to make peace with Israel on Likud terms.”

- Jim Lobe – Dawn/InterPress News Service, “Family ties connect US right, Zionists”

Yes, it is time to impeach President George Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney. Or at least knock them out of office in up and coming election 2004!


“GET NEO-CONS OUT OF THE U.S. GOVT!!

Private Ideological Think Tanks Have Created the Rationale for War on Iraq, Iran, Syria and North Korea. Their Representatives Ceaselessly Promote War in the Media.

LET’S GET ALL THESE WARMONGERS
OUT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT!!

Let’s protest them via e-mail, mail, fax, and non-violent protest at their offices–which are conveniently located within a few blocks of each other! Let’s demand congressional investigations of these warmongers’ REAL agendas – and sources of income!”

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